Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Able
| Decision Date | 30 June 1871 |
| Parties | ILLINOIS CENTRAL RAILROAD COMPANYv.JESSE L. ABLE. |
| Court | Illinois Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
APPEAL from the Circuit Court of Effingham county; the Hon. H. B. DECIUS, Judge, presiding.
Mr. GEORGE W. WALL, for the appellant.
Mr. O. B. FICKLIN, JOHN SCHOLFIELD, and Messrs. WOOD & BARLOW, for the appellee.
If a railway passenger, holding a ticket entitling him to alight at a particular station, is carried past such station without his consent, and without being allowed a reasonable opportunity of leaving the train, he has an action against the company for whatever damages may have accrued to him for non-delivery at the place of his destination. But on the other hand, if he voluntarily leaps from the train when in rapid motion, or leaves it under circumstances which would necessarily or probably render such an act perilous, and receives bodily injury, he could not recover damages for the injury, because it would be the result of his own want of ordinary care. Cases might occur, however, in which a reasonable opportunity to alight has not been given to a passenger, and where he attempts to do so after the train has resumed its motion, but before the motion has become at all rapid, and the stepping from the train would not seem dangerous to a man of ordinary prudence and judgment, and nevertheless bodily injury follows; in such cases the passenger would be entitled to recover damages for the injury, because the railway company has committed a flagrant breach of duty, and the passenger is chargeable with no appreciable negligence. He has a right to construe the momentary halt of the train at the station as an invitation to alight, and to make use of the opportunity thus afforded where not attended with apparent danger, holding the company responsible if it does not furnish reasonable time to leave the train with safety.
The action of the court in giving, refusing, and modifying instructions, was in substantial accordance with these principles.
It is urged, that the verdict is not sustained by the evidence, but we refrain from the consideration of that point, as there is another upon which the case must be sent to another jury. It appears, by the affidavit of the officer having in charge the jury, that after agreeing to find for the plaintiff, they differed widely as to the amount of damages, and it was then agreed that each juror should...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
The Chicago v. Sykes
...invitation of the conductor: R. R. I. & St. L. R. R. Co. v. Coultas, 67 Ill. 398; I. C. R. R. Co. v. Slatton, 54 Ill. 133; I. C. R. R. Co. v. Able, 59 Ill. 131. That it was negligence on the part of the railroad company to obstruct the sidewalk: C. B. & Q. R. R. Co. v. Dewey, 26 Ill. 255; R......
-
Carroll v. Preston Trucking Co., Inc.
...1871, our supreme court held quotient verdicts to be an impermissible method by which a jury may reach its verdict. Illinois Central R.R. Co. v. Able, 59 Ill. 131 (1871). The juror affidavit in Able outlined the method the jury used to decide damages. Able, 59 Ill. at 133. Each juror wrote ......
-
Urbas v. Saintco, Inc., 5-91-0296
...that when a jury agrees in advance to arrive at a verdict by averaging, the verdict thereafter rendered is improper. (Illinois Central R.R. Co. v. Able (1871), 59 Ill. 131.) However, in order to establish that a void quotient verdict was rendered, an advance agreement must be shown. (German......
-
The Chicago & Nw. Ry. Co. v. Bliss
...486; Johnson v. City of Boston, 118 Mass. 114. The verdict was the result of chance and should have been set aside: Ill. Cent, R. R. Co. v. Able, 59 Ill. 131; City of Pekin v. Winkel, 77 Ill. 56; Dunn v. Hall, 8 Blackf. 32; Dana v. Tucker. 4 J. R. 487; Harvey v. Rickett, 15 J. R. 87. Messrs......