Imani on Behalf of Hayes v. Heckler

Decision Date31 July 1986
Docket NumberNo. 85-1334,85-1334
Citation797 F.2d 508
Parties, Unempl.Ins.Rep. CCH 16,934 Nia J. IMANI, on behalf of Terron HAYES, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Margaret HECKLER, Secretary, Department of Health and Human Services, Defendant-Appellee.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit

Maxine T. Bennett, Indianapolis, Ind., for plaintiff-appellant.

Linda E. Tucker, Asst. Reg. Atty., Chicago, Ill., John Daniel Tinder, U.S. Atty., Indianapolis, Ind., for defendant-appellee.

Before BAUER, WOOD and ESCHBACH, Circuit Judges.

ESCHBACH, Circuit Judge.

The primary question presented in this appeal is whether the district court erred in affirming the decision of the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services denying Terron Hayes surviving child's benefits under the Social Security Act. For the reasons stated below, we will affirm.

I

Nia J. Imani, also known as Ramona D. Hayes, filed an "Application for Surviving Child's Insurance Benefits" with the Department of Health and Human Services ("Department") on November 22, 1976, on behalf of her son, Terron Hayes. Imani claimed that Terron was the child of Terry Williams, the deceased wage earner, who died insured on November 4, 1972. After the Department denied her claim on March 18, 1977, she filed a "Request for Reconsideration," which was denied on September 26, 1978. In response to Imani's timely request, a hearing was held before an Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") on December 18, 1978. Imani, who was represented by counsel, appeared and testified in support of her claim. In a decision dated March 6, 1979, the ALJ concluded that Terron was not entitled to surviving child's insurance benefits on the social-security record of Terry Williams.

Pursuant to a court order in an unrelated case, the Department reexamined Imani's original application and once again denied it in a notice dated April 14, 1982. Upon Imani's request for reconsideration, the claim was again denied on June 21, 1982. Imani then sought another hearing before an ALJ, which was held on February 7, 1983. Imani, once again represented by counsel, appeared and testified in support of her application for Terron. The evidence adduced at that proceeding may be outlined as follows:

Imani, then 17 years old, attended from May or June of 1972 to August of 1972, a college preparatory course in Jefferson City, Missouri. She testified that she had no sexual relations during that time. At the conclusion of the course, she returned to her parents' home in Columbia, Missouri. Within a week of Imani's return, Wanda Stapleton, a cousin and friend, introduced her to the wage earner, Terry Williams, then 21 years old. After two or three weeks, the relationship between Imani and Williams "sped up," and they would meet and engage in sexual intercourse at the residence either of Ms. Stapleton or of Danese Williams. The latter was Imani's sister and unrelated to Terry Williams. Imani testifies that she did not recall how many times she had sex with Williams, but eventually suggested that the number was either five or six. Their final liaison occurred on approximately October 21, 1972. Imani and Williams had a dispute at that time, because he would not take her to a movie, and she did not see him again before he was murdered on November 4, 1972.

Imani testified that she thought she might be pregnant in late October of 1972 and that, after a preliminary examination at a clinic, she called Williams two weeks before his death to discuss the matter with him. She underwent a second examination and was informed on November 3, 1972, that she was in fact pregnant. She was unable, however, to relate that information to Williams before he was shot to death on the following day. Imani claimed, nonetheless, that Williams "knew" he was the father. She also offered hearsay evidence in an attempt to prove that Williams had acknowledged to others that he would be a father. She could not, however, show that Williams was regularly providing her with funds, although he did occasionally purchase some beer and food for their dates. Nonetheless, she claimed that he gave Wanda Stapleton $10 to give to Imani to cover the costs of a pregnancy test.

Terron Hayes was born on June 4, 1973, in Columbia, Missouri. The pregnancy was full-term, so that conception probably occurred in late August or early September of 1972. A comparison of the blood types of Imani and Williams does not exclude paternity, but also cannot conclusively determine it, because approximately 30% of the black males in the United States could have fathered a child with Terron's blood type. Imani offered evidence concerning the statements and actions of third parties to support her claim that Williams was the father. She also produced photographs in an attempt to demonstrate a striking resemblance between her son and Williams. The ALJ, however, was not persuaded by the pictures, and Imani subsequently stated that Terron resembled both of his parents.

