Illinois Cent. Gulf R. Co. v. Price
Decision Date | 09 December 1988 |
Parties | ILLINOIS CENTRAL GULF RAILROAD COMPANY v. Steve I. PRICE. 87-216. |
Court | Alabama Supreme Court |
Paul W. Brock and Archibald T. Reeves IV, of Hand, Arendall, Bedsole, Greaves & Johnston, Mobile, for appellant.
Eric D. Jackstadt of Pratt and Callis, East Alton, Ill., and John M. Tyson of Tyson & Tyson, Mobile, for appellee.
Steve Price elected to and did file this Federal Employers' Liability Act action against Illinois Central Gulf Railroad Company in the State courts of Alabama on July 7, 1986, for an injury that Mr. Price received on June 7, 1985, in Hinds County, Mississippi. Thereafter, Mr. Price died of unrelated causes. On January 20, 1987, an attorney for Illinois Central filed a suggestion of death in the State court action, and served a copy of this on attorneys of record for Mr. Price. On July 31, 1987, a motion to dismiss with prejudice was filed by Illinois Central, in which it was alleged that six months had passed since Mr. Price's death was suggested on the record and no motion for substitution had been filed in accordance with Rule 25(a)(1), A.R.Civ.P. The fact that no substitution was filed within the six months or prior to the filing of the motion to dismiss is not disputed.
The trial court dismissed the action without prejudice, correctly noting that this Court has not decided whether Rule 25(a)(1) dismissals should be with or without prejudice. We granted Illinois Central's petition for permission to appeal pursuant to Rule 5(a), A.R.App.P.
The trial court dismissed the action; therefore, the issue of whether the order of dismissal is discretionary with the trial court after six months, subject to denial upon a showing of excusable neglect, is not before us. See Jernigan v. Collier, 234 Ga. 837, 218 S.E.2d 556 (1975).
The issue presented for review is whether dismissal under Rule 25(a)(1) for failure to substitute a personal representative for a plaintiff, after the death of the plaintiff has been suggested on the record for more than six months, must be with prejudice, where the defendant has moved for dismissal with prejudice.
Rule 25(a)(1), A.R.Civ.P., provides, in pertinent part:
(Emphasis supplied.)
In Henderson v. Briarcliff Nursing Home, 451 So.2d 282 (Ala.1984), a personal injury action was pending at the time of the death of the plaintiff. There is no indication that the plaintiff died as a proximate cause of these injuries. The defendant nursing home filed a suggestion of death, in accordance with Rule 25(a)(1). No substitution was made within six months after the suggestion was filed. The nursing home then filed a motion to dismiss, which was granted by the trial court. Justice Beatty wrote:
Whether the dismissal was with or without prejudice was not addressed by the Court, since a dismissal of a personal injury action sounding in tort would be a dismissal on the merits, due to the fact that the cause of action does not survive the death of the plaintiff.
Under Alabama law, a cause of action sounding in tort, as opposed to an action, for personal injuries does not survive in favor of a personal representative. Code 1975, § 6-5-462; Bates v. L & N Employees Credit Union, 374 So.2d 323 (Ala.1979); Carroll v. Florala Memorial Hospital, 288 Ala. 118, 257 So.2d 837 (1972); see Gillilan v. Federated Guaranty Life Insurance Co., 447 So.2d 668, 674 (Ala.1984). Therefore, the effect of a dismissal with prejudice or a dismissal without prejudice, in a case factually similar to this, in which we would apply Alabama law, would be the same. The personal representative could not file an action to recover for the personal injuries of a decedent who died of causes unrelated to his injuries.
The Court of Appeals of Georgia, in a six-to-three decision, construed the dismissal under a statute substantially identical to our Rule 25(a)(1) (Georgia Code Ann. § 81A-125(a)(1)) as being a dismissal on the merits. Jernigan v. Collier, 131 Ga.App. 162, 205 S.E.2d 450 (1974).
In Eastern Credit Association, Inc. v. Braxton's Estate, 215 A.2d 485, 486-87 (D.C.App.1965), the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia wrote:
We are persuaded that the dismissal under Rule 25(a)(1), A.R.Civ.P., acts as a rule of repose.
Code 1975 § 6-5-462, provides in pertinent part:
"[A]ll claims upon which an action has been filed and all claims upon which no action has been filed on a contract, express or implied, and all personal claims upon which an action has been filed, except for injuries to the reputation, survive in favor of and against personal representatives...."
If a plaintiff dies, a pending action for "injuries to the reputation" is extinguished. All other pending actions survive in favor of or against personal representatives. If within six months after suggestion of death upon the record, a motion for substitution has not been made by any party or by the successors or representatives of the deceased party, "the action shall be dismissed as to the deceased party." If this dismissal is not a rule of repose, the dismissal has the effect of being an adjudication on the merits of all actions, except actions based upon an express or implied contract, because, if the action is dismissed, even without prejudice, there is nothing left but a cause of action that death has abated. Whether the dismissal of a contract action would act as a rule of repose would depend solely upon whether the statute of limitations had run on that cause of action. Such disparity as to actions that had been filed prior to death was not the intent of this Court in promulgating Rule 25(a)(1). If death did not extinguish the claim (even if an action had been filed), the pending actions, regardless of their designation as contractual or non-contractual, should be treated similarly. The dismissal under Rule 25(a)(1) is a rule of repose as to Alabama common law causes of action and Alabama statutory causes of action, unless the statute creating the cause of action provides otherwise.
Clearly, 45 U.S.C. § 59 provides that "[a]ny right of action given by this chapter to a person suffering injury shall survive to his or her personal representative." (Emphasis added.) So an F.E.L.A. cause of action does survive death.
In the case at issue, we are dealing with a right to recover derived not from the statutory laws or common law of the State of Alabama, but from the statutory laws of the United States. The laws of the United States provide that an F.E.L.A. cause of action can be enforced in a State court, as well as in a federal court. The forms and mode of enforcing the right may vary because the procedural rules of the two judicial systems are not identical.
We are persuaded that we should not be overly concerned with characterizing a rule that authorizes the revival of an action as either procedural or substantive.
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