Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Cryogenic Transp., Inc.

Decision Date29 June 2012
Docket NumberNo. 11–60366.,11–60366.
Citation686 F.3d 314
PartiesILLINOIS CENTRAL RAILROAD COMPANY, Plaintiff, v. CRYOGENIC TRANSPORTATION, INCORPORATED, Defendant. Clydine Daniel, in her capacity as Administratrix/Executrix/Personal Representative of the Estate of Michael Daniel, deceased, Defendant–Third Party Plaintiff–Appellant. v. Airgas Carbonics, Incorporated, Third Party Defendant–Appellee.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Larry Wade Morris (argued), Attorney, Morris, Haynes & Hornsby, Alexander City, AL, Emily Hornsby Nelson, Morris, Haynes & Hornsby, Birmingham, AL, for DefendantThird Party PlaintiffAppellant.

William Gaudet, Adams & Reese, L.L.P., New Orleans, LA, John Simeon Hooks, Lindsey Nicole Oswalt, Laura F. Rose (argued), Adams & Reese, L.L.P., Ridgeland, MS, for Third Party DefendantAppellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi.

Before JOLLY, BENAVIDES and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.

E. GRADY JOLLY, Circuit Judge:

Clydine Daniel appeals the dismissal of her claim against a company that owned property that her husband, Michael Daniel, exited moments before colliding with a train. The district court dismissed the claim, holding that the property owner owed no duty to Michael Daniel at the time of the collision. We AFFIRM.

I.

On July 26, 2009, Michael Daniel drove an eighteen-wheeler for Cryogenic Transportation to pick up carbon dioxide at a plant in Star, Mississippi, owned by Airgas Carbonics. Upon exiting the Airgas plant, Daniel collided with a passing train operated by Illinois Central Railroad Company. He died two days later.

On August 11, 2009, Illinois Central filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi against Cryogenic Transportation and Michael Daniel's widow, Clydine Daniel, as representative of Michael Daniel's estate. Illinois Central sought recovery for damage to its train, tracks, and other property resulting from the collision. Clydine Daniel filed a counterclaim sounding in negligence, and later amended the counterclaim to add Airgas as a counterclaim defendant.1 Mrs. Daniel sought recovery for damages resulting from Michael Daniel's death.

Airgas filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, which the district court granted orally on October 12, 2010. The court later set out its reasons in writing, explaining that, based on the counterclaim's allegations, Airgas owed no duty to Daniel because Airgas did not own the railroad tracks or railroad crossing at which the accident occurred. On May 4, 2011, the district court entered final judgment on the counterclaim against Airgas under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b). Clydine Daniel appeals.

II.

We review a district court's dismissal for failure to state a claim de novo, accepting as true all well pleaded facts and viewing those facts in the light most favorable to the non-movant. Bass v. Stryker Corp., 669 F.3d 501, 506 (5th Cir.2012). Dismissal was appropriate if Clydine Daniel failed to allege facts supporting a plausible claim or failed to raise her right to relief above a speculative level. Id.

Because diversity furnishes the basis for jurisdiction, we apply the substantive law of Mississippi, the forum state. Citigroup, Inc. v. Fed. Ins. Co., 649 F.3d 367, 371 (5th Cir.2011). Decisions of the Mississippi Supreme Court guide our determination of Mississippi law. Id. In both the district court and this Court, Clydine Daniel pursued a negligence theory based on Airgas's ownership of its premises and its control of the areas surrounding those premises. Tort law, specifically the law of premises liability, is therefore the Mississippi law at issue. See Double Quick, Inc. v. Moore, 73 So.3d 1162, 1165–66 (Miss.2011).

A.

Under Mississippi law, the duty a premises owner owes to entrants depends on whether the entrants are invitees, licensees, or trespassers. Id. at 1166. Here, the parties agree that Michael Daniel was Airgas's business invitee, and therefore that Airgas owed Daniel a duty “to keep the premises reasonably safe and ... to warn only of hidden dangers not in plain and open view.” Id. Airgas's duty extended to all areas substantially under its control that it invited the public to use. Albert v. Scott's Truck Plaza, Inc., 978 So.2d 1264, 1267 (Miss.2008).

The counterclaim, therefore, can state a premises liability claim only if it alleges that the collision occurred at a location under Airgas's control. Id. The counterclaim describes three sets of railroad tracks outside the Airgas plant exit: one set that is a “private crossing owned by Airgas,” a second set that is a “public crossing and the tracks are owned by Illinois Central,” and a third set that is, simply, a “public crossing.” Each set of tracks intersects Andrew Jackson Circle,” a road adjacent to the Airgas plant. The counterclaim alleges that the collision occurred when “the front cab of [Daniel's] truck had crossed over the second set of tracks but the trailer was in the process of crossing over the second set of tracks.”

In other words, the counterclaim indicates that the collision occurred, not on Airgas's property, but on tracks owned by Illinois Central intersecting a public road. There are no allegations from which one might infer that Airgas had control over this public crossing. The district court was therefore correct in holding that Airgas owed no duty to Michael Daniel at the time of the collision.

B.

Irrespective of who controlled the railroad tracks, Clydine Daniel contends that Airgas owed a duty to furnish a safe exit, it breached this duty by requiring Michael Daniel to exit in the direction of railroad tracks, and the breach caused the off-premises collision. This suggested approach—coupling an on-premises duty with an off-premises accident—is foreclosed by the Mississippi Supreme Court's decision in Albert v. Scott's Truck...

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4 cases
  • Stewart v. Waco Indep. Sch. Dist.
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit
    • 14 Marzo 2013
    ...This court reviews such cases de novo, construing facts “in the light most favorable to the non-movant.” Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Cryogenic Transp., Inc., 686 F.3d 314, 316 (5th Cir.2012) (citation omitted). “Dismissal [is] appropriate if [the plaintiff] fail[s] to allege facts supporting a p......
  • H.R. v. Double J Logistics, LLC
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Southern District of Mississippi
    • 19 Septiembre 2017
    ...is based on diversity of citizenship, the substantive law of the forum state, Mississippi, controls. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Cryogenic Transp., Inc., 686 F.3d 314, 316 (5th Cir. 2012). 4. The language of the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 314 (1965) is ...
  • InsuraSource, Inc. v. Phx. Ins. Co., Civil Action No. 2:11cv49–KS–MTP.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Southern District of Mississippi
    • 5 Diciembre 2012
    ...substantive law of the forum state when jurisdiction is based on diversity of citizenship. See, e.g., Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Cryogenic Transp., Inc., 686 F.3d 314, 316 (5th Cir.2012); Citigroup, Inc. v. Fed. Ins. Co., 649 F.3d 367, 371 (5th Cir.2011). The parties have not argued that any ot......
  • Morea v. Star Transp., LLC
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Southern District of Mississippi
    • 29 Octubre 2012
    ...Analysis A. All Claims In this diversity action, the Court applies the substantive law of Mississippi. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Cryogenic Transp., Inc., 686 F.3d 314, 316 (5th Cir. 2012). "In order to prevail on a negligence claim the plaintiff must establish by a preponderance of the evidenc......

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