Illingworth v. Nestle USA, Inc.
Decision Date | 21 May 1996 |
Docket Number | Civil Action No. 95-2409(JCL). |
Citation | 926 F. Supp. 482 |
Parties | Donald D. ILLINGWORTH, Plaintiff, v. NESTLE U.S.A., INC., t/a Nestle Food Company, Defendant. |
Court | U.S. District Court — District of New Jersey |
COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED
David Schechner, Schechner & Targan, West Orange, NJ, for Plaintiff.
Vincent E. Reilly, McElroy, Deutsch & Mulvaney, Morristown, NJ, for Defendant.
This case presents the question of whether an employer can violate the handicap provision of the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination ("LAD") when, at the time it decided to fire the employee, it indisputably lacked knowledge of the employee's handicap. After canvassing New Jersey law and cases interpreting federal antidiscrimination statutes, the Court holds that the employer's knowledge of the employee's handicap is an element of the plaintiff's prima facie case. Absent such knowledge, the prima facie case fails and the employer cannot, as a matter of law, be liable for handicap discrimination.
Nestle U.S.A., Inc., t/a Nestle Food Company ("Nestle") moves for summary judgment dismissing Donald Illingworth's handicap discrimination and breach of contract suit. Nestle disputes whether Illingworth, who is dyslexic, is handicapped within the definition of the Americans With Disabilities Act ("ADA") and the LAD, and contends that neither it nor even Illingworth knew of his dyslexia until months after he was terminated. Thus, he can establish no causal connection between his dyslexia and the decision to terminate him. Illingworth responds that Nestle knew or should have known about his dyslexia given the severe difficulty he encountered trying to master the computer skills that had become part of his job. As for the breach of contract claim, which pertains to Illingworth's alleged entitlement to severance benefits, Nestle argues that there is no genuine dispute that Illingworth is not entitled to additional severance benefits, a claim governed by ERISA rather than the New Jersey common law asserted by Illingworth.
For reasons articulated below, the Court will grant summary judgment and dismiss this lawsuit.
Illingworth's parents recognized when he was quite young that he had some form of learning disability. To remedy this, they sent him to special schools until he was able to return to the public school system. See Illingworth Cert. at ¶ 3. Attached as Exhibit A to his Certification is a letter, written in 1955, from the Director of the Reading and Study Skills Center, Inc., discussing his reading problem and the progress achieved to date.
Despite his learning disability, Illingworth completed high school, college and a tour in the U.S. Navy, where he performed clerical and administrative duties. See Illingworth Dep. (Ex. 2 to Def's Brief) at 22. After college, in 1970, he joined Nestle's predecessor as a Sales Representative. See id. at ¶ 4. In 1976, he was promoted to District Trainer and then Senior Territory Manager. Subsequent promotions raised him, by 1986, to the position of Account Executive, where his responsibilities included managing various regional accounts and developing marketing strategies and inventory control ideas. See id. at ¶¶ 5-7. In 1992, Nestle promoted him to Business (or Merchandiser) Analyst.
Id. at ¶ 9. To perform these duties, Illingworth needed to use a computerized Plan-O-Gram program which, inter alia, gave the user the ability to graphically show store representatives what a particular shelf set-up would look like. See Cannon Decl. at ¶ 3; Illingworth Cert. at ¶ 10. Being given Plan-O-Gram responsibilities by a grocery chain, i.e. being named Captain for a particular department, gives the responsible sales representative a competitive advantage in that particular chain's stores and is considered an important element of successful sales. See Cannon Decl. at ¶ 3. Illingworth states, however, that in his experience being named Captain does not result in automatic placement and increased sales. See Illingworth Cert. at ¶ 11. He also asserts that he would give constructive comments about the Plan-O-Grams submitted by competitors to try to demonstrate why better placement for Nestle products was in the retailer's interest. See id. at ¶ 12. Nestle does not dispute or even address this point.1
In March 1994, one of Illingworth's primary customers, Pathmark, took its store's Plan-O-Gram duties away from Illingworth. See Illingworth Dep. at 88. Prior to this, he had sole Plan-O-Gram responsibilities for several sections of the store. According to John Cannon, Illingworth's regional manager, on March 16, the Pathmark Space Manager told Cannon that he was dissatisfied with Illingworth's space management performance, expressing concerns with his Plan-O-Gram timeliness and thoroughness, cooperativeness in scheduling resets, and flexibility in meeting Pathmark's needs.2 Cannon was concerned because Pathmark was an important customer and Illingworth had notified neither him nor Rick Rising, Illingworth's immediate supervisor.3 Absent such notice, Nestle could not formulate a plan to try to prevent loss of Plan-O-Gram responsibilities. Illingworth also lost the A & P captaincy. See Cannon Decl. at ¶ 7. Cannon reported his concerns regarding Illingworth's performance to his superiors at Nestle, and his decision to terminate plaintiff for performance reasons was approved. On March 21, 1994, Illingworth was notified of his termination. His position was filled in late November 1994.4
At no time prior to his termination did Illingworth tell his Nestle supervisors that he suffered from a medical condition that adversely affected his ability to perform his duties as a Business Analyst. See Illingworth Dep. at 103-104;5 Illingworth Cert. at ¶ 26; Cannon Decl. at ¶ 6. He told them a number of times that he was having great difficulty mastering the computer skills necessary to timely generate Plan-O-Grams. In January 1994, after Illingworth performed unsatisfactorily on an analytical test, he was warned that his performance needed to improve. He asked to be placed in a different job, perhaps his old sales job, a request Cannon denied as not in Nestle's best interests and, in any event, impossible due to the unavailability of sales positions in the New York area in early 1994. See Illingworth Cert. at ¶ 21; Cannon Decl. at ¶ 8. According to Cannon, he "had the impression that Mr. Illingworth was not picking up computer skills as quickly as some others, but he did not attribute this to any mental or physical condition and it was not so pronounced as to suggest anything other than that he was less computer literate than some other employees." Id. at ¶ 9.
Illingworth remained on Nestle's payroll until June 1, 1994, and was given an additional two months as severance pay when he failed to obtain other employment by June 1, 1994. See Cannon Decl. at ¶ 4. In September 1994, some six months after the termination decision, Illingworth was identified by a Suburban Learning Center, Inc. Learning Consultant as having "test results ... consistent with a perceptual impairment/learning disability commonly known as dyslexia." Illingworth Dep. at 120-122 and Dep. Ex. 9.
In late April, 1994, after his termination, Illingworth asked to see the Human Resource Manual. He had never reviewed the provision about termination benefits before April 29, 1994. See Dep. at 74:12-18. The termination benefits policy, issued on March 1, 1994 and only circulated to Human Resources staff (not Nestle employees) for guidance purposes, see Peebles Decl. at ¶ 4, applies in cases where an employee has been terminated because of a "job elimination, consolidation, or displacement caused by a closure, reduction in workforce, divestiture, or restructuring...." Id., Attachment A. Nestle does not have a policy of providing salary continuation or similar severance benefits to employees terminated because of performance deficiencies. See id. at ¶ 2.
Summary judgment is not a disfavored procedural shortcut, but rather an essential thread in the fabric of the ...
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