Igwe v. Skaggs

Decision Date28 June 2017
Docket NumberCIVIL ACTION NO. 16-1403.
Citation258 F.Supp.3d 596
Parties Anthony IGWE, as the Administrator of the Estate of Priscilla L. Robinson v. Jeremy SKAGGS, et al.
CourtU.S. District Court — Western District of Pennsylvania

Dorothy J. Dohanics, Doug J. Olcott, Patrick L. Sullivan, Dallas W. Hartman, P.C., New Castle, PA, John J. Zagari, Pittsburgh, PA, for Anthony Igwe.

Christian D. Marquis, Allison N. Genard, April L. Cressler, Marshall, Dennehey, Warner, Coleman & Goggin, Edward A. Smallwood, Litchfield Cavo, LLP, Colby Bryson, Pittsburgh, PA, for Jeremy Skaggs, et al.

MEMORANDUM

KEARNEY, District Judge

Police officers driving through intersections in response to an emergency must be alert to the presence of innocent drivers possibly unaware of the officer's perceived need to speed through a red traffic signal. Police departments may purchase equipment to transmit a signal to the traffic controller device requesting a change in the color of approaching traffic lights. Our society faces difficult liability questions when the officer's response leads to an intersection collision causing the death of an innocent driver who just happened to be lawfully crossing the intersection when the officer sped through a red light. After review of extensive appendices in support of summary judgment motions filed by the officer, his public employer, and the equipment seller, we find no genuine issue of material fact on the equipment seller's liability for design defect or duty to warn or the public employer's liability for negligence or punitive damages and dismiss the equipment seller and common law claims against the public employer. But disputed material facts require a jury's review of the officer's potential liability for punitive damages for negligence and the public employer's civil rights supervisory liability for the officer's possible conscience shocking conduct or for failing to train officers on how to operate their vehicles when responding in "Emergency Response mode" as distinguished from pursuit.

I. Undisputed Facts1

Monroeville Police Officer Jeremy Skaggs drove his police vehicle at a high rate of speed into a car driven by Priscilla Robinson at an intersection in the Municipality of Monroeville ("Monroeville") ("the intersection").2 Ms. Robinson died the next day of injuries sustained in the collision.3 Her husband, Anthony Igwe, seeks damages against Officer Skaggs for negligence, his employer Monroeville for supervisory liability under federal civil rights laws, and against Global on products liability and negligence theories as the company selling the transmitter system bought by Monroeville.

A. December 8, 2014 midday collision between Officer Skaggs and Ms. Robinson.

Around noon on December 8, 2014, Monroeville police officer Jeremy Frisk called dispatch to check a license plate on a car he followed while driving on State Route 22.4 After being advised by dispatch the license plate's registration did not match the car he followed, Officer Frisk suspected a stolen vehicle.5 Around this time, Officer Skaggs heard over the radio Officer Frisk's plan to stop the vehicle.6 At approximately 12:01:20 p.m., Officer Frisk called out "Unit 991 priority!" and dispatch gave a "991 go ahead" to Officer Frisk.7 Officer Skaggs testified a "priority" call means an emergency situation of high importance.8

After hearing Officer Frisk call "priority," Officer Skaggs activated his emergency lights and sirens and "elected" to travel to Officer Frisk's location to provide back-up.9 Officer Skaggs considered himself a back-up officer under Monroeville's "Emergency Response mode" provided in the Monroeville Police Department's Policy and Procedures Manual ("Monroeville Policy").10

It is undisputed Officer Skaggs was not involved in a pursuit at the time of the collision.11 Instead, Officer Skaggs testified he believed an "Emergency Response" under the Monroeville Policy applied because, when he heard Officer Frisk call "priority," it meant Officer Frisk engaged in a pursuit where there is a risk or potential for injury and a serious crime was in progress.12 Monroeville police officer William Supancic also responded as a back-up to Officer Frisk, activating the lights and siren on his police car.13

