IIP-MI 4 LLC v. City of Warren

• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan
• Writing for the Court: PER CURIAM.
• Docket Number: 373070
• Decision Date: 22 January 2026
• Citation: IIP-MI 4 LLC v. City of Warren, 373070 (Mich. App. Jan 22, 2026)
• Parties: IIP-MI 4 LLC and LIVWELL MICHIGAN LLC, Petitioners-Appellees, v. CITY OF WARREN, Respondent-Appellant.

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IIP-MI 4 LLC and LIVWELL MICHIGAN LLC, Petitioners-Appellees, v. CITY OF WARREN, Respondent-Appellant.

No. 373070

Court of Appeals of Michigan

January 22, 2026

UNPUBLISHED

Tax Tribunal LC No. 24-000081

Before: KOROBKIN, P.J., and Christopher M. Murray and Allie Greenleaf Maldonado, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Respondent City of Warren (the City) appeals by right the Final Opinion and Judgment of the Michigan Tax Tribunal determining that certain property owned by petitioners IIP-MI 4 LLC and LivWell Michigan LLC (collectively, LivWell) is entitled to a Qualified Agricultural Exemption under § 7ee of the General Property Tax Act, MCL 211.1 et seq. We vacate the Tax Tribunal's Final Opinion and Judgment.

I. BACKGROUND

LivWell owns a property primarily used for marijuana production and packaging pursuant to a license issued under the Michigan Regulation and Taxation of Marihuana Act, MCL 333.27951 et seq. (MRTMA) and the Medical Marihuana Facilities Licensing Act, MCL 333.27101 et seq. (MMFLA).^[1] On or about April 29, 2023, LivWell filed a claim for a Qualified Agricultural Exemption (QAE) pursuant to MCL 211.7ee from certain school operating taxes. On or about May 12, 2023, the City sent LivWell notice via mail informing them that the City's tax assessor had denied LivWell's request for a QAE. The notice further advised that a "taxpayer who timely and properly filed Form 2599 may appeal an assessor's denial of the [QAE] for the 2023 assessment year to the July or December Board of Review under MCL 211.ee [sic]."^[2]

LivWell appealed to the 2023 December Board of Review, which denied the QAE on December 22, 2023. Twenty-four days later, on January 15, 2024, LivWell appealed to the Tax Tribunal. The City argued that LivWell was not entitled to a QAE because marijuana production is commercial, not agricultural. Moreover, the Tax Tribunal could not assert jurisdiction because the school operating tax had been levied in the summer, so MCL 211.7ee(6) required LiveWell to appeal to the 2023 July Board of Review, which LivWell failed to do. LivWell argued that marijuana is a plant produced for agricultural use. And regarding jurisdiction, MCL 211.7ee(6) simply prevented them from appealing a 2024 QAE denial to the 2023 December Board of Review. LivWell further argued they had not been provided proper notice of their appeal rights because the notice indicated an appeal could be made "to the July or December Board of Review under MCL 211.ee [sic]."

The Tax Tribunal found that LivWell was required to appeal to the 2023 July Board of Review to properly invoke the Tribunal's jurisdiction. Nevertheless, the Tribunal concluded that jurisdiction could be assumed on the basis that the appeal notice was "plainly misleading." The Tax Tribunal then went on to determine that property was primarily devoted to agricultural use, such that it qualified for the QAE. The City now appeals.

II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW

Judicial review of Tax Tribunal decisions "is limited." Campbell v Dep't of Treasury, 509 Mich. 230, 237; 984 N.W.2d 13 (2022). "In the absence of fraud, error of law or the adoption of wrong principles, no appeal may be taken to any court from any final agency provided for the administration of property tax laws from any decision relating to valuation or allocation." Const 1963, art. 6, § 28. Thus, when analyzing whether the Tax Tribunal "properly interpreted and applied the statutes governing its jurisdiction," as at issue here, "this Court's review is limited to determining whether the Tax Tribunal committed an error of law in its interpretation and application of the statutes." New Covert Generating Co, LLC v Cover Twp, 334 Mich.App. 24, 45; 964 N.W.2d 378 (2020). All the factual findings made by the Tax Tribunal are final if supported by competent and substantial evidence. Mt Pleasant v State Tax Comm, 477 Mich. 50, 53; 729 N.W.2d 833 (2007). However, we review questions of law-including questions of statutory interpretation and the Tax Tribunal's jurisdiction to hear a case-de novo. Strata Oncology, Inc v Dep't of Treasury, 348 Mich.App. 378, 387; 18 NW3d 367 (2023). Under de novo review, we "review the legal issue independently, without required deference to the courts below." Wright v Genesee Co, 504 Mich. 410, 417; 934 N.W.2d 805 (2019).

III. TAX TRIBUNAL'S JURISDICTION

The City argues that the Tax Tribunal lacked jurisdiction to hear LivWell's appeal regarding the denial of their claim for a QAE under MCL 211.7ee and that the lack of jurisdiction required dismissal. We agree.

