Illinois Nat. Bank v. Chegin

• Court: Illinois Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: KLINGBIEL
• Citation: Illinois Nat. Bank v. Chegin, 220 N.E.2d 226, 35 Ill.2d 375 (Ill. 1966)
• Decision Date: 23 September 1966
• Docket Number: No. 39953,39953
• Parties: ILLINOIS NATIONAL BANK, Trustee, Appellee, v. June A. CHEGIN, Appellant.

Page 226

220 N.E.2d 226

35 Ill.2d 375

ILLINOIS NATIONAL BANK, Trustee, Appellee, v. June A. CHEGIN, Appellant.

No. 39953.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Sept. 23, 1966.

Presney & Casper, Springfield, for appellant.

Drach, Terrell & Deffenbaugh, Springfield, for appellee.

KLINGBIEL, Chief Justice.

This is a suit for specific performance brought by the Illinois National Bank, plaintiff-vendor, against June Chegin, defendant-vendee, to enforce a contract entered into on October 15, 1965, for the sale of a small apartment building situated in Springfield. Defendant had refused to perform the contract and in her pleading alleged that the abstract of title tendered by plaintiff did not show merchantable title for the reason that it did not negate the existence of liens, or possible liens, arising under the property forfeiture provisions of article 37 of the Criminal Code. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1965, chap. 38, art. 37.) The circuit court of Sangamon County granted plaintiff's motion for judgment on the pleadings and entered a decree of specific performance. Defendant has been allowed to appeal directly to this court pursuant to Rule 28--1, subd. E. Ill.Rev.Stat.1965, chap. 110, par. 101.28--1, subd. E.

By section 37--1 of the Criminal Code, which was added by an act approved July 2, 1965, the legislature has declared to be a public nuisance any building 'used in the commission' of the offenses of murder, kidnapping, prostitution, theft, gambling, abortion, narcotics violations and other specified crimes, and has provided that any person convicted of knowingly maintaining such a public nuisance shall be subject to fine or imprisonment, or both. Section 37--2, which is titled 'Enforcement of Lien upon Public Nuisance,' then goes on to provide: 'Any building, used in the commission of an offense specified in Section 37--1 of this Act with the intentional, knowing, reckless or negligent permission of the owner thereof, or the agent of the owner managing the building, shall, together with the underlying real estate, all fixtures and other property used to commit such an offense, be subject to a lien and may be sold to pay any unsatisfied judgment that may be recovered and any unsatisfied fine that may be levied under any section of this Article and to pay to any person not maintaining the nuisance his damages as a consequence of the nuisance. An action to enforce such lien may be commenced in any court of competent jurisdiction by the State's Attorney of the county of the nuisance or by the person suffering damages or both, except that a person seeking to recover damages must pursue his remedy within 6 months after the damages are sustained or his cause of action becomes thereafter exclusively enforceable by the State's Attorney of the county of the nuisance.' Ill.Rev.Stat.1965, chap. 38, pars. 37--1, 37--2.

Neither section 37--2 nor its companion sections expressly provide for the filing of notice of the lien, or otherwise provide for the protection of third-party purchasers or mortgagees without notice, and because of this omission defendant contends that section 37--2, properly construed, manifests a legislative intent to create a secret lien good as against Bona fide purchasers without notice. And because the abstract of title did not affirmatively show that the title to the premises in question was not encumbered by such liens, or that there was no pending litigation from which a lien could arise, defendant insists that plaintiff did not furnish an abstract showing good and merchantable title as the contract required. For the plaintiff it is urged that the legislature could not have intended the absurd result contended for by defendant, and that its true intent, gathered by reading section 37--2 in Pari materia with the Conveyances Act, (Ill.Rev.Stat.1965, chap. 30,) and various recording acts, was that the lien under section 37--2 was not to be superior to the rights of a Bona fide purchaser without notice unless and until notice of the fine or judgment from which the lien arises is filed in the office of the recorder of deeds in the county where the lands are located, or, if a suit is pending which could result in a lien, unless and until a Lis pendens notice is filed with the recorder of deeds. Consonant with this construction, plaintiff contends that the abstract tendered reflected a merchantable title.

It is well settled that a court will not force upon a vendee a title which is doubtful in character (Livingston v. Meyers, 6 Ill.2d 325, 129 N.E.2d 12), and if, as defendant contends, the statute in question does grant a lien which, although unrecorded and unknown, would be superior to the rights of a subsequent purchaser, she would be justified in refusthe present tender of title. The question presented for decision is whether this was the legislative intent.

In the construction of a statute the law requires that it be given a reasonable interpretation. Under this rule, statutes are to be construed according to their intent and meaning, taking into consideration the reason for the enactment, the existing circumstances, and the objects sought to be obtained by the legislature. (Southmoor Bank and Trust Co. v. Willis, 15 Ill.2d 388, 155 N.E.2d 308; Spring Hill Cemetery of Danville v. Ryan, 20 Ill.2d 608, 170 N.E.2d 619.) However, it has also been frequently held that where the language of a statute admits of two constructions, one of which would make the enactment absurd, if not mischievous, while the other renders it reasonable and wholesome, the construction which leads to an absurd result will be avoided. (People ex rel. Barrett v. Thillens, 400 Ill. 224, 79 N.E.2d 609; People ex rel. Prindable v. New York Central Railroad Co., 397 Ill. 50, 72 N.E.2d 821.) As was said in the early case of Loverin v. McLaughlin, 161 Ill. 417, 429, 44 N.E. 99, 103: 'Statutes should be so construed as to give them a reasonable meaning, and should not be so interpreted as to lead to absurd consequences. 'Statutes will be construed in the most beneficial way which their language will permit...