Iii v. The Lone Star State Of Tex.
| Decision Date | 28 March 2007 |
| Docket Number | No. A-06-CA-003-SS.,A-06-CA-003-SS. |
| Citation | 713 F.Supp.2d 657 |
| Parties | Harvey Leroy SOSSAMON III # 1120297v.The LONE STAR STATE OF TEXAS, Christina Melton Crain, Cathy Clement, Brad Livingston, Doug Dretke, Rev. R.C. Murphy, Robert Eason, Stacy L. Jackson, and Paul J. Klien. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Texas |
COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED
Scott Medlock, Texas Civil Rights Project, Austin, TX, for Plaintiff.
Kimberly Fuchs, Office of the Texas Attorney General, Austin, TX, for Defendant.
Before the Court are Plaintiff's complaint brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Document No. 1); Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Document No. 23); Defendants' Partial Motion to Dismiss (Document No. 28); Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (Document No. 29); Plaintiff's response thereto (Document No. 33); Plaintiff's Motion for Dismissal Under the Texas Religious Freedom Act, Against the Defendants in their Personal and Individual Capacities (Document No 43); and Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Dismissal and Withdrawal to Amend the Original Complaint (Document No. 48). Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, has been granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis.
At the time he filed his complaint, Plaintiff was an inmate incarcerated in the Robertson Unit of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice-Correctional Institutions Division. Plaintiff files this action pursuant to the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983; the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc through § 2000cc-5; and the Texas Religious Freedom Act (“TRFA”), Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Chapter 110. Plaintiff alleges Defendants have violated his rights under the First, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments, RLUIPA and TRFA by denying him the opportunity to participate in congregational Christian services: (1) in the chapel at the Robertson Unit; and (2) while on cell restriction at the Robertson Unit. Plaintiff seeks declaratory, injunctive and compensatory relief. He sues the Lone Star State of Texas, Christina Melton Crain (Chairperson of the Texas Board of Criminal Justice), Cathy Clement (Assistant Regional Director for Region VI of TDCJ), Brad Livingston (Executive Director of TDCJ), Doug Dretke (former Director of the Correctional Institutions Division of TDCJ), Reverend R.G. Murphy (Region V Program Administrator for the Chaplaincy Department, Rehabilitation and Reentry Programs Director of TDCJ), Robert Eason (Senior Warden at the Robertson Unit), Stacy L. Jackson (Assistant Warden at the Robertson Unit), and Paul J. Klien (Volunteer Chaplain at the Robertson Unit). Plaintiff sues the defendants in their individual and official capacities.
Plaintiff was granted leave to amend his complaint. Subsequently, Plaintiff informed the Court he would not be able to meet the deadline for amending his complaint and requested his request to amend be withdrawn. Plaintiff further requested the Court to go forward with its decisions in this case based on his original complaint. However, Plaintiff moved the Court to dismiss his claims brought pursuant to the TRFA against the defendants in their individual capacities. He further moved the Court to dismiss his claims brought against Defendants Murphy, Jackson and Klien. Plaintiff's requests to dismiss will be granted.
In his original complaint Plaintiff alleges inmates are denied total access to the prison chapel at the Robertson Unit for purposes of religious expression. He further claims Plaintiff and religious inmates wanting access to the chapel are victims of discrimination. Plaintiff explains prison officials allow inmates access to the chapel for non-religious purposes. Plaintiff contends Defendants have exaggerated the need for security in the chapel. Plaintiff complains Defendants have evicted God out of His house and reduced Christian worship services to attendance inside a multi-purpose room. According to Plaintiff, the multi-purpose rooms contain no traditional Christian symbols or furnishings. Plaintiff further asserts their services or Bible studies are often interrupted by security personnel or loud yelling just outside the window to the room. Plaintiff also claims inmates are retaliated against and harassed by security personnel if an inmate worker does not stop worshiping and report to work as ordered. Plaintiff claims the retaliation and harassment may consist of a strip search. However, Plaintiff does not allege he has personally been subjected to a strip search for failing to report to work, and he did not raise this issue in his prison grievances.
