Iglesias v. True, Case No. 19-cv-00415-JPG

• Decision Date: 25 July 2019
• Docket Number: Case No. 19-cv-00415-JPG
• Citation: 403 F.Supp.3d 680
• Parties: Cristina Nichole IGLESIAS (a.k.a. Cristian Noel Iglesias), Plaintiff, v. Warden TRUE, Ian Connors, Deborah Schult Alix McLearen, Donald Trump and John Does #1-10, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Illinois

403 F.Supp.3d 680

Cristina Nichole IGLESIAS (a.k.a. Cristian Noel Iglesias), Plaintiff,

v.Warden TRUE, Ian Connors, Deborah Schult Alix McLearen, Donald Trump and John Does #1-10, Defendants.

Case No. 19-cv-00415-JPG

United States District Court, S.D. Illinois.

Signed July 25, 2019

Cristian Noel Iglesias, Marion, IL, pro se.

MEMORANDUM & ORDER

GILBERT, District Judge:

Plaintiff Cristina Iglesias, an inmate with the Federal Bureau of Prisons ("BOP") who is currently incarcerated at the United States Penitentiary located in Marion, Illinois ("USP Marion"), brings this action for alleged violations of his constitutional rights by persons acting under the color of federal authority that occurred in connection with her placement and treatment in a male-only prison facility under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents , 403 U.S. 388, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 L.Ed.2d 619 (1971), the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. , and the Rehabilitation Act ("RA"), 29 U.S.C. §§ 794 –94e. Plaintiff seeks injunctive, declaratory and monetary relief.

This case is now before the Court for preliminary review of the Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Under Section 1915A, the Court is required to screen prisoner complaints to filter out non-meritorious claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). Any portion of a complaint that is legally frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or asks for money damages from a defendant who by law is immune from such relief must be dismissed. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). At this juncture, the factual allegations of the pro se complaint are to be liberally construed. Rodriguez v. Plymouth Ambulance Serv. , 577 F.3d 816, 821 (7th Cir. 2009).

Complaint

Plaintiff makes the following allegations in the Complaint (Doc. 1): Plaintiff is a transgendered inmate, anatomically male but identifying as female.¹ (Id. , pp. 2, 7). She has been diagnosed with gender dysphoria and has been receiving hormone replacement therapy since 2015. (Id. , pp. 7, 48). Plaintiff has also been diagnosed with borderline personality disorder. (Id. , p. 48). She is being held at USP Marion, a male-only facility, and is required to "liv[e] outwardly as a male." (Id. , pp. 8-9). Plaintiff has a history of suicidal ideation and attempts, as well as one attempt at self-castration. (Id. ).

Plaintiff has requested transfer to a female institution on multiple occasions, which have been denied. (Id. , p. 9). She has been harassed and abused on multiple occasions. (Id. , p. 10). She has also requested sex reassignment surgery, laser hair removal and for her official paperwork to be altered to reflect that she is female. (Id. , pp. 9-11). All of these requests have either been denied or drawn a string of non-responses delaying (and constructively denying) the requested relief. Plaintiff identifies another male-to-female transgendered inmate—Peter Langdon—who was transferred from USP Marion to a female facility in Texas. (Id. , p. 20). Plaintiff asserts that they are similarly situated in all other respects.

Further, Plaintiff states that the Bureau of Prisons' Transgender Offender Manual was recently revised to require the Transgender Executive Council ("TEC") to "use biological sex as the initial determination for [facility] designation[.]" (Id. , p. 84). The policy also instructs the TEC to consider issues such as health and safety of the transgendered inmate, behavioral history, overall demeanor, likely interactions with other inmates, etc. (Id. ). The policy further states that assignment based on identified gender "would be appropriate only in rare cases after consideration of all of the [stated] factors and where there has been significant progress toward transition as demonstrated by medical and mental health history." (Id. ).

Based on the allegations in the Complaint, the Court finds it convenient to reorganize the pro se action into the following enumerated Counts:

Count 1: Eighth Amendment claim for deliberate indifference to a serious medical condition against Defendants

Count 2: First Amendment claim for denial of Plaintiff's requests to have her official paperwork reflect a sex and gender of "female".

Count 3: Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection "class of one" claim.

Count 4: Eighth Amendment claim for failure to protect her from abuse and sexual assault.

Count 5: ADA/RA claims for failure to accommodate a serious disability.

Count 6: Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment claim for gender discrimination against Defendants Trump, John Doe #10 (U.S. Attorney General), and John Doe #9 (Director of the Bureau of Prisons) for formulating and implementing a discriminatory regulation requiring use of biological sex as the initial determinant for facility placement.

