Idaho State AFL-CIO v. Leroy, AFL-CIO

• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Idaho
• Writing for the Court: DONALDSON; Upon filing of plaintiffs' complaint; BISTLINE; Givens; BISTLINE; In Toncray, supra
• Citation: 110 Idaho 691,718 P.2d 1129
• Parties: , 121 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2531 IDAHO STATE, an unincorporated association: James E. Kerns, individually, and as President of the Idaho State; International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America Local 983; United Transportation Union Local 78; International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local 449; Brotherhood of Painters and Allied Trades, Local 764; Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers Union Local 2632; Boise City Typographical Union Local 271; Idaho American Postal Workers Union; H. Fred Liebenau, individually and in his capacity as a member and president of the Boise City Typographical Union Local; Glen Hatch individually, and in his capacity as a member and president of the Brotherhood of Painters and Allied Trades Local Union; Leland Raymond, individually, and in his capacity as a member and officer of United Transportation Union Local 78; Rex Cherry, individually, and in his capacity as a member and business manager of International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers Local 449; Carter L. Wilson III, individually, and in his capacity as a member and president of Idaho American Postal Workers Union; Steven H. Gentry, individually, and in his capacity as a member and president of Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers Local 2632; Paul McKendrick, individually, and in his capacity as secretary- treasurer of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, Local 983; and Warbonnet Electric, Inc., an Idaho corporation; Plaintiffs-Respondents, Cross-Appellants, v. David LEROY, in his capacity as President of the Idaho Senate, and his delegates; Tom Stivers, in his capacity as Speaker of the Idaho House of Representatives, and his delegates; Pete Cenarrusa, as Secretary of State for the State of Idaho; Jim Jones, as Attorney General of the State of Idaho; Shawn Anderson, as Bannock County Prosecuting Attorney and on behalf of all those similarly situated, their successors and assigns, Defendants-Appel
• Decision Date: 29 January 1986
• Docket Number: AFL-CIO,No. 16074,No. 271,No. 764

Page 1129

718 P.2d 1129 110 Idaho 691, 121 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2531 IDAHO STATE AFL-CIO, an unincorporated association: James E. Kerns, individually, and as President of the Idaho State AFL-CIO; International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America Local 983; United Transportation Union Local 78; International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local 449; Brotherhood of Painters and Allied Trades, Local 764; Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers Union Local 2632; Boise City Typographical Union Local 271; Idaho American Postal Workers Union; H. Fred Liebenau, individually and in his capacity as a member and president of the Boise City Typographical Union Local No. 271; Glen Hatch individually, and in his capacity as a member and president of the Brotherhood of Painters and Allied Trades Local Union No. 764; Leland Raymond, individually, and in his capacity as a member and officer of United Transportation Union Local 78; Rex Cherry, individually, and in his capacity as a member and business manager of International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers Local 449; Carter L. Wilson III, individually, and in his capacity as a member and president of Idaho American Postal Workers Union; Steven H. Gentry, individually, and in his capacity as a member and president of Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers Local 2632; Paul McKendrick, individually, and in his capacity as secretary- treasurer of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, Local 983; and Warbonnet Electric, Inc., an Idaho corporation; Plaintiffs-Respondents, Cross-Appellants,
v.
David LEROY, in his capacity as President of the Idaho Senate, and his delegates; Tom Stivers, in his capacity as Speaker of the Idaho House of Representatives, and his delegates; Pete Cenarrusa, as Secretary of State for the State of Idaho; Jim Jones, as Attorney General of the State of Idaho; Shawn Anderson, as Bannock County Prosecuting Attorney and on behalf of all those similarly situated, their successors and assigns, Defendants-Appellants, Cross-Respondents. No. 16074. Supreme Court of Idaho. Jan. 29, 1986.
Rehearing Denied May 21, 1986.

Page 1130

[110 Idaho 692] Jim Jones, Atty. Gen., P. Mark Thompson, Deputy Atty. Gen., Boise, for defendants-appellants, cross-respondents.

Patricia L. McDermott, Douglas James Balfour, and Gaylen L. Box, Pocatello, for plaintiffs-respondents, cross-appellants.

DONALDSON, Chief Justice.

On January 31, 1985 the Idaho Legislature overrode the Governor's veto and enacted H.B. 2, a "right to work" bill. The bill was designated as an "emergency bill" pursuant to art. 3, § 22 of the Idaho Constitution which allowed the legislature to thereby render it immediately effective.

That same day, the plaintiffs filed a complaint and motion in Sixth Judicial District Court, Bannock County, for a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction to enjoin (1) defendants David Leroy, in his capacity as President of the Idaho Senate, and Tom Stivers, in his capacity as Speaker of the Idaho House of Representatives, from authenticating the bill as law; (2) defendant Pete Cenarrusa, Idaho Secretary of State, from filing or certifying the bill as law; and (3) defendants Jim Jones, Idaho Attorney General, and Shawn Anderson, Bannock County Prosecuting Attorney, on behalf of all prosecuting attorneys of Idaho similarly situated, from taking any action to enforce the provisions of the bill.

