Iliad Research & Trading, L.P. v. Advaxis, Inc.
Decision Date | 04 May 2015 |
Docket Number | Case No. 2:14-CV-00478-BSJ |
Parties | ILIAD RESEARCH AND TRADING, L.P., a Delaware limited partnership, Plaintiff, v. ADVAXIS, INC., a Delaware Corporation, Defendant. |
Court | U.S. District Court — District of Utah |
Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment,1 Defendant's Motion to Deny Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and for Discovery,2 and Plaintiff's Motion to Strike3 came before the court for hearing on March 11, 2015. Jeremy C. Reutzel and Brig Harman appeared on behalf of Plaintiff. Frederick R. Kessler and Jack Nelson appeared on behalf of Defendant.4
After hearing arguments from counsel, the court granted Plaintiff's Motion to Strike and reserved ruling on the remaining two motions.5
Having considered the parties' briefs, the arguments of counsel, and the relevant law, the court GRANTS Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and DENIES Defendant's competing motion for denial and discovery.
The following facts are not genuinely disputed:
Whether Advaxis breached the Purchase Agreement when it entered into the Section 3(a)(10) transaction with Ironridge requires analysis of three questions: (i) was Tonaquint entitled to participate in the Section 3(a)(10) transaction with Ironridge; (ii) if so, did Advaxis provide sufficient notice of the Section 3(a)(10) transaction with Ironridge; and (iii) did Tonaquint (and Iliad) waive any material breach to the Purchase Agreement?
The court will analyze these three questions in turn.
The Purchase Agreement says what it says. And with regards to the Section 3(a)(10) Participation Right, as outlined above, the Purchase Agreement says the following:
Section 3(a)(9) and 3(a)(10) Right of Participation. Pursuant to the terms of this subsection, [Advaxis] hereby grants [Tonaquint] a right of participation with respect to any transaction or arrangement structured, in whole or in part, in accordance with Section 3(a)(9) or Section 3(a)(10) of the 1933 Act . . . that [Advaxis] proposes to enter into any time during the period beginning on the date hereof and ending on the later of (i) two (2) years after the date hereof and (ii) the date that all of [Advaxis'] obligations hereunder and the Note are paid and performed in full and the Warrant is exercised in full (or otherwise expired) . . . provided, however, that [Tonaquint] may only elect to participate in acquiring up to 50% of the principal balance of such Section 3(a)(9) or 3(a)(10) Transaction.
(CM/ECF No. 22-2), at §5.2(k).
Advaxis seeks to stand in two places at once regarding this contract provision and whether it is ambiguous or unambiguous. In its opposition to the summary judgment motion, Advaxis argues the meaning of the Participation Right provision is unambiguous:
Iliad's interpretation is contrary to the plain language of the purchase agreement's Participation Right. The Participation Right only permitted Tonaquint to participate in Section 3(a)(9) or Section 3(a)(10) transactions "that [Advaxis] proposes to enter into any time during the period beginning on the date hereof . . ." Thus, the Purchase Agreement gives a Participation Right only in transactions that Advaxis "proposed" to enter into after the Purchase Agreement was executed. This interpretation comports with the plain meaning of the word "proposes."
(CM/ECF No. 39), at 5 (internal citations omitted). But at the March 11, 2015 hearing, Advaxis' position was more opaque:
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