At approximately 12:02:34 p.m., Officer Frisk reported over the radio the suspect he followed appeared to reach around in the vehicle and act awkwardly.14 An audio recording reflects the radio transmissions.15 However, the time stamps reflected in the audio recordings are not consistent with the time stamps in the video recording from Officer Skaggs's patrol car, a discrepancy Monroeville attributes to the two systems' link to different computer servers at the Monroeville Police Department.16 According to the audio tape, at 12:02: 46 p.m. Officer Frisk radioed the suspect "bailed out" of the vehicle and fled on foot.17 According to the audio tape, at 12:03:43 p.m. Monroeville dispatch asked Officer Skaggs to proceed to Officer Frisk's location.18 According to the audio tape, at 12:03:55 p.m. Officer Frisk reported the suspect had something in his hand, possibly a firearm and requested police units.19 Officer Skaggs believed this report indicated the suspect may have been reaching for a weapon or contraband.20

The video recording in Officer Skaggs's vehicle shows his collision with Ms. Robinson's car occurred at 12:02:58 p.m.21 Officer Skaggs entered the intersection against a red traffic signal.22 Monroeville admits the traffic light at the intersection did not change to green despite evidence of a preemption request from the Opticom system because Officer Skaggs likely "over ran" the signal, entering the intersection against a red traffic light.23 Officer Skaggs testified he did not rely on the Opticom system as he approached the intersection.24

The video recording from Officer Skaggs's vehicle shows he applied the brakes at 12:02:56.25 When he applied his brakes, Officer Skaggs estimated he was seven car lengths from the intersection.26 Officer Skaggs operated his vehicle 57 miles per hour approximately 0.5 seconds before colliding into Ms. Robinson.27

B. Monroeville's Opticom system.

Monroeville purchased an Opticom Emergency Vehicle Preemption System ("Opticom system") which, among other things, purports to assist police and emergency vehicles approaching traffic signals. Global's predecessor, 3M Company, manufactured the Opticom system in use at the intersection.28

The Opticom system consists of three parts: an emitter placed in the emergency vehicle; a detector located at the traffic signal; and a phase selector.29 The emitter is located in an emergency vehicle and is activated by the switching on of emergency lights and siren. The emitter sends out an infrared signal, or "pulse," in front of the vehicle.30 The detector, located on the traffic signal, detects the emitter's signal once the vehicle comes within a detectable range, and relays the signal to a phase selector located in the traffic controller cabinet at the intersection.31 The phase selector submits a "preemption request" to the traffic controller.32 The traffic controller is neither owned nor operated by Global.33

When it receives the preemption request from the Opticom system, the traffic controller determines if and when the traffic signal will change.34 The Opticom system itself does not change the traffic signal.35 It is possible to "over run" the Opticom system; that is, an emergency vehicle may encounter a red traffic signal if it travels faster than the time it takes for the signal to change to green.36

The possibility of "over running" or "out running" the Opticom system and whether Global properly warned against it is the issue in Mr. Igwe's products liability claim against Global. Global provided a driving training package entitled the "3M Opticom Priority Control System, Driver Preparation Instructor Guide" ("Instructor Guide") made available to all purchasers and end users of the Opticom system.37 The Instructor Guide provides "Notes to Instructors," including a section on its purpose to "provide emergency vehicle drivers with a logical, complete discussion of how to appropriately use the Opticom system"; "provide a concise, self-contained resource for presenters and trainers"; "raise and answer frequently asked questions"; "instill respect for the benefits and limits of the system"; and "identify, and thus encourage safe, responsible emergency vehicle driving with the system."38

The Instructor Guide contains sections on the "Fundamentals" of "traffic control" and "911 support"; an explanation of the "priority signal control"; an explanation of the "system" itself including the emitter, detector, and phase selector; and "System Variables."39 The section on "System Variables" explains the time delay limitations. This includes an explanation it may take five, ten, or even fifteen seconds or more from the time the detector receives a single from the emitter until the controller grants the green light "if it grants it at all."40 "System Variables" include time delay limitations, warning "having the emitter activated does not instantly give you a green light," and warning of "planned ‘delay’ times" depending on a variety of factors such as "street width, number of lanes, presence of protected turning lanes with green arrows, progression of traffic, synchronization with other signals—even the time of day,"41 "intersection phasing,"42 "installation pattern,"43 "multiple use" of the Opticom system used by several agencies such as EMS, fire, and police,44 and "neighbor communities" that may not have the Opticom system45 The Instructor Guide contains sections on "Performance Variables" including "interacting agents" such as other drivers, public transportation, pedestrians, bicyclists, and emergency responders all using the roadways and "system checks" regarding system maintenance.46

Although all parties contend the Instructor Guide does not warn about the possibility of over...

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