Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Hector

• Decision Date: 17 November 1986
• Docket Number: No. 86-21,86-21
• Citation: Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Hector, 479 U.S. 85, 107 S.Ct. 379, 93 L.Ed.2d 326 (1986)
• Parties: IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE v. Virginia HECTOR
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

479 U.S. 85

107 S.Ct. 379

93 L.Ed.2d 326

IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE

v Virginia HECTOR.

No. 86-21.

Nov. 17, 1986.

PER CURIAM.

Virginia Hector, a native and citizen of Dominica, West Indies, entered the United States in April 1975 as a nonimmigrant visitor for pleasure. She has remained in this country illegally since April 30, 1975, when her authorization to stay expired. The youngest of her four children, a 10-year-old boy, resides with her here; the other three children live with their grandparents in Dominica. In 1983, two of Hector's nieces, United States citizens aged 10 and 11, came to live with her in order to attend school in what their parents perceived to be a superior educational system. The nieces' parents continue to reside in Dominica.

The Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) instituted deportation proceedings against Hector in July 1983. She conceded deportability, but applied for suspension of deportation pursuant to § 244(a)(1) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (Act), 66 Stat. 214, as amended, 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a)(1). That section authorizes the Attorney General, in his discretion, to suspend deportation of an illegal alien, and to adjust the alien's status to that of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence, if the deportable alien

"has been physically present in the United States for a continuous period of not less than seven years immediately preceding the date of . . . application, and proves that during all of such period he was and is a person of good moral character; and is a person whose deportation would, in the opinion of the Attorney General, result in extreme hardship to the alien or to his spouse, parent, or child, who is a citizen of the United States or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence."

An Immigration Judge and the Board of Immigration Appeals (Board) found that Hector satisfied the first two statutory elements—continuous physical residence and good moral character but that she could not demonstrate extreme hardship to herself, or to her "spouse, parent, or child." With respect to her nieces, the Board determined that, as a factual matter, Hector's separation from them would not constitute extreme hard- ship to herself; ¹ as a legal matter, the Board concluded that a niece is not a "child" within the meaning of § 244(a)(1).

The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit granted Hector's petition for review and remanded the case to the Board. 782 F.2d 1028 (1986). The court held that the Board had erred in not giving sufficient consideration to whether Hector's relationship with her nieces was the functional equivalent of a parent-child relationship. The court thus instructed the Board to ascertain whether there was a parental-type relationship, and, if so, to determine whether Hector's nieces would experience extreme hardship as a result of her deportation.²

In so holding, the court relied on its earlier decision in Tovar v. INS, 612 F.2d 794 (1980), which held that the term "child" as used in § 244(a)(1) includes individuals who do not fit within the statutory definition of "child" set out in § 101(b)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(1), if their relationship with the deportable alien closely resembles that of a parent and child.³

Because we find the plain language of the statute so compelling, we reverse, and hold that the Board is not required under § 244(a)(1) to consider the hardship to a third party other than a spouse, parent, or child, as defined by the Act. Congress has specifically identified the relatives whose hardship is to be considered, and then set forth unusually detailed and unyielding provisions defining each class of included relatives.⁴ The statutory definition of the term "child" is particularly exhaustive.⁵ Hector has never claimed, and the Court of Appeals did not hold, that the two nieces qualify under that statutory definition.

As we have explained with reference to the technical definition of "child" contained within this statute:

"With respect to each of these legislative policy distinctions, it could be argued that the line should have been drawn at a different point and that the statutory definitions deny preferential status to [some] who share strong family ties. . . . But it is clear from our cases . . . that these are policy questions entrusted exclusively to the political branches of our Government, and we have no judicial authority to substitute our political judgment for that of the Congress." Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 798, 97 S.Ct. 1473, 1481, 52 L.Ed.2d 50 (1977).

Thus, even if Hector's relationship with her nieces closely resembles a parent-child relationship, we are constrained to hold that Congress, through the plain language of the statute,⁶ precluded this functional approach to defining the term "child." Cf. INS v. Phinpathya, 464 U.S. 183, 194, 104 S.Ct. 584, 591, 78 L.Ed.2d 401 (1984) (refusing to ignore "the clear congressional mandate and the plain meaning of the statute" where it was clear that "Congress considered the harsh consequences of its actions"). Congress has shown its willingness to redefine the term "child" on a number of occasions,⁷ but it has not included nieces in that definition or authorized us to adopt a functional definition.⁸

Accordingly, the petition for certiorari is granted, and the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed.

It is so ordered.

Justice BRENNAN would grant the petition and set the case for oral argument.

Justice MARSHALL dissents from this summary disposition, which has been ordered without affording the parties prior notice or an opportunity to file briefs on the merits. See, e.g., Acosta v. Louisiana Dept. of Health and Human Resources, 478 U.S. 251, 106 S.Ct. 2876, 92 L.Ed.2d 192 (1986) (MARSHALL, J., dissenting).

1 The Board found that "[t]he emotional hardship to the respondent due to difficulties encountered by her nieces as a result of her deportation also does not constitute extreme hardship even when combined with the other factors in her case." App. to Pet. for Cert. 12a. Cf. Contreras-Buenfil v. INS, 712 F.2d 401, 403 (CA9 1983); Antoine-Dorcelli v. INS, 703 F.2d 19, 22 (CA1 1983).

2 Both the Immigration Judge and the Board had also held, in the alternative, that Hector's relationship with her nieces was not akin to a mother and daughter relationship, and that, in any event, the nieces would not experience extreme hardship as a result of Hector's deportation. The Court of Appeals held, however, that the Board had foreclosed presentation of evidence on these issues, and had not meaningfully addressed each relevant factor. App. to Pet. for Cert. 4a. Judge Garth dissented, concluding that the Board has adequately considered Hector's relationship with her nieces and the hardship issue. Id., at 5a, n. 1.

3 The Courts of Appeals have reached varying conclusions on whether hardship to an alien's relative or loved one who does not qualify under the statute's technical definitions as a spouse, parent, or child must be independently considered in assessing extreme hardship under § 244(a)(1). As indicated, the Third Circuit has held that the Board must look at the hardship that some third parties would experience, even if they do not qualify under the definitional section of the Act. See Tovar v. INS, 612 F.2d 794, 797-798 (1980). A number of other Circuits have rejected this flexible approach. See, e.g., Zamora-Garcia v. United States Dept. of Justice INS, 737 F.2d 488 (CA5 1984); Contreras-Buenfil, supra, at 403.

4 The term "parent" is defined in 8 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(2); the term "spouse" is defined in § 1101(a)(35).

5 The definitional section provides:

"(b) As used in subchapters I and II of this chapter—

"(1) The term "child" means an unmarried person under twenty-one years of age who is—

"(A) a legitimate child;

"(B) a stepchild, whether or not born out of wedlock, provided the child had not reached the age of eighteen years at the time the marriage creating the status of stepchild occurred;

"(C) a child legitimated under the law of the child's residence or domicile, or under the law of the father's residence or domicile, whether in or outside the United States, if such legitimation takes place before the child reaches the age of eighteen years and the child is in the legal custody of the legitimating parent or parents at the time of such legitimation;

"(D) an illegitimate child by, through...