The Michigan Tax Tribunal was created by the Tax Tribunal Act, MCL 205.701 et seq. Mich Props, LLC v Meridian Twp, 491 Mich. 518, 541; 817 N.W.2d 548 (2012). "The jurisdiction of the Tax Tribunal is granted by statute." Nicholson v Birmingham Bd of Review, 191 Mich.App. 237, 239; 477 N.W.2d 492 (1991). The Tax Tribunal "has no equitable power to waive or otherwise disregard a statutory requirement or filing deadline." Sixarp, LLC v Byron Twp, __ Mich. __; __ NW3d __ (2025) (Docket No. 166190); slip op at 6. In the absence of statutory authority, the Tax Tribunal lacks subject-matter jurisdiction and "should not proceed further except to dismiss the action." Electronic Data Sys Corp v Flint Twp, 253 Mich.App. 538, 544; 656 N.W.2d 215 (2002). This is because the "lack of subject-matter jurisdiction is so serious a defect in the proceedings that a tribunal is duty-bound to dismiss a plaintiff's claim even if the defendant does not request it." Bluewater Nat Gas Holding, LLC v Ray Twp, __ Mich.App. __, __; __ NW3d __ (2025) (Docket No. 373788); slip op at 3, quoting Electronic Data Sys Corp, 253 Mich.App. at 544.

To determine if the Tax Tribunal had subject-matter jurisdiction to hear this case, we must interpret several statutes. "The goal of statutory interpretation is to discern and give effect to the Legislature's intent," the best indicator of which is "the language of the statute itself." New Covert Generating Co, LLC, 334 Mich.App. at 51 (citation omitted). "If the statute is unambiguous, this Court must assume that the Legislature intended the meaning clearly expressed and must enforce the statute as written." Bluewater Nat Gas Holding, LLC, __ Mich.App. at __; slip op at 4 (quotation marks and citation omitted). "When considering the correct interpretation, the statute must be read as a whole, and individual words and phrases, while important, should be read in the context of the entire legislative scheme." Id. (quotation marks, citations, and brackets omitted). "Moreover, under in pari materia, 'statutes that relate to the same subject or that share a common purpose should, if possible, be read together to create a harmonious body of law.'" Id. quoting Sixarp, LLC, __ Mich. at __; slip op at 11 (quotation marks and citations omitted). "Courts must give effect to every word, phrase, and clause in a statute and avoid an interpretation that would render any part of the statute surplusage or nugatory." State Farm Fire & Cas Co v Old Republic Ins Co, 466 Mich. 142, 146; 644 N.W.2d 715 (2002).

The first relevant statute in this case is MCL 205.735a, which "is part of a set of laws that govern the appeal of property-tax assessments in Michigan." Spartan Stores, Inc v City of Grand Rapids, 307 Mich.App. 565, 570; 861 N.W.2d 347 (2014). MCL 205.735a has repeatedly been interpreted to be a jurisdictional statute. For example, the Supreme Court recently considered MCL 205.735a(3)-which addresses the appeal of assessment disputes-and determined that the "Legislature has clearly mandated that the requirement for appeal in the [Tax Tribunal] under MCL 205.735a(3) is jurisdictional." Sixarp, LLC, __ Mich. at __; slip op at 8. The requirements of MCL 205.735a(3) are as follows:

Except as otherwise provided in this section or by law, for an assessment dispute as to the valuation or exemption of property, the assessment must be protested before the board of review before the tribunal acquires jurisdiction of the dispute under subsection (6). [(Emphasis added.)]

The Sixarp Court examined this language and determined:

The statute plainly states that "the assessment must be protested before the board of review before the tribunal acquires jurisdiction of the dispute." MCL 205.735a(3) (emphasis added). As a result, MCL 205.735a(3) "is not a notice statute, but is a jurisdictional statute that governs when and how a petitioner invokes the Tax Tribunal's jurisdiction." [Sixarp, __ Mich. at __; slip op at 8.]

The provision at issue in the present case is MCL 205.735a(5), which addresses the appeal of a QAE claim. MCL 205.735a(5) is not meaningfully distinguishable from MCL 205.735a(3):

For a dispute regarding a determination of a claim of exemption of a principal residence or qualified agricultural property for a year in which the July or December board of review has authority to determine a claim of exemption for a principal residence or qualified agricultural property, the claim of exemption shall be presented to either the July or December board of review before the tribunal acquires jurisdiction of the dispute. [MCL 205.735a(5) (emphasis added).]

The same operative words appear in the same order. Accordingly, MCL 205.735a(5) is jurisdictional.^[3] In other words, the Tax Tribunal has jurisdiction to hear a QAE claim only if an appeal is first made to the Board of Review with the authority to hear the claim.

In turn, MCL 211.7ee(6) explains which Board of Review has the authority to determine a claim of exemption in a given case:

An owner of property that is qualified agricultural property on May 1 for which an exemption was not on the tax roll may file an appeal with the July or December board of review in the year the exemption was claimed or the immediately

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