The parties and the Court will use these designations in all future pleadings and orders, unless otherwise directed by a judicial officer of this Court. Any other claim that is mentioned in the First Amended Complaint but not addressed herein is considered dismissed without prejudice as inadequately pled under Twombly .²

Discussion

Count 1

Plaintiff's first claims fall under the general umbrella of deliberate indifference to a serious medical need—that her gender dysphoria causes her significant suffering in being forced to live as a man amongst male prisoners, and that she has been denied the accommodations and treatments which would alleviate that suffering. The Supreme Court has recognized that deliberate indifference to the serious medical needs of prisoners may constitute cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment. Estelle v. Gamble , 429 U.S. 97, 104, 97 S.Ct. 285, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976) ; Carlson v. Green , 446 U.S. 14, 100 S.Ct. 1468, 64 L.Ed.2d 15 (1980). To prevail on a claim for deliberate indifference to a serious medical need, there are "two high hurdles, which every inmate-plaintiff must clear."

Dunigan ex rel. Nyman v. Winnebago Cnty. , 165 F.3d 587, 590 (7th Cir. 1999). First, the plaintiff must demonstrate he suffered from an objectively serious medical condition. Id. at 591-92. Second, the plaintiff must establish the individual prison officials were deliberately indifferent to that condition. Id.

Gender dysphoria has generally been recognized as an objectively serious medical condition within the 7th Circuit for more than 30 years. See Meriwether v. Faulkner , 821 F.2d 408, 413 (7th Cir. 1987) and Mitchell v. Kallas , 895 F.3d 492, 499 (7th Cir. 2018). The first hurdle is therefore cleared.

However, "a defendant cannot be liable under Bivens on the basis of respondeat superior or supervisory liability, rather, there must be individual participation and involvement by the defendant.... each Government official, his or her title notwithstanding, is only liable for his or her own misconduct." Arnett v. Webster , 658 F.3d 742, 757 (7th Cir. 2011) (internal citations omitted). To establish deliberate indifference, a plaintiff must show that a given defendant "actually knew of and disregarded a substantial risk of harm." Mitchell , 895 F.3d at 498 (7th Cir. 2018) (citation omitted). Here, Plaintiff frames each of her deliberate indifference allegations against "Defendants" as a whole, with no indication of who knew what facts that should have led them to conclude that Plaintiff's medical needs were not being served. This makes it impossible to determine from the body of the Complaint which of the Defendants had sufficient knowledge and personal involvement to support a claim that they were deliberately indifferent. The closest Plaintiff comes is Ian Connors, the National Inmate Appeals Administrator for the Bureau of Prisons. Plaintiff has included several pieces of correspondence from Connors as exhibits to her Complaint. Those letters, responding to Plaintiff's administrative remedy appeals, show that he was aware of Plaintiff's claims that she was not receiving treatment or accommodation she believed necessary for her gender dysphoria, including facility reassignment, gender reassignment surgery and laser hair removal. (Doc. 1, pp. 60, 62, 65 and 69). While an official—especially a grievance official—does not have "a free-floating obligation to put things to rights," Burks v. Raemisch , 555 F.3d 592, 595 (7th Cir. 2009), these letters are enough to make out a plausible claim that Connors had some personal involvement in the alleged deprivation of needed treatment and accommodation. As such, Count 1 will proceed against Connors, and be dismissed without prejudice as to the remaining Defendants.

Count 2

Plaintiff asserts that her First Amendment rights have been compromised by officials' refusal to change her records to identify her as female. Plaintiff cannot bring this type of claim against federal officials pursuant to Bivens in light of the Supreme Court's recent decision in Ziglar v. Abbasi , ––– U.S. ––––, 137 S.Ct. 1843, 198 L.Ed.2d 290 (2017). Ziglar suggests that the only valid contexts for constitutional claims against federal officers are those previously recognized by the Court under the Fourth, Fifth, and Eighth Amendments. See Bivens , 403 U.S. at 397, 91 S.Ct. 1999 (Fourth Amendment unreasonable search and seizure); Davis v. Passman , 442 U.S. 228, 99 S.Ct. 2264, 60 L.Ed.2d 846 (1979) (Fifth Amendment gender discrimination); and Carlson, supra (Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference to medical needs). The Supreme Court held that federal courts should not expand Bivens actions to reach contexts that the Supreme Court has not officially recognized unless "special factors" counsel otherwise. Ziglar , 137 S.Ct. at 1859-60.

Plaintiff's First Amendment claim does not fit under any of the three scenarios recognized by Bivens . Further, the Supreme Court has stated the "[w]e have never held that Bivens extends to First Amendment claims." Reichle v. Howards , 566 U.S. 658, 663 n. 4, 132 S.Ct. 2088, 182 L.Ed.2d 985 (2012).

Nor are there any "special factors" in this case that would urge expanding Bivens here....