Imhof v. Walton County
| Decision Date | 15 September 2021 |
| Docket Number | Nos. 1D19-0980,1D19-1530,s. 1D19-0980 |
| Parties | Judah IMHOF, Richard Bullard, Beach to Bay Connection, Inc., and South Walton Community Council, Inc., Appellants, v. WALTON COUNTY, Florida, a political subdivision of the State of Florida, and Ashwood Holdings Florida, LLC, a Florida limited liability company, Appellees. |
| Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
Terrell Arline of Terrell K. Arline Attorney at Law, Tallahassee, for Appellants.
Sidney N. Noyes and Heather R. Christman, Office of the County Attorney, DeFuniak Springs, for Appellee Walton County, Florida; Dana C. Matthews and C. Stephen Tatum of Matthews & Jones, LLP, Destin, for Appellee Ashwood Holdings Florida, LLC.
Robert N. Hartsell, Heidi Mehaffey, and Shai Ozery of Robert N. Hartsell, P.A., Pompano Beach, for Amicus Curiae 1000 Friends of Florida, Inc.; Nancy E. Stroud of Lewis, Stroud & Deutsch, P.L., Boca Raton, for Amici Curiae The American Planning Association, Florida Chapter and The American Planning Association.
The primary question here concerns the scope of a trial court's de novo review in an action, brought pursuant to section 163.3215(3), Florida Statutes (2018), challenging whether a development order is consistent with a local comprehensive plan. As we will explain in detail, we agree with the appellants, based on our reading of the statutory text, that the trial court should have considered all of their claims of inconsistency and not just those specifically addressed to plan components concerning land use, density, or intensity of use. We then must certify conflict with the Second District's holding in Heine v. Lee County , 221 So. 3d 1254 (Fla. 2d DCA 2017), that the provision does limit a party to those three bases for challenging a development order's consistency. Because the trial court, in reliance on Heine , failed to consider several of the appellants’ inconsistency claims before rendering judgment against them, we reverse and remand for the trial court to consider and dispose of those claims on the merits.
There are two ancillary issues we also must address. First, we agree with South Walton Community Council, Inc. ("SWCC") that it has standing to participate in the appellants’ consistency action as an "aggrieved or adversely affected party," as that term is defined in section 163.3215(2). Because the trial court reached the opposite conclusion, we instruct the trial court to reinstate SWCC for the remainder of the proceeding on remand. Second, the appellants ask that we reverse the separate amended cost judgment against them. Because costs were taxed in favor of Ashwood Holdings Florida, LLC ("Ashwood") when it was one of the prevailing parties under the final judgment, our reversal of that judgment requires that we reverse the cost judgment as well.
These cases stem from a grant of a development order by Walton County to Ashwood. The order allowed Ashwood to build a new planned unit development ("PUD") known as Cypress Lake. Cypress Lake was to consist of one hundred forty-one residential units, which would be divided into eighty-five single-family houses, forty duplex units, and sixteen condominium units. The PUD also would include fifty-three thousand square feet of commercial space divided among four mixed-use buildings. The land to be developed abuts Walton County Highway 30-A on one side, and Topsail Hill Preserve State Park, a conservation zone, on at least one other.
Before us are four appellants. Two are individual landowners. Two are non-profit corporations concerned with environmental conservation and sustainable development within Walton County. All of them sued the county and Ashwood pursuant to section 163.3215(3). In the suit, they asserted that the development order approving the Cypress Lake PUD materially altered the designated land use, density, and intensity of use for the parcel where the PUD would be located. They in turn claimed that the order was inconsistent with the county's comprehensive development plan in a variety of ways. They sought to invalidate the development order and stop Cypress Lake from being constructed as proposed.
The appellants divided the alleged inconsistencies across three broad headings and identified those inconsistencies in terms of objectives and policies within the local plan. The trial court recategorized the claims as follows:
The county and Ashwood asserted that none but the first of these claims is cognizable under the statute. By their reading, section 163.3215(3) limits the type of inconsistency claims that can be brought. They argued that the only cognizable (or "relevant") claims in an action under the subsection are those addressing inconsistency with the aspects of the comprehensive plan dealing with land use, density, and intensity of use. They also argued that the appellants were not "aggrieved or adversely affected" parties under section 163.3215(2), so the appellants did not have standing to sue in any event. Regardless of any of the claims asserted, though, the county and Ashwood maintained that the development order for the Cypress Lake PUD was entirely consistent with the comprehensive plan.
Relying on the Second District's decision in Heine , the trial court agreed with the county and Ashwood about the scope of claims that could be asserted in a suit under section 163.3215(3). As a result, the court held a multi-day evidentiary hearing but engaged in a de novo review of the county's grant of the Cypress Lake development order only with respect to the inconsistency claims relating to density and intensity (i.e. , the first category described by the trial court). The court found that the proposed Cypress Lake PUD, in this respect at least, was consistent with the county's comprehensive plan. The court also concluded that SWCC could not sue under section 163.3215(2), finding that it lacked an interest in the development beyond that shared by all persons. The court rendered a final judgment against the appellants based on these determinations, and it rendered a separate cost judgment in favor of Ashwood as a prevailing party.
Two appeals, now consolidated, followed. One challenges the final judgment determining that the development order approving the Cypress Lake PUD is consistent with the comprehensive plan (Case Number 19-980). The other challenges the ensuing cost judgment (Case Number 19-1530). In the former case, no one challenges the trial court's determination regarding the one category of claim (regarding density and intensity) it left intact. We do not address it here. Instead, we consider the appellants’ assertion that the trial court erred by refusing to include all of their claims as part of its de novo review, and that it erred by dropping SWCC as a plaintiff.2
Let us first put section 163.3215(3) in context. Under Florida's Community Planning Act,3 county and municipal governments must develop comprehensive plans, approved by the State, that outline their respective "principles, guidelines, standards, and strategies" for land development in the future. § 163.3177(1), Fla. Stat. (2018) ; see also id. (1)(c) (providing that the format of a comprehensive plan "typically is expressed in goals, objectives, policies, and strategies"). The purpose of comprehensive planning is not to compel local governments to regulate their land in a particular way, but rather to "establish meaningful and predictable standards for the use and development of land and provide meaningful guidelines for the content of more detailed land development and use regulations." Id. (1).
The Act requires that there be several "elements" in the comprehensive plan, which generally include the following:
All development on land covered by a local government's comprehensive plan, and all action taken by the government regarding that development, must comport with the plan. § 163.3194(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (2018) ; see Dixon v. City of Jacksonville , 774 So. 2d 763, 764 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000) (). A comprehensive plan is essentially "a constitution for all future development within the governmental boundary." Machado v. Musgrove , 519 So. 2d 629, 632 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987).
The Legislature is clear in the Act about its expectation of complete consistency between a development order and the local comprehensive plan. The Act states the intent as follows:
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