Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Dodd

• Decision Date: 05 May 1913
• Docket Number: 16,513
• Citation: 61 So. 743,105 Miss. 23
• Court: Mississippi Supreme Court
• Parties: ILLINOIS CENTRAL RAILROAD COMPANY v. R. E. DODD ET AL

61 So. 743

105 Miss. 23

ILLINOIS CENTRAL RAILROAD COMPANY v. R. E. DODD ET AL

No. 16,513

Supreme Court of Mississippi

May 5, 1913

APPEAL from the Railroad Commission of Mississippi.

Petition by R. E. Dodd to the Mississippi Railroad Commission for the establishment of a crossing over the right of way of the Illinois Central Railroad Company. From an order establishing the crossing the railroad appeals.

The facts are fully stated in the opinion of the court.

Appeal dismissed.

Mayes &amp Mayes, for appellant.

Chapter 86 of the Laws of 1908, page 71, provides that whenever the railroad commission shall make an order, "the validity of which shall be disputed upon the ground that the commission was without power to make it, or whenever the commission shall refuse to make an order asked for upon the ground that it was without power to make it, any person feeling aggrieved by the action of the commission may appeal therefrom directly to the supreme court. Upon such appeal the supreme court shall decide nothing except as to the power of the commission in the premises, and all other questions which may be involved shall remain unaffected thereby." See also, section 4890, Code 1906.

In the first place, we desire to call the court's attention to the fact that this right of appeal from the order of the railroad commission is not a new law. It is a right which seems to have been generally granted in many states. In this connection we call attention of the court to 33 Cyc. 52 dealing with railroad commissioners, in which it says "In some cases the statute gives the right of appeal from orders of the railroad commissioners, or authorizes the railroad company to bring an action against the commissioners to have the regulation, order or finding vacated, and right of appeal from the judgment there rendered to the supreme court or appellate court." If the court will examine Cyc. and the annotations to Cyc. on this subject from 1901 to 1912, it will find that the right of appeal from an order of the railroad commission is quite generally given throughout the states.

We here wish to emphasize the broad distinction between the exercise by the supreme court of the review of an administrative or legislative function conferred upon the railroad commission and the review by the appellate court of a question of a judicial nature. The legislature has not granted, and could not grant, an appeal from the order of the railroad commission to the supreme court in a matter purely administrative; that is, involving a question requiring the best judgment and discretion of the commission as to whether it is good or bad policy. Such questions are not judicial in nature, but are committed to the judgment of the commission and cannot be reviewed on appeal, unless they become unreasonable. But there is no such question involved here.

Our statute simply provides that on appeal to the supreme court from an order of the railroad commission, the sole question shall be as to the power of the commission--as to whether they have the legal right to do as they have. Surely, this presents a judicial question.

At this point we invite the court's attention to another point, this: That the organization of the railroad commission and the granting to it of certain judicial functions, is the organization of an inferior court within the meaning of section 172 of the Constitution; the Constitution fixes the jurisdiction of all the courts named therein; and, of course, the legislature cannot take away from any of these courts the powers conferred by the Constitution; but section 172 provides that the legislature shall, from time to time, establish other inferior courts, etc. The legislature cannot confide to the railroad commission any judicial jurisdiction which has been conferred by the Constitution upon any other court of the state. The jurisdiction confided to the railroad commission is such as the statute gives it; and the statute gives it no power to determine any case or controversy now determinable by any one of the courts named in the Constitution. We hold, therefore, that when the legislature created the commission as an inferior court, conferring upon it certain judicial functions, it had the right to say that an appeal should be granted from this court so created by it; and it had a right to name the court to which such appeal should be taken.

It is true that section 144 of the Constitution vests the judicial power in a supreme court, and such other courts as are provided for therein; and it is also true that section 146 of the Constitution limits the jurisdiction of the supreme court to such things as properly belong to a court of appeals.

We desire to call the attention of the court to the fact that in 56 So. 670, in the case of Railroad Co. v. City of Charleston, this court sustained a motion to dismiss an appeal, not upon the ground that the act authorizing it was unconstitutional, but upon the ground that the bill of exceptions had not been perfected within the proper time. This case, in effect, approved the right of the legislature to authorize by law an appeal direct from the order of the commission.

We also call the court's attention to the fact that in the case of the Mississippi Railroad Commission v. Y. & M. V. R. R. Co., 56 So. 663, this court has again expressly approved the right to appeal, from an order of the railroad commission, as provided in section 2890 of the Code of 1906, Laws of 1908, 71. In other words, we have been operating under section 4890 of the Code of 1906, and the Laws of 1908, granting the right to take an appeal from the order of the railroad commission to the supreme court since 1906, and this is the first effort to have this law declared unconstitutional.

The attorney-general calls our attention to several sections of the Constitution, which he claims to be violated by the statute granting an appeal from the order of the railroad commission to the supreme court. His idea seems to be that if the railroad commission has not sufficient judicial power to render a judgment which is final, and which finally disposes of the matter, this prevents an appeal from any order which they make, for any reason, because he contends that they are not acting in any judicial function. We will undertake to show a little later that there is nothing in this contention.

We hold that when the Constitution so provides, and when the statutes of the state give to the railroad commission certain judicial duties, it is within the province of the legislature to authorize an appeal from this inferior court, established by it, to the supreme court, as to all matters which are in their nature judicial; and when it comes to the construction of a statute and the determination as to whether certain powers have been conferred by law upon the commission, surely it cannot be said that this question is other than judicial. This does not confer original jurisdiction on the supreme court. The controversy begins before the commission and the railroad commission itself has to determine whether it has this power, or not, as the case may be. And however it may be decided, an appeal is granted to the supreme court for the purpose of determining whether the power is given to the commission by the statute. Clearly, this is a judicial question; the mere fact that an appeal is allowed gives no ground for avoiding this act; and it cannot be argued that the supreme court is going beyond its jurisdiction merely because an appeal is allowed from the holding of the commission, unless the question submitted to the court is one, the decision of which does not properly belong to a court of appeals. Construction of statutes, declaring of the jurisdiction and rights of so important a body as the railroad commission, involve judicial questions. For what is meant by original jurisdiction see Words and Phrases, vol. 6.

We do not care to follow the various decisions cited by the attorney- general in his brief, for the reason that we do not think they apply. In the Hayburn case, 2 Dallas, the court held that there was no judicial function exercised; in the case of 13 Howard, the court merely held that the Supreme Court of the United States could not exercise powers not judicial. In all the cases cited by the attorney-general the holdings have merely been to the effect that appellate courts would not take control of questions not judicial in nature.

In 78 N.E. 338 the same point seems to have been made as in the brief of the attorney-general. It appears that the Constitution of Indiana declares, as does ours, that, "The judicial power shall be vested in the supreme court, and such other courts as the general assembly may establish." And it was held that the legislature might invest the appellate court with such jurisdiction as it sees fit, only providing that the duty required is a judicial duty; and in determining whether a rate fixed by the commission has been established in due form of law, and under a valid law, and by a valid commission, it was held that the appellate court was exercising a judicial authority. To the same effect is the case of State v. Johnson, 49 L. R. A. 662, relied upon by counsel for motion. In other words, the only cases in which it has been held that these appeals could not be granted have been where appeals carried to the appellate court some question to be decided, not of a judicial character, which is not true of the instant case. The right of appeal granted by our statute carries to the supreme court only questions of a judicial character, and none else.

In the case of Tyson v. Washington County, 12 L. R. A. 350 the court held that the division of power between the several branches of the state government, by the Constitution of Nebraska, is...