In an exhaustive order dated June 17, 1983, the ALJ found that the child was not entitled to the benefits sought in the application filed in November of 1976. In support of this conclusion, he made the following findings:

1. Terron Hayes is not the "child" of the wage earner under Missouri State law as required by Section 216(h)(2)(A) of the Social Security Act.

2. Terron Hayes is not the "child" of the wage earner pursuant to Section 216(h)(2)(B) of the Social Security Act as his mother and the wage earner never went through a marriage ceremony.

3. Terron Hayes is not the "child" of the wage earner pursuant to Section 216(h)(3)(C) of the Social Security Act as the evidence of record does not establish that the wage earner was ever decreed by a court to be his father, was ever ordered by a court to contribute to his support, or ever acknowledged him in writing. Furthermore, the evidence of record does not establish that the wage earner was his biological father or that the wage earner was either living with him or contributing to his support at the time of his death.

The order of the ALJ became the final decision of the Secretary when the Department's Appeals Council denied the claimant's request for review.

Imani commenced the instant action in federal district court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Sec. 405(g) for review of the Secretary's decision. The case was referred to a magistrate, who stated in his extensive "report and recommended entry" that there was substantial evidence to support the findings of the Secretary, as the "totality of evidence" confirmed the administrative determination that Terron Hayes was not the "child" of Terry Williams within the meaning of the Social Security Act. The district court adopted the magistrate's report. This appeal followed.

II

Before turning to the substantive questions presented in this appeal, we must first articulate the applicable standard of review. Under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 405(g), the Secretary's findings are conclusive if they are supported by "substantial evidence." This standard applies to the district court's review of the Secretary's decision as well as this court's review of the district court's decision. Schaefer v. Heckler, 792 F.2d 81, 84 (7th Cir.1986). "Substantial evidence" is defined as that which "a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Id. (quoting Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401, 91 S.Ct. 1420, 1427, 28 L.Ed.2d 842 (1971)). We are not allowed to reappraise the record. Davis v. Califano, 603 F.2d 618, 625 (7th Cir.1979). The "clearly erroneous" standard for review of a trial court's factual findings under Fed.R.Civ.P. 52(a) does not apply, because the findings under consideration are those of the Secretary, not of the district court. Schmoll v. Harris, 636 F.2d 1146, 1150 (7th Cir.1980). The Secretary's conclusions of law are not entitled to such deference, however, and if the Secretary committed an error of law, reversal is required without regard to the volume of the evidence in support of the factual findings. Id.

Section 202(d)(1) of the Social Security Act ("Act"), codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. Sec. 402(d)(1), establishes the criteria for entitlement to child's insurance benefits. It provides that every "child," as defined by 42 U.S.C. Sec. 416(e), of an individual who dies fully or currently insured under the Act is entitled to these benefits if the child has applied for the benefits, is unmarried, under 18 years of age, and was dependent on the deceased individual at the time of the latter's death.

Dependency is presumed for certain classes of children. See 42 U.S.C. Sec. 402(d)(3). 42 U.S.C. Sec. 416(h)(2) sets forth the rules for the determination of family status. Under Sec. 416(h)(2)(A), benefits are available to those children who, under the substantive law of the insured decedent's domicile, would be considered a child of the insured for the purposes of intestate succession. If the applicant fails to meet that requirement, he can under Sec. 416(h)(2)(B) still demonstrate that he is entitled to benefits by showing that the insured participated in a marriage ceremony that would be valid but for a nonobvious defect. If the applicant cannot satisfy this requirement, he may under Sec. 416(h)(3)(C)(i) prevail nonetheless if he shows that the insured had acknowledged in writing that the applicant was his child, that the insured had been decreed by a court to be the parent of the applicant, or that the insured had been ordered by a court to contribute to the support of the applicant because the applicant was the child of the insured. Finally, the applicant is entitled to benefits under Sec. 416(h)(3)(C)(ii) if he shows "by evidence satisfactory to the Secretary" that the insured was the applicant's parent and was either living with or contributing to the support of the applicant at the time of death.

It is undisputed that Imani and Williams never married...

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