Illinois Public Aid Commission v. Massie

• Decision Date: 20 March 1958
• Docket Number: No. 34648,34648
• Citation: 150 N.E.2d 154,13 Ill.2d 498
• Parties: ILLINOIS PUBLIC AID COMMISSION, Appellant, v. James H. MASSIE et al., Appellees.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Page 154

150 N.E.2d 154

13 Ill.2d 498

ILLINOIS PUBLIC AID COMMISSION, Appellant, v. James H. MASSIE et al., Appellees.

No. 34648.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

March 20, 1958.

Rehearing Denied May 23, 1958.

Latham Castle, Atty. Gen. (William C. Wines, Raymond S. Sarnow, and A. Zola Groves, Chicago, of counsel), for appellant.

Epler C. Mills and C. G. Colburn, Virginia, for appellees.

DAILY, Justice.

This appeal, prosecuted by the Illinois Public Aid Commission, is taken from a judgment of the circuit court of Cass County awarding James H. Massie, an undertaker, the full amount of his $994 claim for funeral services against the estate of Nellie Frances Waddell, deceased. The cause had originated in the county court when the commission objected to Massie's claim and the latter appealed to the circuit court from a verdict and judgment for only $650 in the county court. The commission had itself filed claims of $3,607 and $136 under authority of section 5-8 of the Old Age Assistance Act, (Ill.Rev.Stat.1953, chap. 23, par. 440-8,) such claims representing amounts conceded to have been received by the decedent from the State for old age assistance and medical care. We have jurisdiction because the interest of the State is involved.

As was true below, the commission contends that the funeral claim is excessive in view of the insolvent nature of the estate. Relevant facts show that the value of the estate totalled approximately $2,155, of which $1625 was realized from the sale of decedent's modest home. The home had been appraised, however, at $2,250. Apart from costs of administration, estimated at $400, the only liabilities are the claims of the undertaker and the State, first and sixth class claims respectively; however, those items produce a deficiency of approximately $3,100. Thus it is manifest that the amount recovered by the commission will increase or diminish in proportion to the amount allowed the undertaker. The latter, it appears, was aware that decedent had been receiving old age assistance, had some knowledge of the limited assets of which she died possessed, and the amount of credit he extended was on the basis of the estimated value of the decedent's real estate. Decedent's casket was selected by brothers, sisters and a niece from a stock with prices ranging from $325 to $2,000. Without pressure or suggestion from Massie, they chose a casket priced at $750 and a burial vault costing $165, their selection being influenced by decedent's expressed wish 'to be buried just like her late husband.' The husband had died eight years before and had been buried by the same undertaker at a cost of $479.96, but the uncontradicted evidence is that casket prices then ranged from $175 to $1000 and that the cost of vaults and other items of necessary expense were considerably cheaper.

The commission has stipulated that the sum of $994 represents the fair cash value and the customary charge for the services and merchandise furnished by Massie. Its theory, however, is that the $994 figure is unreasonable and extravagant for the burial of one whose estate is insolvent, particularly when the decedent, to the knowledge of the undertaker, had been receiving old age assistance during her lifetime. In support of such theory we are referred to In re Estate of Purefoy, 256 Ill.App. 523, 526, where it is said: 'The mere fact that the cost of the items for the funeral may be reasonable is not sufficient. In addition to proof of the reasonable cost of the items for the funeral, it must be shown that the funeral expenses were suitable and proper to the condition and station of life of the husband.' Massie, while arguing that the expenses were not unreasonable under all the circumstances of the case, also seeks to justify the amount of credit he extended by those cases which point out that an undertaker's materials and services must be furnished immediately when death comes, and hold that it was intended by law that such thingg be done on the credit of the estate rather than awaiting an inquiry into the financial responaibility of those liable to pay. See Van Meter v. Illinois Merchants Trust Co., 239 Ill.App. 168; Stevens v. Williamson, 222 Ill.App. 258; Golsen v. Golsen, 127 Ill.App. 84.

The infrequent but apparently always troublesome question of the amount of funeral expenses allowable against a decedent's estate is the subject of a comparatively recent and thorough annotation found in 4 A.L.R.2d 995. From the many authorities discussed there, it appears the question is perhaps most simply and ideally resolved in those jurisdictions which have statutes specifically limiting, and placing a ceiling upon, the amount which may be charged against the decedent's estate for such expense. See: McComas v. Wiley, 135 Md. 584, 109 A. 312, and Watson v. Cook, 170 Md. 377, 184 A. 908, involving a Maryland statute fixing a limit of $300 except by special order of the court; Succession of Burns, 109 La. 1081, 7 So.2d 359; and Succession of Holstun, LaApp., 141 So. 793, relative to a Louisiana statute placing a $200 limit on insolvent estates; Acacia Mutual Life Ass'n v. Walker, D.C., 45 F.Supp. 756, concerning a West Virginia statute limiting the funeral claim against an estate to $300 unless the excess is ratified by the administrator; Schroyer v. Hopwood, 65 Ohio App. 443, 30 N.E.2d 440, anent on Ohio statute providing that an executor may allow $350 for funeral expenses and that the probate court may allow sums in excess of that amount, and Goeth v. McCollum, Tex.Civ.App., 94 S.W.2d 781, 783, treating upon a Texas law providing for reasonable funeral expense 'not to exceed the sum of $500.00'). Statutes of such nature, however, appear to be the exception rather than the rule and, unfortunately, have no counterpart in the laws of this State.

In the absence of statutory mandate limiting or modifying the rule, it is a well settled principle that the amount which may be charged and allowed against a decedent's estate for funeral expenses must be reasonable. Equally certain is the impossibility of fixing an inflexible rule as to what is reasonable and, in making such determination, courts look to such factors as the decedent's station in life and the value of his estate. Other factors entering into the determination are the solvency or insolvency of the estate, since the rights of creditors must be taken into consideration, and the effect which the expenditures will have on the heirs and next of kin, particularly where there are surviving members of a decedent's family basically dependent upon the estate for support. The latter consideration, however, is no factor in this case.

Considering first the element of the value...