Immersion Corp. v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc.
| Decision Date | 15 October 2018 |
| Docket Number | CASE NO. 2:17-CV-572-JRG LEAD |
| Parties | IMMERSION CORPORATION v. SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS AMERICA, INC., et al. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Texas |
Before the Court is the Opening Claim Construction Brief (Dkt. No. 72) filed by Plaintiff Immersion Corporation ("Plaintiff" or "Immersion"), Defendants Samsung Electronics America, Inc. and Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd.'s (collectively, "Samsung's") Responsive Claim Construction Brief (Dkt. No. 73), and Plaintiff's reply (Dkt. No. 74). The Court held a claim construction hearing on October 9, 2018.
I. BACKGROUND ....................................................................................................................... 2
II. LEGAL PRINCIPLES ........................................................................................................... 3
III. AGREED TERMS ................................................................................................................. 8
IV. DISPUTED TERMS ............................................................................................................ 10
A. "outputting a force directly on said touch input device" .................................................... 10
B. "touch input device" ............................................................................................................ 22
C. "approximately planar touch surface" ................................................................................. 29
D. "touch screen" ..................................................................................................................... 36
V. CONCLUSION ...................................................................................................................... 38
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff brings suit alleging infringement of United States Patents Nos. 6,429,846 ("the '846 Patent"), 7,969,288 ("the '288 Patent"), 7,982,720 ("the '720 Patent"), 8,031,181 ("the '181 Patent"), 8,619,051 ("the '051 Patent"), and 9,323,332 ("the '332 Patent") (collectively, "the patents-in-suit"). (See Dkt. No. 72, Exs. A-I.) The parties have presented disputed terms that appear in the '846 Patent, the '720 Patent, and the '181 Patent. Although the specifications of the '846 Patent, the '720 Patent, and the '181 Patent are not identical, these patents share a common ancestry.
The '846 Patent, the '720 Patent, and the '181 Patent are each titled "Haptic Feedback for Touchpads and Other Touch Controls." The '846 Patent issued on August 6, 2002, the '720 Patent issued on July 19, 2011, and the '181 Patent issued on October 4, 2011. Each of the '846 Patent, the '720 Patent, and the '181 Patent bears an earliest priority date of June 23, 1998. The Abstracts of the '846 Patent, the '720 Patent, and the '181 Patent state:
A haptic feedback planar touch control used to provide input to a computer. A touch input device includes a planar touch surface that inputs a position signal to a processor of the computer based on a location of user contact on the touch surface. The computer can position a cursor in a displayed graphical environment based at least in part on the position signal, or perform a different function. At least one actuator is also coupled to the touch input device and outputs a force to provide a haptic sensation to the user contacting the touch surface. The touch input device can be a touchpad separate from the computer's display screen, or can be a touch screen. Output haptic sensations on the touch input device can include pulses, vibrations, and spatial textures. The touch input device can include multiple different regions to control different computer functions.
The '846 Patent, the '720 Patent, and the '181 Patent name inventors Louis B. Rosenberg and James R. Riegel and are sometimes referred to by the parties as the "Rosenberg" patents.
The District of Delaware construed terms in the '846 Patent in Immersion Corporation v. HTC Corporation, No. 12-259. The proceedings in HTC included a Memorandum Opinionregarding claim construction as well as a separate Claim Construction Order. See HTC, Dkt. No. 332, 2015 WL 581572 (D. Del. Feb. 11, 2015) ("HTC Memorandum Opinion") (Andrews, J.) (); see also HTC, Dkt. No. 337, 2015 WL 11111076 (D. Del. Feb. 18, 2015) ("HTC Order") (Andrews, J.) (attached to Plaintiff's Reply Brief (Dkt. No. 74) as Ex. 30).
