ILC Data Device Corp. v. County of Suffolk

• Decision Date: 14 September 1992
• Citation: 588 N.Y.S.2d 845,182 A.D.2d 293
• Parties: , 61 USLW 2197, 1992 O.S.H.D. (CCH) P 29,838 ILC DATA DEVICE CORP., et al., Respondents, v. COUNTY OF SUFFOLK, Appellant.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

Page 845

588 N.Y.S.2d 845

182 A.D.2d 293, 61 USLW 2197, 1992

O.S.H.D. (CCH) P 29,838

ILC DATA DEVICE CORP., et al., Respondents, v. COUNTY OF SUFFOLK, Appellant.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division,

Second Department.

Sept. 14, 1992.

E. Thomas Boyle, County Atty., Hauppauge (Harriet A. Gilliam, of counsel), for appellant.

Meltzer, Lippe, Goldstein & Wolf, P.C., Mineola (Gary N. Sazer and Brian S. Conneely, of counsel), for respondents.

David A. Mintz, Gabrielle Semel, and Alan M. Compagnon, New York City (Amy Young on the brief), for Communications Workers of America, AFL-CIO, amicus curiae.

Before SULLIVAN, J.P., and LAWRENCE, EIBER and PIZZUTO, JJ.

SULLIVAN, Justice Presiding.

The chief issue presented on this appeal is whether Local Laws, 1988, No. 21 of the County of Suffolk, which governs certain aspects of video display terminal (hereinafter VDT) equipment usage among employers doing business within the county, is inconsistent with or preempted by any New York State or Federal law. We conclude that it is preempted by the New York State Labor Law and therefore is invalid.

I. BACKGROUND

After conducting a series of public hearings and reviewing extensive testimonial and documentary submissions, the Suffolk County Legislature enacted Local Laws, 1988, No. 21 of the County of Suffolk (hereinafter Local Law No. 21), entitled "A local law providing employee protection against video display terminals". Section 1 of the law sets forth the legislative intent underlying its enactment as follows:

"This Legislature hereby finds ands [sic ] determines that it is in the public interest to provide public ¹

and private sector employees who operate video display terminals within Suffolk County with a safe and healthy work environment. This legislature further determines that, although some employers and manufacturers have recognized and implemented minimum safeguards in equipment and workstation design and work routine in order to better protect the health and wellbeing of employees who operate video display terminals on a regular basis, the vast majority of terminal operators remain, as yet, unprotected.

"Therefore, it is the intent of this Legislature to protect the health and safety of video display terminal operators within the County of Suffolk by requiring employers who have twenty or more video display terminals within the County of Suffolk to implement widely recognized employed [sic ] safeguards so as to prevent harm and injury to such workers".

To this end, Local Law No. 21 requires that those employers operating 20 or more VDTs in the County meet certain workplace standards, inter alia, for light, noise levels, and seating comfort for their employees who are VDT operators. Additionally, the law affords VDT operators the opportunity to have an annual eye examination and to receive corrective lenses necessitated by VDT usage, with 80% of the cost therefor to be borne by the employer (see, Local Law No. 21 § 3[A]. Moreover, the legislation expressly authorizes the Commissioner of the Suffolk County Department of Health Services to promulgate regulations governing the inspection of employer premises and the enforcement of the Local Law (see, Local Law No. 21 §§ 6, 8).

By service of a summons and complaint dated July 20, 1988, the plaintiffs, ² corporations which claimed that they would be adversely affected by the provisions of Local Law No. 21, commenced the instant action against the defendant County of Suffolk for a judgment (1) declaring that Local Law No. 21 is unconstitutional and void, and (2) permanently enjoining its implementation and enforcement. In three causes of action, the plaintiffs alleged a multitude of bases for invalidating the law, including the Legislature's lack of authority under the Municipal Home Rule Law to enact it; the preemption of the Local Law, inter alia, by New York's Labor Law and Workers' Compensation Law as well as by Federal legislation such as the Employee Retirement Income Security Act and the Occupational Safety and Health Act; the law's authorization of warrantless searches in violation of Federal and New York State constitutional provisions; the denial of equal protection resulting from the application of the law only to employers with 20 or more VDTs, and the lack of credible scientific evidence to support the law's premise that operators of VDTs are at risk of injury. Thereafter, the County unsuccessfully moved to dismiss the complaint, while the plaintiffs succeeded in obtaining a preliminary injunction with respect to the implementation of a portion of Local Law No. 21.

