Immigration Assistance Project v. INS, C88-379R.

• Decision Date: 03 June 1989
• Docket Number: No. C88-379R.,C88-379R.
• Citation: 717 F. Supp. 1444
• Parties: IMMIGRATION ASSISTANCE PROJECT OF THE LOS ANGELES COUNTY FEDERATION OF LABOR (AFL-CIO), et al., Plaintiffs, v. IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Washington

717 F. Supp. 1444

IMMIGRATION ASSISTANCE PROJECT OF THE LOS ANGELES COUNTY FEDERATION OF LABOR (AFL-CIO), et al., Plaintiffs, v. IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE, et al., Defendants.

No. C88-379R.

United States District Court, W.D. Washington, at Seattle.

June 3, 1989.

Robert H. Gibbs, Seattle, Wash., for plaintiffs.

Donald Keener, U.S. Dept. of Justice, Office of Immigration Litigation, Civ., Washington, D.C., for defendants.

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO AMEND JUDGMENT

ROTHSTEIN, Chief Judge.

THIS MATTER comes before the court on plaintiffs' motion to amend judgment. Having reviewed the motion, together with all documents filed in support and in opposition, and being fully advised, the court finds and rules as follows:

I. BACKGROUND

For the third time, this court reviews various challenges to the Immigration and Naturalization Service's ("INS") implementation of the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 ("IRCA"), 8 U.S.C. § 1255a et seq. Plaintiffs, a group of organizations which assist documented and undocumented aliens, seek both declaratory and injunctive relief against the INS's administration of the legalization provisions of IRCA. On November 4, 1988, this court granted in part and denied in part the INS's motion to dismiss. See Order Granting In Part and Denying In Part Defendants' Motion to Dismiss ("first order"). The court dismissed plaintiffs' claim for an extension of the deadline for legalization applications under IRCA, as well as those claims decided in Ayuda, et al. v. Meese et al., 687 F.Supp. 650 (D.D.C.1988) that the INS did not appeal.

In addition, since plaintiffs' amended complaint failed to allege that the individual named plaintiffs submitted timely applications for legalization, the court ruled that these individual plaintiffs lacked standing. In a companion order, the court denied plaintiffs' motion for class certification. See Order Denying Plaintiffs' Motion for Provisional Class Certification ("certification order").

The court did not dismiss the suit, however, ruling instead that the various organizational plaintiffs had standing in their own right to seek relief from the INS's regulations and practices. On March 8, 1989, this court granted in part plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment and denied defendants' motion to dismiss. 709 F.Supp. 998 (W.D.Wash.1989). See Order Granting In Part Plaintiffs' Motion For Summary Judgment and Denying Defendants' Motion to Dismiss ("second order"). The court granted relief on three categories of legalization applications.

First, the court entered a declaratory judgment that a non-immigrant's violation of the address reporting requirement ("section 265 applicants") created unlawful status and therefore qualified the non-immigrant for legalization under IRCA's "known to the government" standard. See 1255a(a)(2)(B). The court refused, however, to order the INS to rule on section 265 applications. Currently, the INS is holding these applications in abeyance.

Second, the court held as irrational the INS's distinction between applicants with duration of status visa who qualified under the INS's "passage of time" standard and those who qualified under the "known to the government" standard. The court found that this distinction placed an addition element of proof on certain applicants without a rational basis for doing so. Finally, third, the court ordered the INS to reopen all cases decided contrary to the Legalization Appeals Unit's ("LAU") decision in Matter of N. See Exhibit A to Defendants' Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment. On March 17, 1989, the parties in a telephone conference with the court decided that a trial was unnecessary in this matter.¹ Instead, plaintiffs obtained leave from the court to file a motion to clarify the court's judgment in its second order.² Plaintiffs now move for such an order clarifying this court's prior judgments.

II. DISCUSSION

A. ISSUES PREVIOUSLY DECIDED

Plaintiffs seek reconsideration of two prior rulings by the court. First, plaintiffs contend that the court should certify this case as a class action in order to avoid confusion over the scope of the court's orders and insure that those who should benefit from the court's rulings actually do so. In response, the INS argues that plaintiffs request for class certification was, and is, untimely, and furthermore, that certifying the class would require plaintiffs to amend their complaint and substantially change the character of this suit.

The court finds no grounds to reconsider its refusal to certify the class. The court denied plaintiffs' motion for two reasons: it was late under the local rules and plaintiffs failed to allege that the individual class representatives had filed timely applications for legalization. For this second reason, the court concluded that named plaintiffs' claims were not typical of those of the entire class.

