Illinois Bell Telephone Co. v. Gilbert
Decision Date | 29 April 1933 |
Docket Number | No. 3746.,3746. |
Citation | 3 F. Supp. 595 |
Parties | ILLINOIS BELL TELEPHONE CO. v. GILBERT et al. (CITY OF CHICAGO, Intervener). |
Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois |
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Chas. S. Cutting, of Chicago, Ill., Philip Barton Warren, of Springfield, Ill., Wm. D. Bangs and Horace Kent Tenney, both of Chicago, Ill., and William H. Thompson, of Indianapolis, Ind., for plaintiff.
Benj. F. Goldstein, Edmund D. Adcock, G. I. Haight, Francis X. Busch, and Samuel A. Ettelson, all of Chicago, Ill., Simon Hear and Oscar E. Carlstrom, of Chicago, Ill., for defendants.
Before EVANS and SPARKS, Circuit Judges, and WILKERSON, District Judge.
The final decree of this court entered on January 31, 1930, enjoined the enforcement of an order of the Illinois Commerce Commission which prescribed rates for telephone service in the city of Chicago upon the ground that the order was confiscatory. Illinois Bell Tel. Co. v. Moynihan, 38 F.(2d) 77. The order of the Commission was made on August 16, 1923, effective October 1, 1923. The decree of January 31, 1930, was set aside by the Supreme Court and the cause remanded to this court. Smith v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 282 U. S. 133, 51 S. Ct. 65, 75 L. Ed. 255. The Supreme Court said that "there should be appropriate findings as to the results of the intrastate business in Chicago and the effect of the rates in question for each of the years since the date of the Commission's order."
As to the separation of the intrastate and interstate property, revenues and expenses of the company, the Supreme Court (page 149 of 282 U. S., 51 S. Ct. 65, 69) said:
And again on the same subject:
We have endeavored to comply with this mandate in making the separation of intrastate and interstate property, revenue, and expenses. The difficulties in so doing are, of course, apparent. Such separation has been made on the basis of actual use. Certain portions of the property were used exclusively for exchange or local intrastate business, certain portions exclusively for intrastate toll purposes, and certain portions exclusively for interstate toll purposes. Such portions of property require no apportionment, and have been directly segregated in accordance with their respective uses. The remainder of the property not so directly segregated, including the subscribers' station apparatus and equipment, of the subscribers' lines, and the local central office equipment, has been apportioned to plaintiff's exchange (intrastate), intrastate toll and interstate toll business, respectively, in accordance with its actual proportionate use for each of such classes of business. Obviously this apportionment cannot be exact. In our opinion, however, it is reasonably accurate.
In valuing the property, one of the elements to which consideration has been given is the reproduction cost new as of December 31 for each of the years 1923 to 1931. In the findings of January 31, 1930, we approved the method employed by plaintiff in determining the reproduction cost new of the property. We have adhered to that conclusion, and are now of opinion that the reproduction costs determined in accordance with the method pursued by plaintiff are substantially accurate. Such reproduction costs of plaintiff's property in service in the Chicago area, exclusive of working cash capital, materials, and supplies, construction work in progress, and going value, based upon the estimates of plaintiff's engineer, Sloan, are as follows: 1923, $148,581,042; 1924, $156,452,212; 1925, $172,257,055; 1926, $178,413,771; 1927, $191,820,622; 1928, $202,604,906; 1929, $219,327,112; 1930, $228,411,330; 1931, $226,912,713.
The evidence as to the book cost of plaintiff's Chicago area property, exclusive of working cash capital, materials and supplies, construction work in progress, and going value, as of December 31, for each of the years 1923 to 1931, is as follows: 1923, $100,040,051; 1924, $110,987,626; 1925, $126,493,467; 1926, $140,915,840; 1927, $155,508,437; 1928, $169,390,828; 1929, $182,657,561; 1930, $191,286,165; 1931, $195,422,113.
The evidence shows that the average amounts of working cash capital reasonably employed in the Chicago area were as follows: 1923, $3,000,000; 1924, $3,150,000; 1925, $3,325,000; 1926, $3,550,000; 1927, $3,825,000; 1928, $4,050,000; 1929, $4,500,000; 1930, $4,550,000; 1931, $4,250,000.
The average investment of plaintiff in its Chicago area in materials and supplies necessary in the conduct of its business as shown by the evidence are as follows: 1923, $233,022; 1924, $299,310; 1925, $358,227; 1926, $336,693; 1927, $326,599; 1928, $344,336; 1929, $276,091; 1930, $209,784; 1931, $224,433.
The amounts invested in property in the process of construction are shown by the evidence to be as follows: 1923, $812,543; 1924, $2,100,245; 1925, $1,390,296; 1926, $775,279; 1927, $5,437,059; 1928, $3,275,756; 1929, $1,974,688; 1930, $4,415,765; 1931, $441,956.
The valuation of plaintiff's property for 1931 and 1932 presents some difficulties which are not present in the other years. We are obliged to take notice of the general decline in property values which has accompanied the present period of business stagnation. For this reason we cannot take the reproduction estimates, based on the costs of labor and material stated in the record at their face. We have fixed values, therefore, for 1931 and 1932 which in our opinion give due consideration to the element of the present general decline in values.
In considering reproduction cost new as an element in arriving at value, it is necessary to deduct the actual existing depreciation in the property as compared with the new one in order to find the value of the physical elements commonly referred to as the structural value of the property.
A consideration of the evidence on this subject, including that of the witnesses who inspected the property, has led to the conclusion that the fair rate of depreciation is 16 per cent. for the years 1923 to 1928, inclusive, and 15 per cent. for the succeeding years.
In determining the element of going value, consideration has been given to the evidence relating to the construction and management of plaintiff's Chicago property. It is well planned, effectively engineered, and properly constructed. It has a capable staff of operating employees. It is well adapted to the needs of Chicago, and through years of operation has become fully efficient and serviceable to that community. Continuously from 1923 to the present time, it has had established routines, attached customers, and trained employees. The plaintiff has been efficiently and economically operated, and has had a high standard of maintenance. The company's credit has been excellent and, if given reasonable rates, it has good earning power. The number of its telephone stations increased from 690,000 at the end of 1923 to over 980,000 at the end of 1930. Plaintiff has engineered and planned its property so that, as additions are required to meet the future needs of the community, they may be made efficiently and economically.
From a consideration of the pertinent facts, we have reached the conclusion that 8 per cent. is a reasonable allowance for going value.
With reference to purchases by the Illinois Company from the Western Electric Company, the Supreme Court (page 153 of 282 U. S., 51 S. Ct. 65, 70) said: ...
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