Illinois Country Club, Inc. v. Indus. Comm'n

• Decision Date: 19 September 1944
• Docket Number: No. 27929.,27929.
• Citation: 56 N.E.2d 786,387 Ill. 484
• Parties: ILLINOIS COUNTRY CLUB, Inc., v. INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION et al.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

387 Ill. 484

56 N.E.2d 786

ILLINOIS COUNTRY CLUB, Inc.,

v.INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION et al.

No. 27929.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Sept. 19, 1944.

Error to Circuit Court, Cook County; John Prystalski, Judge.

Proceeding under the Workmen's Compensation Act by John P. McGill, employee, opposed by Illinois Country Club, Inc., employer. To review a judgment confirming a decision of the Industrial Commission awarding employee compensation for temporary total disability, employer brings error.

Reversed and remanded with directions.Angerstein & Angerstein, of Chicago (Bernard F. Martin, Thomas C. Angerstein, George W. Angerstein, and Michael J. Thuma, all of Chicago, of counsel), for plaintiff in error.

Augustine J. Bowe, William J. Bowe, and John D. Casey, all of Chicago, for defendant in error.

WILSON, Justice.

John P. McGill, Jr., by Sarah McGill, his mother and next friend, filed an application for the adjustment of compensation with the Industrial Commission, charging that he suffered an accidental injury caused by a stroke of lightning on May 22, 1941, while employed as a caddy by the Illinois Country Club, Inc. The arbitrator denied compensation on the ground that the accidental injury did not arise out of and in the course of McGill's employment. The Industrial Commission, on review, set aside the finding of the arbitrator, decided that McGill's accidental injuries arose out of and in the course of his employment, and awarded him compensation for temporary total disability. The circuit court of Cook county confirmed the decision of the commission. We have granted the petition of the employer for a writ of error, and the record is submitted for a further review.

The facts and circumstances attending the injury are not in dispute. Nor is the employment relationship challenged. May 22, 1941, a church holiday, McGill, then sixteen years of age, a student at Foreman High School, Chicago, worked as a caddy on the golf course of the Illinois Country Club. He had served as a caddy at this club during previous summers and on holidays during the current school year. About 1:30 o'clock in the afternoon, McGill was caddying for a patron of the club, Martin Ward, who was playing golf with two other persons, and they, in turn, were accompanied by caddies. A storm arose while Ward and his companions were on the fourth hole. According to McGill, ‘It was not lightning yet and he played a few more holes.’ He testified further that when they arrived at the sixth hole it started lightning and ‘I went out where Martin (Ward) was and got struck.’ Other testimony on direct as well as on cross-examination indicates that McGill was under a tree at the time he was struck. On cross-examination, he stated that ‘when the storm started to come up,’ the golfers continued their game, played the fifth and sixth holes and were going to the seventh tee. He added that immediately before being struck he was holding two golf bags in which there were about thirty clubs, made partly of wood and partly of steel, and that he happened to be holding the two bags because another caddy was holding an umbrella over four members of the group who were standing under a tree. In either event, whether McGill, when struck, was on the fairway or sheltered under a tree, he lost consciousness and, upon reviving shortly afterwards, ran towards the club house where he fainted. A member administered first aid, and he was taken to a hospital where he remained four days.

Other facts and circumstances merit mention. McGill, when struck, was wearing a belt with a metal stud. He suffered a mark or burn on his right arm at the elbow and a ring of burns above the belt line of his abdomen. Testimony with respectto the extent and effect of the injuries sustained need not be recounted. So far as the record discloses, no other person in the group of players or caddies nor any other person on the golf course was struck by lightning during the storm. Likewise, evidence is wanting that any tree, the golf clubs, or any other objects were struck.

Since the facts are not in controversy, the decisive issue as to whether the employee's injuries arose out of and in the course of his employment is a question of law. Farley v. Industrial Comm., 378 Ill. 234, 37 N.E.2d 787;Northwestern Yeast Co. v. Industrial Comm., 378 Ill. 195, 37 N.E.2d 806;Puttkammer v. Industrial Comm., 371 Ill. 497, 21 N.E.2d 575;Ervin v. Industrial Comm., 364 Ill. 56, 4 N.E.2d 22. The Workmen's Compensation Act requires that an accidental injury, to be compensable, must arise out of and in the course of employment. The phrases ‘arising out of’ and ‘in the course of’ the employment are used conjunctively in the statute. Klug v. Industrial Comm., 381 Ill. 608, 46 N.E.2d 38;Borgeson v. Industrial Comm., 368 Ill. 188, 13 N.E.2d 164. In particular, the words ‘arising out of’ refer to the origin or cause of the accident and are descriptive of its character, while the words ‘in the course of’ refer to the time, place and circumstances under which the accident occurs. Vincennes Bridge Co. v. Industrial Comm., 351 Ill. 444, 184 N.E. 603;Mueller Const. Co. v. Industrial Board, 283 Ill. 148, 118 N.E. 1028, L.R.A.1918F, 891, Ann.Cas.1918E, 808. Both elements must, however, be present at the time of injury in order to justify compensation. Mazursky v. Industrial Comm., 364 Ill. 445, 4 N.E.2d 823. Admittedly, McGill's injury was received in the course of his employment. Unless it also arose out of his employment, the award of compensation cannot stand. The precise question thus presented for decision is whether injuries to an employee, caused by a stroke of lightning while engaged in the performance of his duties as a caddy on a golf course, under the circumstances narrated, arise out of his employment. An injury may be said to arise out of the employment when, upon consideration of all the circumstances, there is apparent to the rational mind a causal connection between the conditions under which the work is required to be performed and the resulting injury. The mere fact that an employee was present at the place of injury because of his employment will not suffice unless the injury itself is a result of some risk of the employment. Borgeson v. Industrial Comm., 368 Ill. 188, 13 N.E.2d 164;In re McNicol's case, 215 Mass. 497, 102 N.E. 697, L.R.A.1916A, 306. Conversely, if an injury is caused by reason of some factor unrelated to the nature of the employment, it cannot be said to arise out of the employment, and an injury which cannot fairly be traced to the employment as a contributing, proximate cause, and...