Plaintiffs argue that their failure to move for class certification within 90 days was harmless error, far outweighed by the need to certify the class in order to grant nationwide relief. Plaintiffs note correctly that in most cases, violation of the local rule's 90-day time limit does not warrant dismissal of all class claims. See Slanina v. William Penn Parking Corp., 106 F.R.D. 419 (W.D.Pa.1984). However, plaintiffs also failed to satisfy the requirement of typicality under Fed.R.Civ.P. 23, and absent yet another amended complaint and subsequent discovery by defendants, plaintiffs cannot remedy this defect. The court finds that certifying a class, with the necessary prerequisite of discovery and subsequent motions, would unduly complicate this action with no appreciable benefits.

The court concludes further that the injunctive relief discussed below is sufficiently clear both in scope and application to make class certification unnecessary. The Ninth Circuit, in Bresgal v. Brock, 843 F.2d 1163, 1170 (9th Cir.1987), recently approved an injunction against a federal agency, there the Department of Labor, that affected enforcement of a federal program nationwide.

Where relief can be structured on an individual basis, it must be narrowly tailored to remedy the specific harm shown. On the other hand, an injunction is not necessarily made overbroad by extending benefit or protection to persons other than prevailing parties in the lawsuit— even if it is not a class action—if such breadth is necessary to give prevailing parties the relief to which they are entitled.

Bresgal v. Brock, 843 F.2d at 1170 (emphasis original). So long as the agency is a party to the suit, as the INS is here, a district court may enjoin a federal agency and in effect order nationwide compliance if such injunctive relief is both appropriate and necessary. Bresgal, 843 F.2d at 1171 (district court has power to order nationwide relief when it is required). Thus, this court need not certify plaintiffs' class to accomplish the same end.

Next, plaintiffs seek reconsideration of this court's decision not to extend the deadline for legalization applications and request the court to retain jurisdiction to consider relief for potential applicants deterred by the INS. See First Order at 15-16. In its first order, the court concluded that it had no authority either at law or in equity to extend the limit for filing applications, citing the United States Supreme Court's opinion in INS v. Pangilinan, 486 U.S. 875, 108 S.Ct. 2210, 100 L.Ed.2d 882 (1988). Plaintiffs contend that a recent decision from the D.C.Circuit as well as pending appeals in the Ninth Circuit, justify this court retaining jurisdiction over claims that the INS denied applicants a reasonable opportunity to file for legalization or that an applicant "constructively filed" an application. See In re Thornburgh, 869 F.2d 1503, 1516 (D.C.Cir.1989).

Plaintiffs' argument has two strands: first, plaintiffs directly challenge the court's earlier ruling that Pangilinan curbs any consideration of late applications. On this point the court shall not alter its prior decision. Although In re Thornburgh supports plaintiffs' assertions, the D.C.Circuit issued that opinion on a writ of mandamus, concluding that Judge Sporkin's appointment of a Special Master in Ayuda was not illegal. See In re Thornburgh, 869 F.2d at 1505.

Thus, the case has limited bearing here, where the issue has always been whether potential applicants have a legal right to relief. Given that IRCA expressly prohibits review of late filings and that the Supreme Court in Pangilinan prohibited the use of estoppel or equitable powers to extend application deadlines, the court finds no grounds to reconsider its earlier ruling. See 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(f)(2); Agcaoili v. Gustafson, 870 F.2d 462, 464 (9th Cir.1989) (Pangilinan foreclosed all claims for naturalization). This court has no authority to extend the period for applications under IRCA.

The court also rejects the second strand to plaintiffs' argument. Plaintiffs contend that relief other than acceptance of late applications may be available and that the court should retain jurisdiction to consider these alternate forms of relief. See In re Thornburgh, 869 F.2d at 1517 (Special Masters in Ayuda appointed to study lesser forms of relief). Yet plaintiffs do not make specific requests, but rather ask the court to retain jurisdiction in case alternate forms of relief appear in the future. The court is unwilling to retain jurisdiction on such speculative grounds and therefore denies plaintiffs' request.

B. CATEGORY 1 APPLICANTS—SECTION 265

Plaintiffs seek relief for section 265 applicants additional to the court's declaratory judgment in their favor. First, plaintiffs request that the court require the INS to adjudicate these applications within three months. Second, if it is unable to process an application within three months, the INS, according to plaintiffs, should notify the applicant of this...