Ihley v. Padgett

• Decision Date: 06 October 1887
• Citation: 3 S.E. 468,27 S.C. 300
• Parties: IHLEY v. PADGETT and others.
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court

3 S.E. 468

27 S.C. 300

IHLEY v. PADGETT and others.

Supreme Court of South Carolina

October 6, 1887

Appeal from court of common pleas, Hampton county; WITHERSPOON Judge.

McGOWAN J.

Nancy Ihley had a life-estate in a plantation known as "Rice-Hope," under her father's will, which gave it to her, "her heirs and assigns, in trust nevertheless, that all the productions of rent of said land be applied to the use of the said Nancy and her children during the said Nancy's life-time, and at her death to be equally divided among her children, share and share alike, be they few or many," etc. Nancy had a husband, S. L Ihley, and several children, among whom was George C. Ihley the plaintiff. About the year 1870, Nancy Ihley and her children, who were all grown up and apparently of age, negotiated a sale of "Rice-Hope" to one Macon B. Allen at the price of five dollars per acre, and in consideration thereof the mother and all her children, George C. and his three sisters, united in a conveyance of the plantation to him, under whom the defendants hold. At that time there was no claim that the plaintiff was under age or unwilling to sign the deed; but, on the contrary, he received $25 for going in the night to summon the heirs and witnesses who were to sign the deed. It seems that without objection the purchase money was delivered to the father, S. L. Ihley, and $1,200 of it, some time after, was used in the purchase of another place, known as "Log Hall," and the title made to the mother Nancy, George C., the plaintiff, and one of his sisters, jointly, and the family removed to this new place, and cultivated the same.

In 1885, Nancy Ihley, the mother, died, and in January, 1886, George C. Ihley, the youngest child, instituted this action to recover his undivided share of the "Rice-Hope" plantation; alleging that, when he, with the other children, signed the deed of "Rice-Hope" to Allen in 1870, he was not quite 21 years of age, having been born March 12, 1850, and the deed executed in May or June, 1870; that he signed the deed "through persuasion and under compulsion," and had never received anything for his interest; and praying that the conveyance from himself to Macon B. Allen be declared void, and the same be delivered up to be canceled, etc.

The cause came on to be heard by Judge WITHERSPOON, who, having taken the testimony which is in the brief, decreed that the deed originally was not void, but merely voidable; that it was not executed by the plaintiff through persuasion or compulsion; and that the plaintiff, after he attained his majority, had confirmed it by accepting in lieu thereof an interest in the "Log Hall" place, and by acquiescing in the sale for more than 14 years, from March, 1871, when he came of age, to January, 1886; and he therefore dismissed the complaint. From this decree the plaintiff appeals to this court, upon the ground "that his honor erred in deciding that the plaintiff, George C. Ihley, confirmed the deed executed to Macon B. Allen of the "Rice-Hope" plantation during his minority after he reached his majority by long acquiescence, and by receiving his proportionate share of said plantation, or its equivalent in another tract of land," etc.

Clearly the plaintiff cannot avoid his deed upon the ground that there was coercion or positive fraud practiced to induce him to sign it. There is not the slightest evidence either of coercion or of fraud in obtaining the conveyance. His appearance did not afford the evidence that he was under age. It was not shown that he was lacking in ordinary capacity. He assisted in making arrangements for the execution of the deed, and the purchaser, Allen, did not know that he was a minor. There is no good objection to the deed, unless it arises out of the fact that the plaintiff was by a few months under age, when he, together with the other members of the family, executed it.

Did the minority of the plaintiff when he signed the deed make it, as to him, absolutely void, or only voidable? Without going into the question as to what acts of a minor are absolutely void and what are voidable only, it will be quite sufficient, for the purposes of this case, to say that it is well-established that "all gifts, grants, or deeds made by infants by deed or matter in writing, and to take effect by delivery of his hand, are voidable only by himself, his heirs, or those who are entitled to his estate." Zouch v. Parsons, 3 Burrows, 1794; Lester v. Frazer, 2 Hill, Ch. 541; Cheshire v. Barrett, 4 McCord, 241. From its very nature, a thing voidable only needs no positive confirmation, but stands good until impeached by a proper party. In the first instance, confirmation has no proper application to it; but when there is an effort to avoid the act, it becomes important to inquire whether there has been confirmation; for, if so, the matter has passed beyond the control of the party, and is no longer voidable.

The plaintiff here seeks to avoid his deed upon the ground that he was under age when he executed it, and the question is whether he had already confirmed it after coming of age before the application was made. In the case of Norris v. Vance, 3 Rich. Law, 165 it was held that there may be confirmation of an infant's act in either of three ways: "There must be, after he attains his majority, with a full knowledge of his rights, (1) acquiescence from which assent may be fairly inferred; (2) an adequate benefit enjoyed which has grown directly or indirectly out of the contract; or (3) some direct act of express assent." Does this case come under any of the heads of this classification? We cannot say that the evidence shows any direct act of express assent by the plaintiff to the sale and conveyance of "Rice-Hope" after he attained his majority. It does, however, appear that a part of the price of "Rice-Hope" ($1,200) was applied in the purchase of another place, (Log Hall,) the title to which was executed...