Iles v. Metro. Gov't of Nashville & Davidson Cnty.
| Decision Date | 12 November 2020 |
| Docket Number | No. 3:20-cv-00402,3:20-cv-00402 |
| Citation | 500 F.Supp.3d 711 |
| Parties | Myriah ILES, Plaintiffs, v. METROPOLITAN GOVERNMENT OF NASHVILLE AND DAVIDSON COUNTY, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Tennessee |
Christopher K. Thompson, Thompson Law, Nashville, TN, for Plaintiffs.
Rebecca Cothran Blair, The Blair Law Firm, Brentwood, TN, for Defendant Patrick Cuthbertson.
John M. L. Brown, 810 Dominican Drive, Nashville, TN, for Defendant Robert Durbin.
Kristin Ellis Berexa, Farrar & Bates, LLP, Nashville, TN, for Defendant Carlos Lara.
Pending before the Court is Defendant Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County's ("Defendant Metro") Motion to Dismiss (Doc. No. 22, "Motion"). Plaintiff has filed a Response (Doc. No. 27). Defendant has filed a Reply (Doc. No. 28). The Motion is ripe for review.
For the reasons discussed, the Court will grant the Motion.
Plaintiff's Complaint arises from a series of events surrounding her arrest after spending an evening in downtown Nashville with a female friend. While walking to Plaintiff's car, the heel on one her friend's shoes broke, and she asked Plaintiff to carry her. (Doc. No. 1 at 4). Plaintiff, a female police officer, proceeded to carry her friend "piggy-back." (Id. ). This proved to be difficult, and Plaintiff then began to carry her friend over her shoulder. (Id. at 5). Two unknown women approached Plaintiff. It appears that one of them conducted herself with some human decency, asking Plaintiff whether her (Plaintiff's) friend was all right. Alas, the other unknown woman did not do likewise, hurling a racial slur Plaintiff's way and telling Plaintiff put her friend down (Id. ). Evidently rising above this egregious provocation, Plaintiff put her friend down, explained that she was not hurting her friend, and walked away; when the women followed, Plaintiff showed them her police commission ID card. (Id. ). The two women, now joined by two men, surrounded Plaintiff, and one of the women slapped the card out of Plaintiff's hand. (Id. ). Plaintiff was pushed to the ground and attempted to call 911 three or four times. (Id. at 6). Plaintiff then attempted to sling her arms in order to create some space between her and the group, and one of the men wrestled her to the ground and held her there until the police arrived. (Id. ). Plaintiff was transported to the hospital and then to jail. (Id. at 6-7).
Thereafter, Plaintiff was relieved from active duty. (Id. at 7). A detective swore out an arrest warrant for Plaintiff because he had been threatened by another officer with suspension if he did not do so. (Id. at 8). No one wished to prosecute, and the charges were dismissed. (Id. at 9). Plaintiff was placed back on active duty. (Id. ). A summary of the events was published on the Internet by Defendant Metro. (Id. at 10-11).
Plaintiff brings claims for violations of her Fourth Amendment rights and false light. (Id. at 10-11). Defendant Metro has moved to dismiss the claims against it.
For purposes of a motion to dismiss brought under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court must take all the factual allegations in the complaint as true, as it has done above. Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face. Id. A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Id. Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice. Id. When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief. Id. at 1950. A legal conclusion, including one couched as a factual allegation, need not be accepted as true on a motion to dismiss, nor are mere recitations of the elements of a cause of action sufficient. Id. ; Fritz v. Charter Township of Comstock , 592 F.3d 718, 722 (6th Cir. 2010), cited in Abriq v. Hall , 295 F. Supp. 3d 874, 877 (M.D. Tenn. 2018). Moreover, factual allegations that are merely consistent with the defendant's liability do not satisfy the claimant's burden, as mere consistency does not establish plausibility of entitlement to relief even if it supports the possibility of relief. Iqbal , 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937.
In determining whether a complaint is sufficient under the standards of Iqbal and its predecessor and complementary case, Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007), it may be appropriate to "begin [the] analysis by identifying the allegations in the complaint that are not entitled to the assumption of truth." Iqbal , 556 U.S. at 680, 129 S.Ct. 1937. This can be crucial, as no such allegations count toward the plaintiff's goal of reaching plausibility of relief. To reiterate, such allegations include "bare assertions," formulaic recitation of the elements, and "conclusory" or "bald" allegations. Id. at 681, 129 S.Ct. 1937. The question is whether the remaining allegations—factual allegations, i.e. , allegations of factual matter—plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief. Id. If not, the pleading fails to meet the standard of Fed. R. Civ. P. 8 and thus must be dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). Id. at 683, 129 S.Ct. 1937.
As a general rule, matters outside the pleadings may not be considered in ruling on a motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) unless the motion is converted to one for summary judgment under Rule 56. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d). When a document is referred to in the pleadings and is integral to the claims, it may be considered without converting a motion to dismiss into one for summary judgment. Doe v. Ohio State Univ. , 219 F. Supp. 3d 645, 652-53 (S.D. Ohio 2016) ; Blanch v. Trans Union, LLC , 333 F. Supp. 3d 789, 791-92 (M.D. Tenn. 2018).
Defendant argues in its Motion that it is entitled to dismissal on 1) the claims brought against it pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (" Section 1983"), and 2) any false light claim. (Doc. No. 22). This encompasses all of the counts in Plaintiff's claims against Metro. (Doc. No. 1). In her Response, Plaintiff states that she does not oppose Defendant's Motion to the extent it seeks dismissal of the Section 1983 claims. (Doc. No. 27 at 8). The Court therefore will dismiss the Section 1983 claims against Defendant Metro. The Court will focus the rest of its discussion on Plaintiff's false light claims. Defendant Metro lodges two primary attacks against Plaintiff's false light claims: 1) that Defendant Metro has immunity, and 2) that this Court should not exercise supplemental jurisdiction. (Doc. No. 22 at 5-6); (Doc. No. 28 at 3-4). Plaintiff argues that Defendant Metro does not have immunity under the GTLA. (Doc. No. 27 at 3).
The crux of Plaintiff's false light claim is encompassed in two paragraphs of her Complaint:2
(Doc. No. 1 at 10-11). Plaintiff additionally attached an Exhibit to her Complaint with the publication. (Doc. No. 1-2).
Defendant Metro argues that it is protected by governmental immunity that it claims it enjoys under the Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act ("GTLA"). The GTLA provides that governmental entities are immune from lawsuits arising from the exercise or discharge of governmental functions, with certain exceptions. Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-20-201. One of these exceptions is that governmental entities are not immune when a plaintiff's injury arises from the negligence of a governmental employee. Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-20-205. However, from this exception, Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-20-205 in turn excepts the following torts: "[f]alse imprisonment pursuant to a mittimus from a court, false arrest, malicious prosecution, intentional trespass, abuse of process, libel, slander, deceit, interference with contract rights, infliction of mental anguish, invasion of right of privacy , or civil rights." Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-20-201(2) (emphasis added). That is, subsection (2) of Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-20-205 (hereinafter, "Subsection (2)") provides an exception to Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-20-205's exception to sovereign immunity; in other words, where applicable, Subsection (2)'s exception-to-the-exception effectively grants governmental entities sovereign immunity. The parties have different perspectives on whether "invasion of right of privacy" as listed in Subsection (2) includes a false light claim.
Plaintiff counsels the Court that a false light claim is not included in the "invasion of right of privacy" listed in Subsection (2). To support this contention, Plaintiff points the Court to Limbaugh v....
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