Plaintiffs are labor organizations, officers and members of those organizations, and an employer of union labor. Defendants, as noted above, are legislative officers, the Secretary of State, the Attorney

Page 1131

[110 Idaho 693] General, and the prosecuting attorneys of the state of Idaho.

The complaint charges that H.B. 2 would prevent plaintiffs from continuing to enjoy the protection of collective bargaining agreements or entering into new collective bargaining agreements, thereby abrogating valuable property rights and irreparably damaging plaintiffs; that H.B. 2 would abrogate federally guaranteed rights; that H.B. 2 violates the supremacy clause of the United States Constitution; that H.B. 2 violates the plaintiffs' constitutional rights of assembly and freedom of speech; that H.B. 2 violates the equal protection clause of the United States Constitution; that H.B. 2 violates the United States Constitution and the Idaho Constitution in that it impairs the obligation of contract; that plaintiffs are deprived of property rights without due process of law in violation of the constitutions of the United States and the state of Idaho; and lastly, that the emergency clause contained in H.B. 2, which purports to make H.B. 2 effective upon its passage, impairs plaintiffs' constitutional right under the referendum provision of art. 3 § 1 of the Idaho Constitution. Plaintiffs further allege that the declaration of emergency in H.B. 2 was ineffective, invalid and void since no such emergency actually existed.

We emphasize that the only portion of plaintiffs' complaint which is presently before this Court is that relating to the validity of the emergency clause in H.B. 2 and the temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction issued by the district court based on the alleged invalidity of the emergency clause.

Upon filing of plaintiffs' complaint, Judge George Hargraves of the Sixth Judicial District Court issued a temporary restraining order and set a hearing on the preliminary injunction for February 5, 1985. Judge Hargraves then referred the case to Judge Dell Smith in Bannock County for final determination.

The defendants then filed a petition for a writ of prohibition with this Court to prevent Judge Hargraves or Judge Smith from enforcing the temporary restraining order. On February 1, 1985, this Court issued an order and alternative writ staying the enforcement of the temporary restraining order against defendant Cenarrusa. This Court did not, however, stay the hearing on the motion for preliminary injunction set for February 5.

Before the hearing, defendants moved for a change of venue to Ada County pursuant to I.C. § 5-402. On February 5, 1985, the hearing to show cause was held before Judge Smith on the preliminary injunction. The next day, defendants moved to strike the testimony and evidence presented at the hearing since plaintiffs failed to give sufficient notice to defendants of their intent to produce testimony and evidence at the hearing. Defendants also argued that their motion for a change of venue had to be determined before any other proceedings. Defendants then moved to stay all proceedings until the court ruled on their motion for change of venue.

Defendants' motion for a stay was denied and further hearings were held on February 12. The next day, Judge Smith denied defendants' motion to strike, but granted their motion for a change of venue to the Fourth Judicial District, Ada County. The judge also extended the temporary restraining order against defendants Jones, Anderson and all prosecuting attorneys in Idaho for fourteen additional days.

On February 14, 1985, plaintiffs moved in Fourth Judicial District Court for a preliminary injunction or extension of the temporary restraining order beyond the February 27th deadline. A hearing was held before Judge Robert Newhouse on February 27 at which time he extended the temporary restraining order until further order of the court.

On April 5, 1985, defendants answered plaintiffs' complaint for injunctive and declaratory relief and, along with other defenses, challenged the jurisdiction of the court to review the legislature's declaration of an emergency.

Page 1132

[110 Idaho 694] On May 14, 1985, Judge Newhouse issued his Memorandum Decision in which he interpreted art. 3, § 22 (the power of the legislature to declare an emergency in the preamble or body of an act) and art. 3, § 1 (the power of the people to demand a referendum on any act passed by the legislature) of the Idaho Constitution. Judge Newhouse concluded that the legislature's declaration of emergency would defeat the voters' right to a referendum. Therefore, he granted the preliminary injunction until such time as a trial could decide whether the legislature acted improperly by enacting the emergency provision.

On May 23, 1985, the defendants filed a petition for a writ of prohibition with this Court against Judge Newhouse. This Court denied the petition but granted permission to the defendants to file an appeal of Judge Newhouse's decision pursuant to I.A.R. 12. This Court further ordered that Judge Newhouse's preliminary injunction would continue in full force and effect until further order of this Court.

On July 1, 1985, defendants filed their Notice of Appeal seeking a determination whether the legislature's declaration of emergency in an act is immune from judicial review. On July 15, plaintiffs filed a Notice of Cross-Appeal seeking a determination whether Judge Smith erred when he ordered a change of venue from Bannock County to Ada County; and whether Judge Newhouse erred when he ordered a trial to decide if an emergency actually existed when H.B. 2 was passed, where the legislative record on the bill was already before the Court.

For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the change of venue granted by Judge Smith of the Sixth Judicial District, vacate the preliminary injunction issued by Judge Newhouse of the Fourth Judicial District, and remand for further proceedings on plaintiffs' claims not raised in this appeal.

I.

Legislative Declarations of Emergency

The central issue on this appeal is whether the courts, in the particular circumstances of this case, may properly review the legislature's declaration of emergency in legislation it passes. This issue touches on seemingly conflicting provisions of the Idaho Constitution and the Idaho Code. Our analysis must be made in light of the doctrine of the separation of powers among...