Iheakanwa v. Saks Fifth Ave., LLC

• Decision Date: 30 August 2022
• Docket Number: CIVIL GLS-21-2930
• Parties: JENNIFER IHEAKANWA, Plaintiff, v. SAKS FIFTH AVENUE, LLC, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Maryland

JENNIFER IHEAKANWA, Plaintiff,
v.
SAKS FIFTH AVENUE, LLC, Defendant.

CIVIL No. GLS-21-2930

United States District Court, D. Maryland, Southern Division

August 30, 2022

MEMORANDUM OPINION

THE HONORABLE GINA L. SIMMS, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Pending before the Court is a Letter Request to Dismiss the Second Amended Complaint (“Request to Dismiss”), filed by Defendant Saks Fifth Avenue, LLC. (“Defendant”). (ECF No. 28). The Court construes the Letter Request as a motion to dismiss and finds that the issues raised have been fully briefed, as the Plaintiff, Jennifer Iheakanwa (“Plaintiff”), has filed a letter in opposition (“Letter Opposition”) and the Defendant has filed a reply (“Reply”). (ECF Nos. 29, 30). No hearing is necessary. See Local Rule 105.6 (D. Md. 2021). For the reasons set forth below, Defendant's Request to Dismiss the Second Amended Complaint is granted in part, denied in part.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Procedural Background

On November 15, 2021, Plaintiff filed a three-count complaint against the Defendant, alleging Maryland law violations of negligence, discrimination based on race, and defamation. This Court's jurisdiction is premised upon diversity of citizenship pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332.

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(ECF No. 1). On December 21, 2021, the parties consented to the jurisdiction of this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). (ECF No. 13).

Thereafter, on January 3, 2022, Defendant filed a “Notice of Intent to File a Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint.” On January 10, 2022, Plaintiff filed a “Notice of Intent to File Amended Complaint,” contemporaneously with her First Amended Complaint. The First Amended Complaint no longer contained a discrimination claim. Instead, Plaintiff advanced claims of negligence, defamation, and civil conspiracy against the Defendant. On January 11, 2022, Plaintiff filed her response to Defendant's pleading. (ECF Nos. 20-23).

At the Fed.R.Civ.P. 16 teleconference held on January 21, 2022, the Court: (1) granted Plaintiff's request to file her First Amended Complaint; (2) granted Plaintiff leave to file a Second Amended Complaint; and (3) set a letter briefing schedule for the parties to set forth their arguments regarding whether the Second Amended Complaint should be dismissed. (ECF Nos. 25, 26).

On March 14, 2022, Plaintiff filed her Second Amended Complaint. The Second Amended Complaint no longer contains a negligence count; rather it contains two causes of action, namely allegations of defamation (Count I) and a civil conspiracy to defame Plaintiff (Count II). (ECF No. 27, “Second Amended Complaint”).

On March 28, 2022, Defendant filed its Request to Dismiss, and Plaintiff filed her response thereto on April 11, 2022. Defendant filed its Reply in support of its Request to Dismiss on April 25, 2022.

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B. Factual Background^[1]

Plaintiff alleges that on May 26, 2021, she entered Defendant's store, which is located at 5555 Wisconsin Avenue, Chevy Chase, Maryland. (Second Amended Complaint, ¶ 5). Plaintiff made a purchase of $22,743.36; she paid $6,408.36 in cash and paid the remaining balance on her debit card. (Id., ¶¶ 7, 8). Then, Plaintiff left Defendant's store, having been issued a receipt after the cashier counted the cash payment twice. The same day, at about 4:00 p.m., Plaintiff received a phone call from Defendant. The cashier who had been involved in Plaintiff's transaction explained that the sales record was short by $3,000.00 that day and she believed that the shortage came from Plaintiff's purchase. Plaintiff told the cashier to review the relevant video footage of her transaction. The cashier insisted that Plaintiff return to the store, and Plaintiff did so the next day. (Second Amended Complaint, ¶¶ 10-14, 16 -18, 63, 64).

On May 27, 2021, after Plaintiff arrived at the store, the cashier called her manager. (Id., ¶ 20). The cashier and the manager then confronted Plaintiff in the presence of other shoppers inside the store. The cashier and the manager insisted that the $3,000.00 shortage was from Plaintiff's purchase. (Id., ¶¶ 21, 22). They “failed or refused” to play the video footage despite Plaintiff's demands (Id., ¶¶ 23, 46, 65). The manager yelled at Plaintiff, which drew the attention of shoppers, who “stopped and gazed at the Plaintiff to see what the commotion was about.” (Id., ¶¶ 24, 25, 47, 48). Some shoppers took pictures of Plaintiff. (Id., ¶ 49).