Plaintiff further alleges Christians are discriminated against at the Robertson Unit because they are not provided special accommodations to hold religious ceremonies and do the necessary rituals in the chapel or any other sanctified place for Easter week and the Sunday service unlike Muslims, who receive special accommodations during Ramadan and other Muslim holy days. Plaintiff further complains there are no special meals for Christians to observe any religious holy day or period.
Plaintiff contends Defendants have subjected him to cruel and unusual punishment by causing him spiritual, mental, emotional and physical pain. Plaintiff explains this punishment was caused by denying him the most basic opportunities to express and practice his Christian faith inside the prison sanctuary. Plaintiff asserts he was forced to accept and witness the eviction of God from the chapel and the reducing of God to a time-share deity with anger management prisoners in the multi-purpose room empty of any Christian symbols or furnishings.
In addition to being denied access to the chapel, Plaintiff alleges inmates subjected to cell restrictions as a result of a disciplinary violation are not allowed to attend church services. According to Plaintiff, prisoners are allowed to leave their cells while on cell restriction for many other purposes including going to work, eat, shower, medical lay-ins, educational classes, the law library and other secular activities.
According to Plaintiff, on September 15, 2005, Plaintiff was found guilty of a minor rule infraction. As result, he received 15 days cell restriction and 15 days loss of commissary privileges. Because of the cell restriction, he was denied permission to attend religious services on September 18, 2005, and September 25, 2005. Plaintiff grieved the issue, and was told by Warden Eason that he would look into the cell restriction policy.
Defendants move for summary judgment arguing TDCJ's policies concerning religious practices are reasonably related to legitimate penological interests-safety and security-and do not violate Plaintiff's constitutional rights. Defendants contend the policies are justified by compelling state interests and there is no other way, let alone a less restrictive way, to balance TDCJ's accommodation of religions with the need to ensure the safety and security of offenders and correctional personnel.
Plaintiff moves for partial summary judgment seeking summary judgment on his claims arising from the cell restriction policy and the denial of access to the chapel.
A court will, on a motion for summary judgment, render judgment if the evidence shows that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Eason v. Thaler, 73 F.3d 1322, 1325 (5th Cir.1996); Int'l Shortstop. Inc. v. Rally's Inc., 939 F.2d 1257, 1263 (5th Cir.1991) cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1059, 112 S.Ct. 936, 117 L.Ed.2d 107 (1992). When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported, an adverse party may not rest upon mere allegations or denials but must set forth specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial. Ray v. Tandem Computers, Inc., 63 F.3d 429, 433 (5th Cir.1995); Fed.R.Civ.P. 56.
Both movants and non-movants bear burdens of proof in the summary judgment process. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). The movant with the burden of proof at trial must establish every essential element of its claim or affirmative defense. Id. at 322, 106 S.Ct. at 2552. In so doing, the moving party without the burden of proof need only point to the absence of evidence on an essential element of the non-movant's claims or affirmative defenses. Id. at 323-24, 106 S.Ct. at 2554. At that point, the burden shifts to the non-moving party to “produce evidence in support of its claims or affirmative defenses ... designating specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Id. at 324, 106 S.Ct. at 2553. The non-moving party must produce “specific facts” showing a genuine issue for trial, not mere general allegations. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e); Tubacex v. M/V Risan, 45 F.3d 951, 954 (5th Cir.1995).
In deciding whether to grant summary judgment, the Court should view the evidence in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment and indulge all reasonable inferences in favor of that party. The Fifth Circuit has concluded “[t]he standard of review is not merely whether there is a sufficient factual dispute to permit the case to go forward, but whether a rational trier of fact could find for the non-moving party based upon the evidence before the court.” James v. Sadler, 909 F.2d 834, 837 (5th Cir.1990) (citing ( Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586, 106 S.Ct. at 1356)). To the extent facts are undisputed, a Court may resolve the case as a matter of law. Blackwell v. Barton, 34 F.3d 298, 301 (5th Cir.1994).
Plaintiff's claims for monetary damages against the State of Texas and the defendants sued in their official capacities are barred under the Eleventh Amendment because such an action is the same as a suit against the sovereign. Pennhurst State...
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