II. LEGAL PRINCIPLES
Claim construction is clearly an issue of law for the court to decide. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 970-71 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc), aff'd, 517 U.S. 370 (1996). It is understood that "[a] claim in a patent provides the metes and bounds of the right which the patent confers on the patentee to exclude others from making, using or selling the protected invention." Burke, Inc. v. Bruno Indep. Living Aids, Inc., 183 F.3d 1334, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
"In some cases, however, the district court will need to look beyond the patent's intrinsic evidence and to consult extrinsic evidence in order to understand, for example, the background science or the meaning of a term in the relevant art during the relevant time period." Teva Pharms. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 831, 841 (2015) (citation omitted). Id. (citing 517 U.S. 370).
To ascertain the meaning of claims, courts look to three primary sources: the claims, the specification, and the prosecution history. Markman, 52 F.3d at 979. The specification must contain a written description of the invention that enables one of ordinary skill in the art to make and use the invention. Id. A patent's claims must be read in view of the specification, of whichthey are a part. Id. For claim construction purposes, the description may act as a sort of dictionary, which explains the invention and may define terms used in the claims. Id. "One purpose for examining the specification is to determine if the patentee has limited the scope of the claims." Watts v. XL Sys., Inc., 232 F.3d 877, 882 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
Nonetheless, it is the function of the claims, not the specification, to set forth the limits of the patentee's invention. Otherwise, there would be no need for claims. SRI Int'l v. Matsushita Elec. Corp., 775 F.2d 1107, 1121 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (en banc). The patentee is free to be his own lexicographer, but any special definition given to a word must be clearly set forth in the specification. Intellicall, Inc. v. Phonometrics, Inc., 952 F.2d 1384, 1388 (Fed. Cir. 1992). Although the specification may indicate that certain embodiments are preferred, particular embodiments appearing in the specification will not be read into the claims when the claim language is broader than the embodiments. Electro Med. Sys., S.A. v. Cooper Life Sciences, Inc., 34 F.3d 1048, 1054 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
This Court's claim construction analysis is substantially guided by the Federal Circuit's decision in Phillips v. AWH Corporation, 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). In Phillips, the court set forth several guideposts that courts should follow when construing claims. In particular, the court reiterated that "the claims of a patent define the invention to which the patentee is entitled the right to exclude." Id. at 1312 (quoting Innova/Pure Water, Inc. v. Safari Water Filtration Sys., Inc., 381 F.3d 1111, 1115 (Fed. Cir. 2004)). To that end, the words used in a claim are generally given their ordinary and customary meaning. Id. The ordinary and customary meaning of a claim term "is the meaning that the term would have to a person of ordinary skill in the art in question at the time of the invention, i.e., as of the effective filing date of the patent application." Id. at 1313. This principle of patent law flows naturally from the recognition thatinventors are usually persons who are skilled in the field of the invention and that patents are addressed to, and intended to be read by, others skilled in the particular art. Id.
Despite the importance of claim terms, Phillips made clear that "the person of ordinary skill in the art is deemed to read the claim term not only in the context of the particular claim in which the disputed term appears, but in the context of the entire patent, including the specification." Id. Although the claims themselves may provide guidance as to the meaning of particular terms, those terms are part of "a fully integrated written instrument." Id. at 1315 (quoting Markman, 52 F.3d at 978). Thus, the Phillips court emphasized the specification as being the primary basis for construing the claims. Id. at 1314-17. As the Supreme Court stated long ago, "in case of doubt or ambiguity it is proper in all cases to refer back to the descriptive portions of the specification to aid in solving the doubt or in ascertaining the true intent and meaning of the language employed in the claims." Bates v. Coe, 98 U.S. 31, 38 (1878). In addressing the role of the specification, the Phillips court quoted with approval its earlier observations from Renishaw PLC v. Marposs Societa' per Azioni, 158 F.3d 1243, 1250 (Fed. Cir. 1998):
Ultimately, the interpretation to be given a term can only be determined and confirmed with a full understanding of what the inventors actually invented and intended to envelop with the claim. The construction that stays true to the claim language and most naturally aligns with the patent's description of the invention will be, in the end, the correct construction.
Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1316. Consequently, Phillips emphasized the important role the specification plays in the claim...
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