The County subsequently moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, and the plaintiffs cross-moved for partial summary judgment on their first and second causes of action. In a decision dated December 27, 1989, the Supreme Court denied the County's motion in its entirety and granted the plaintiffs' cross-motion to the extent of striking down Local Law No. 21 on the ground that the Legislature had no authority to enact it under Municipal Home Rule Law § 11(1)(f) (see, ILC Data Device Corp. v. County of Suffolk, 146 Misc.2d 462, 550 N.Y.S.2d 993). The County presently appeals from the ensuing order.

We agree with the conclusion reached by the Supreme Court, although we reach that conclusion upon a somewhat different analysis.

II. LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY

The plaintiffs' primary contention throughout this action has been that the Suffolk County Legislature lacked authority under the Municipal Home Rule Law to enact Local Law No. 21, with the result that it is invalid. They maintain that Local Law No. 21 is inconsistent with and preempted by a host of Federal and State enactments, chief among these the New York State Labor Law. Conversely, the County and amicus curiae urge that there is no inconsistency or preemption and that Local Law No. 21 constitutes a valid exercise of the County's general police power to protect the health and to ensure the safety of its people.

In discussing the extent of the County's home rule powers, it is useful to note that "since the fount of the police power is the sovereign State, such power can be exercised by a local governmental unit only when and to the degree it has been delegated such lawmaking authority" (People v. De Jesus, 54 N.Y.2d 465, 468, 446 N.Y.S.2d 207, 430 N.E.2d 1260; see, Matter of Ames v. Smoot, 98 A.D.2d 216, 471 N.Y.S.2d 128). Local governments have indeed received broad grants of legislative power in order to enact laws affecting their parochial concerns (see, N.Y. Const., art. IX, § 2[c][i]; Municipal Home Rule Law § 10[1][i]. However, their authority to legislate goes far beyond purely local matters, as is evidenced by the language of the New York Constitution, article IX, § 2(c)(ii)(10):

"In addition to powers granted in the statute of local governments or in any other law * * * (ii) every local government shall have power to adopt and amend local laws not inconsistent with the provisions of this constitution or any general law ³ relating to the following subjects, whether or not they relate to the property, affairs or government of such local government, except to the extent that the legislature shall restrict the adoption of such a local law relating to other than the property, affairs or government of such local government:

* * * * * *

"(10) The government, protection, order, conduct, safety, health and well-being of persons or property therein " (emphasis supplied).

The foregoing constitutional provision is repeated virtually verbatim in Municipal Home Rule Law § 10(1)(ii)(a)(12), and the legislative powers conferred on local governments by the Constitution and the Municipal Home Rule Law are to be broadly construed (see, N.Y. Const., art. IX, § 3[c]; Municipal Home Rule Law § 51; Kamhi v. Town of Yorktown, 74 N.Y.2d 423, 548 N.Y.S.2d 144, 547 N.E.2d 346).

The plaintiffs contend, and the Supreme Court found, that regardless of whether Local Law No. 21 could be validly enacted pursuant to Municipal Home Rule Law § 10, its adoption is precluded by Municipal Home Rule Law § 11(1)(f), which provides in relevant part as follows:

"Notwithstanding any provision of this chapter, the legislative body shall not be deemed authorized by this chapter to adopt a local law which supersedes a state statute, if such local law:

* * * * * *

"f. Applies to or affects any provision of * * * the labor law * * * or the workmen's compensation law". ⁴

The plaintiffs claim that since Local Law No. 21 sets certain standards for VDT workstations and permits VDT operators to avail themselves of employer-funded vision care, it "applies to or affects" both the Labor Law and the Workers' Compensation Law. Hence, they reason that the local law impermissibly "supersedes" these State laws and must therefore be invalidated. The argument is unpersuasive.

It is a basic principle of statutory interpretation that "[s]tatutory language is generally to be construed in accordance with its plain and obvious sense, and the meaning attached to it should be neither strained nor artificial (see, Civil Serv. Employees Assn. v. County of Oneida, 78 A.D.2d 1004, 433 N.Y.S.2d 907; McKinney's Cons.Laws of N.Y., Book 1, Statutes § 94)" (Shoreham-Wading Riv. Cent. School Dist. v. Town of Brookhaven, 107 A.D.2d 219, 223, 486 N.Y.S.2d 277). The construction of Municipal Home Rule Law § 11(1)(f) advocated by the plaintiffs violates this principle and turns the statute on its head by asserting that if a local law applies to or affects the Labor Law or Workers' Compensation Law, then it improperly supersedes such law. However, the plain language of the statute requires that, in order to be invalid, a local law must first supersede a State statute, and then it must additionally apply to or affect a provision of one of the enumerated bodies of State law. In the present case, Local Law No. 21 contains no statement indicating an intent to supersede any other law. Additiona...