Illinois Central Railroad Company v. Ward

• Court: United States State Supreme Court (Kentucky)
• Writing for the Court: Judge Willis
• Citation: 237 Ky. 478
• Decision Date: 17 February 1931
• Parties: Illinois Central Railroad Company et al. v. Ward. (Two Cases)

237 Ky. 478 Illinois Central Railroad Company et al.
v.
Ward. (Two Cases) Court of Appeals of Kentucky. Decided February 17, 1931.

1. Eminent Domain. — Closing or unreasonable obstruction of highway, street, or alley is taking private property within Constitution (Constitution, secs. 13, 242).

2. Highways. — Closing or obstruction of public highway is forbidden except when necessary for public use (Constitution, secs. 13, 242).

3. Eminent Domain. — Closing or obstruction of public highway, when necessary for public use, is allowed only upon rendering just compensation (Constitution, secs. 13, 242).

4. Highways. — Property owner peculiarly and especially affected by obstruction of highway may maintain action independent of remedy on behalf of public for abatement of obstruction or damages.

5. Highways. — In adjacent property owner's action for obstruction of public highway, that other means of access to property are available affects merely amount and not right to recovery of damages.

6. Highways. — Under statute order of county court authorizing change of public roads affects no one not party to it (Ky. Stats., secs. 4298-4302).

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7. Highways. — Neither statute authorizing county engineer to change public highway nor order of county court approving change afford authority for obstruction of public highway (Ky. Stats., secs. 4298-4302).

8. Highways. — County court's ex parte order authorizing change of public highway held to provide no defense to landowners' action for incidental injuries to land for wrongful obstruction of highway (Ky. Stats., secs. 4298-4302).

9. Highways. — That landowners executed deed conveying to railroad small boundary of land for relocating public highway did not estop owners from maintaining action for injuries to land by wrongful obstruction of highway.

10. Estoppel. — Deed is never construed to operate by way of estoppel beyond clear meaning of words used.

11. Estoppel. — To constitute "estoppel," action must have been induced that would result in prejudice to actor if person inducing action should be permitted to change position.

Appeal from Hickman Circuit Court.

TRABUE, DOOLAN, HELM & HELM and BENNETT, ROBBINS & SMITH for appellants.

GARDNER & McDONALD for appellees.

OPINION OF THE COURT BY JUDGE WILLIS.

Affirming.

Thomas T. Ward and his wife own adjacent tracts of land, used together as a single farm, and containing in the aggregate 57 acres. Each instituted an action against the Illinois Central Railroad Company and the Chicago, St. Louis & New Orleans Railroad Company, to recover damages for injuries to their respective properties. It was alleged in each petition that the defendants had wrongfully, completely, and permanently obstructed and stopped up a portion of the public road that served as a way to and from the land, and had thereby destroyed the only means of ingress and egress to and from the property, and had thereby compelled them to travel a great distance in the opposite direction, over a circuitous route, whenever it was necessary to travel to the west, north, and south of their residence located on the farm. The cases were tried together, resulting in verdicts for Thomas T. Ward and Margaret Ward in the sums of $800 and $400 respectively. The railroad companies have prosecuted an appeal from the larger judgment and have entered a motion for an appeal from the lesser one.

It is insisted (1) that the petitions fail to state causes of action; (2) that an ex parte order appearing on the order book of the county court authorized the defendants

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to close or to obstruct the road for which appellee had no remedy; and (3) that the appellees were estopped from maintaining the actions by virtue of a deed executed and delivered by them to the appellants.

1. The appellants argue that the law of Kentucky affords no remedy to an abutting owner for an injury to his land caused by an obstruction or even the destruction of a public road. It is well settled, however, that the closing or unreasonable obstruction of a highway, street, or alley is a taking of private property within the meaning of sections 13 and 242 of the Constitution, and is forbidden except when necessary for a public use, and allowed then only upon rendering of just compensation. Henderson v. City of Lexington, 132 Ky. 390, 111 S.W. 318, 33 Ky. Law Rep. 703, 22 L.R.A. (N.S.) 20; Gargan v. L.N.A. & C.R.R. Co., 89 Ky. 212, 12 S.W. 259, 11 Ky. Law Rep. 489, 6 L.R.A. 340. And a property owner who is peculiarly and especially affected by reason of the obstruction of a public road or street may maintain an action independently of the remedy on behalf of the public at large, for the abatement of the obstruction, or for damages to adjacent property resulting therefrom. Layman v. Beeler, 113 Ky. 221, 67 S.W. 995, 24 Ky. Law Rep. 174; Bourbon Stock Yard Co. v. Wooley, 76 S.W. 28, 25 Ky. Law Rep. 477; Salmon v. Martin, 156 Ky. 309, 160 S.W. 1058; Yates v. Big Sandy Ry. Co., 89 S.W. 108, 28 Ky. Law Rep. 206; Husband v. Cotton, 171 Ky. 177, 188 S.W. 380, L.R.A. 1917A, 1150; Solar Coal Co. v. Hoskins, 220 Ky. 693, 295 S.W. 989.

The fact that some other means of access to the property may be available affects merely the amount and not the right to the recovery of damages. Golden v. Louisville & N.R. Co., 228 Ky. 134, 14 S.W. (2d) 379; Lexington & E. Ry. Co. v. Hargis, 180 Ky. 636, 203 S. W. 525.

The appellants rely upon Bradbury v. Walton, 94 Ky. 167, 21 S.W. 869, 14 Ky. Law Rep. 823; Chenault v. Collins, 155 Ky. 312, 159 S.W. 834; and Beatty v. Louisville & N.R. Co., 176 Ky. 100, 195 S.W. 487, in support of the argument that an abutting owner in no event has any right of property in the continued maintenance of a public road. The language...