An unnamed third party intervened, at which point the manager told the third party that Plaintiff “purchased some items and failed to pay for some of those items.” (Id., ¶ 26). Plaintiff

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then paid an additional $3,000.00 to Defendant “to avoid the embarrassment and ridicule” and “out of fear and intimidation.” (Id., ¶ 27). After Plaintiff paid the money to the cashier, the manager approached Plaintiff and threatened her. (Id., ¶¶ 28, 51). In front of the other patrons of the store, the manager said, “It's good you paid this $3,000.00, because I would hate for you to suffer because of this.” (Id., ¶¶ 29, 52). The manager did not explain the statement further, despite Plaintiff's request. (Id., ¶¶ 31, 32, 53). Instead, the manager asked Plaintiff to leave. (Id., ¶ 53). According to the Plaintiff, the manager's statements meant that “Plaintiff had taken Defendant's merchandise without paying for the items,” and that if Plaintiff did not pay the additional money, she would be “charged with and prosecuted for theft.” (Id., ¶ 54).

The manager and cashier knew that the statements were false and refused to play the video footage of Plaintiff's original purchase because of that knowledge. (Id., ¶¶ 55, 56). According to the Plaintiff, the cashier and manager had “agreed and conspired between themselves to create a bogus shortage in cash payment” so that they could “extort additional money from Plaintiff.” (Id., ¶ 66). The employees made this plan to “accuse Plaintiff of not paying for part of her shopping bill” so that they would “avoid getting into trouble with their employer for the sales shortage resulting from their incompetence.” (Id., ¶ 71).

Following the confrontation, Plaintiff left the store, feeling embarrassed, humiliated, and ashamed. (Id., ¶¶ 33, 57). As a result of the incident, Plaintiff was unable to timely make her rent payment for June 2021. (Id., ¶¶ 35, 61). In addition, Plaintiff's reputation “was tarnished” because her friends contacted her to inquire about the incident, having heard about it from shoppers who were present in the store. (Id., ¶¶ 36, 37, 38, 58, 59, 61). Plaintiff's work performance was also adversely affected. (Id., ¶¶ 39, 61). Finally, Plaintiff suffers from “humiliation, ridicule, shame,

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emotional distress, and other forms of health disorder,” including that she apparently sought counseling after the events at Defendant's store. (Id., ¶¶ 41, 61).

On August 14, 2021, Defendant returned the additional $3,000.00 Plaintiff paid on May 27, 2021. (Id., ¶ 40).

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A defendant who files a motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) is asserting that, even if a court construes the facts advanced in the Plaintiff's complaint as true, that complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must provide a defendant with fair notice of the claim and “the grounds upon which it rests.” Ray v. Roane, 948 F.3d 222, 226 (4th Cir. 2020) (citing Tobey v. Jones, 706 F.3d 379, 387 (4th Cir. 2013)). In other words, a complaint must contain sufficient facts and must state a “plausible claim for relief.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); see also Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007) (complaint must set forth enough facts as to suggest a “cognizable cause of action”). A claim satisfies this requirement, i.e., has “facial plausibility,” when a plaintiff pleads sufficient factual content to “allo[w] the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. At this stage, a court does not resolve disputes of facts or the merits of claims. Ray, 948 F.3d at 226 (citation omitted).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Plaintiff's Exhibits to the Letter Opposition

In this case, Plaintiff attached two exhibits to her Letter Opposition to support her arguments that she has sufficiently pleaded her claims. Because a motion to dismiss tests the sufficiency of a complaint, a court generally limits its review to the allegations in the complaint.

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Goines v. Valley Cmty. Servs. Bd., 822 F.3d 159, 166 (4th Cir. 2016) (quoting Occupy Columbia v. Haley, 738 F.3d 107, 116 (4th Cir. 2013)). However, a court may consider additional documents if they are integral to a complaint and their authenticity is not in dispute. King v. Rubenstein, 825 F.3d 206, 212 (4th Cir. 2016) (quoting Philips v. Pitt Cty. Mem'l Hosp., 572 F.3d 176, 180 (4th Cir. 2009)); Goines, 822 F.3d at 166; Robinson v. American Honda Motor Co., Inc., 551 F.2d 218, 222-23 (4th Cir. 2009) (a court may consider a document attached to a plaintiff's opposition to a motion to dismiss because the document was integral to and explicitly referenced in the complaint). To be “integral,” a document must “by its ‘very existence, and not the mere information it contains, give[] rise to the legal rights asserted.'” Parker v. Children's Nat'l Med. Ctr., Inc., Civ. No. ELH-20-3523, 2021 WL 5840949, at *5 (D. Md. Dec. 9, 2021) (quoting Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc. v. Severstal Sparrows Point, LLC, 794 F.Supp.2d 602, 611 (D. Md. 2011)).

In this case, Plaintiff's exhibits are: (1) an unsworn letter from a friend of Plaintiff's who is a professional counselor; and (2) an unsworn letter from Plaintiff's sublessor. (ECF No. 29-1). Plaintiff has not made any argument as to why the Court may consider these two exhibits in the context of this request to dismiss. Indeed, Plaintiff does...