Illinois Life Ins. Co. v. Prentiss

• Decision Date: 05 April 1917
• Docket Number: No. 11050.,11050.
• Citation: 115 N.E. 554,277 Ill. 383
• Parties: ILLINOIS LIFE INS. CO. v. PRENTISS.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

277 Ill. 383

115 N.E. 554

ILLINOIS LIFE INS. CO.

v.PRENTISS.

No. 11050.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Feb. 21, 1917.

Rehearing Denied April 5, 1917.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Cook County; Thomas G. Windes, Judge.

Bill by the Illinois Life Insurance Company against James H. Prentiss. From decree for complainant, affirmed by Appellate Court (199 Ill. App. 326), defendant appeals. Reversed and remanded, with directions.Frederick A. Brown, Raymond S. Pruitt, and Ralph R. Bradley, all of Chicago (John G. McDonald, of Chicago, of counsel), for appellant.

Henry W. Price and Hugh T. Martin, both of Chicago, for appellee.

COOKE, J.

This is an appeal from a decree of the circuit court of Cook county forever restraining appellant, James H. Prentiss, from instituting suit against appellee, the Illinois Life Insurance Company, in the state of Missouri or in any other jurisdiction where the right of trial by jury is other or different from the right thereto existing in the state of Illinois, on a certain policy of insurance issued by appellee upon the life of Clinton S. Woolfolk, deceased. The amended bill filed by appellee charges that appellee is a corporation organized and existing under the laws of the state of Illinois; that on February 7, 1912, it issued to Clinton S. Woolfolk a policy of insurance by which it undertook to pay the estate of the insured the sum of $50,000 upon his death, subject to the conditions set forth in the policy and the application therefor; that on February 16, 1912, Woolfolk assigned said policy of insurance to appellant, to which assignment the appellee conditionally consented; that on March 28, 1913, Woolfolk committed suicide at his home in Cook county, Ill.; that appellee has refused the demand to pay the amount of the said policy for the reason that in the application for the policy Woolfolk committed various breaches of warranty and made various fraudulent representations, and for the further reason that, the insured having committed suicide within two years from the date of the policy, appellee's liability is limited to an amount equal to the premiums paid, which amount has been tendered to appellant and refused by him; that on November 18, 1915, appellant filed his suit against appellee on said policy in the circuit court of Cook county and filed therein his declaration; that appellee has been duly served with process and has entered its appearance in said suit and the said circuit court has jurisdiction of the subject-matter and of the parties and has full power to adjudicate all questions between them as to said policy of insurance; that Woolfolk up to the time of his death, and appellant and the administratrix of the estate of Woolfolk, have been at all times since the issuance of the policy, and are now, residents of Cook county, and the estate of Woolfolk is now in process of administration in Cook county; that the policy of insurance, and the premiums thereon, are by the terms of the policy payable in said county, and by the application, which is made a part of the policy, it was agreed that the contract contained in the policy, together with the application, should be construed according to the laws of Illinois; that appellant has threatened to start suit against appellee in the state of Missouri, with the purpose of depriving appellee of the right of trial by jury as guaranteed to the citizens of Illinois by section 5 of article 2 of the Constitution; that the Constitution of Missouri (article 2, § 28) provides that in a trial by jury in all civil cases three-fourths of the members concurring can render a verdict, and a statute of Missouri (Rev. St. 1909, § 7280) provides that in all trials of civil actions in any court of record in that state a jury shall consist of 12 men, but three-fourths or more concurring can render a verdict which shall have the same force and effect as though rendered by the entire panel; that it is the intention of appellant by the institution of a suit in the state of Missouri to harass and annoy appellee and obtain an unjust advantage to which appellant is not entitled under the laws of Illinois; that in order to adequately present its defense in a suit upon said policy of insurance it will be necessary for appellee to produce a large number of witnesses, some of them being public officials and employés, others being medical experts who performed an autopsy upon Woolfolk, and still others being business men and other persons not concerned in the litigation and strangers to appellee; that all of the witnesses who appellee knows would be necessary and procurable for its defense are residents of Illinois, and, with the possible exception of one or two, all reside in or do business in Cook county; that appellee does not know and has never heard of any witnesses residing in Missouri whose testimony is material on either side; that some persons whose testimony is necessary will be unwilling witnesses and others are wholly indifferent; that it will be impossible to procure the attendance at the trial in Missouri of some of these witnesses; that to procure the attendance of those who will be willing to go will put complainant to great and unnecessary expense and cause great inconvenience to the witnesses themselves; that it will be practically impossible to compel the attendance of unwilling witnesses before a commissioner should appellee endeavor to take the depositions of such persons for use in a suit to be tried in Missouri; that at such trial it will be necessary for appellee to show, as a motive for the suicide of Woolfolk, the bad financial condition of the Realty Realization Company, of which Woolfolk was president, and the main office of which was located in the city of Chicago, where the books and records of said corporation can now be found in the possession of the trustee in bankruptcy of the said Realty Realization Company; and that it would be impossible to transport said books and records to the state of Missouri for use on the trial there. It is further alleged that appellee is licensed to do business in the state of Missouri and has agents in that state. The cause was heard on demurrer to the bill, which was overruled, and, appellant having elected to stand by his demurrer, a decree was entered in accordance with the prayer of the bill.

A court of equity has power to restrain a person within its jurisdiction from beginning a suit against the complainant in a foreign state which will result in a fraud or gross wrong or oppression. Royal League v. Kavanagh, 233 Ill. 175, 84 N. E. 178. As we said in that case, this jurisdiction rests upon the authority vested in courts of equity over persons within the limits of their jurisdiction and amenable to process to stay acts contrary to equity and good conscience, but the prosecution of a suit in a foreign jurisdiction will not be restrained unless a clear equity is presented requiring the interposition of the court to prevent a manifest wrong and injustice. A party has the legal right to bring his action in any court which has jurisdiction of the subject-matter and which can obtain jurisdiction of the parties. Should he begin two suits within the same jurisdiction, the pendency of the suit first brought may be pleaded in abatement of the later proceeding. This is not true of suits brought in different jurisdictions upon the same cause of action. The mere pendency of a suit in a sister state or in a court of the United States cannot be pleaded in abatement of a proceeding in a state court. While the doctrine announced in the Kavanagh Case, supra, is now applied in every jurisdiction in the Union, this power is sparingly exercised, and it is only where it clearly appears that the prosecution of an action in a foreign state will result in a fraud, gross wrong, or oppression, that a court of equity will interfere with the general right of a party to press his action in any jurisdiction in which he may see fit and in as many of them as he chooses and restrain him from the prosecution of such a suit.

A suit against appellee on a policy of insurance is a transitory action. Appellee is licensed to do business in the state of Missouri and has agents there upon whom service of process may be had. Appellant has the legal right to bring his action against appellee on this policy of insurance in the state of Missouri, and this right will not be interfered with unless a clear equity is presented requiring the interpositon of the court to prevent a manifest wrong and injury. The bare fact that a suit on this policy has been begun and is now pending in this state, in the absence of equitable considerations, furnishes no ground to enjoin appellant from suing his claim in a foreign jurisdiction, although the cause of action is the same and arises out of the contract of insurance involved in the litigation in the circuit court of Cook county. Ambursen Hydraulic Construction Co. v. Northern Contracting Co., 140 Ga. 1, 78 S. E. 340,47 L....