Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Rios-Pineda, RIOS-PINEDA and E

Decision Date13 May 1985
Docket NumberNo. 83-2032,RIOS-PINEDA and E,83-2032
Citation85 L.Ed.2d 452,471 U.S. 444,105 S.Ct. 2098
PartiesIMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE, Petitioner, v. Bernardostarnilada Rios-Pineda De Rios
CourtU.S. Supreme Court
Syllabus

Section 244(a)(1) of the Immigration and Nationality Act allows the Attorney General to suspend an alien's deportation if the alien has been present in the United States for a continuous period of at least seven years, is of good moral character, and demonstrates that deportation would result in extreme hardship to the alien or to the alien's spouse or child, who is a United States citizen. Even if these prerequisites are satisfied, the Attorney General has discretion to refuse to suspend deportation. While the Act itself does not provide for reopening suspension proceedings once suspension has been denied, the Attorney General has promulgated regulations under the Act providing that a motion to reopen will be denied unless reopening is sought on the basis of circumstances that have arisen subsequent to the original deportation hearing. The Attorney General has delegated his authority and discretion to suspend deportation to special inquiry officers of the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), whose decisions are subject to review by the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA). Respondents husband and wife, citizens of Mexico, were smuggled illegally into the United States in 1974. Respondent husband was apprehended in 1978, and, although at his request he was granted permission to return voluntarily to Mexico in lieu of deportation, he refused to leave as promised. Deportation proceedings were then instituted against respondents, who by that time had a child, who, being born in the United States, was a United States citizen. Following a December 1978 hearing, an Immigration Judge denied respondents' request for suspension of deportation and ordered their deportation, and the BIA dismissed an appeal. After the Court of Appeals in 1982 had reversed the BIA's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings because respondents had accrued the requisite seven years' presence in the United States during the pendency of the appeal, respondents moved the BIA to reopen and requested suspension of deportation, in the meantime having had a second child born in the United States. The BIA denied the motion to reopen on the grounds, inter alia, that the seven years' presence and an additional child were available only because respondents had delayed departure by frivolous appeals and that respondents' conduct had shown a blatant disregard for the immigration laws. The Court of Appeals reversed and directed the BIA to reopen the proceeding, holding, inter alia, that respondents had made out a prima facie case of hardship and that the factors relied on by the BIA did not justify its refusal to reopen.

Held: The refusal to reopen the suspension proceeding was within the Attorney General's discretion. If, as was required by the regulations, respondents' motion to reopen was based on intervening circumstances demonstrating 7-year residence and extreme hardship, the Attorney General, acting through the BIA, nevertheless had the authority to deny the motion. Although by the time the BIA denied the motion respondents had been in the United States for seven years, that was not the case when suspension of deportation was first denied; the seven years accrued during the pendency of respondents' baseless appeals. And the Attorney General did not abuse his discretion in denying reopening based on respondents' flagrant violation of the immigration laws in entering the United States, as well as respondent husband's willful failure to depart voluntarily after his request to do so was honored by the INS. Pp. 449-452.

720 F.2d 529 (CA 8 1983), reversed.

Alan Ira Horowitz, Washington, D.C., for petitioner.

Lawrence H. Rudnick, Philadelphia, Pa., for respondents.

Justice WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court.

Section 244(a)(1) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (Act), 66 Stat. 214, as amended, 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a)(1), allows the Attorney General to suspend the deportation of an alien. To warrant such action, the alien must have been physically present in the United States for a continuous period of at least seven years, be of good moral character, and demonstrate that deportation would result in extreme hardship to the alien, or the alien's "spouse, parent, or child who is a citizen of the United States or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence." Ibid. Even if these prerequisites are satisfied, it remains in the discretion of the Attorney General to suspend, or refuse to suspend, deportation. INS v. Jong Ha Wang, 450 U.S. 139, 144, n. 5, 101 S.Ct. 1027, 1030, n. 5, 67 L.Ed.2d 123 (1981); Jay v. Boyd, 351 U.S. 345, 353, 76 S.Ct. 919, 924, 100 L.Ed. 1242 (1956). Although Congress did not provide a statutory mechanism for reopening suspension proceedings once suspension has been denied, the Attorney General has promulgated regulations under the Act allowing for such a procedure. 8 CFR § 3.2 (1985). Under the regulations, a motion to reopen will be denied unless reopening is sought on the basis of circumstances which have arisen subsequent to the original hearing. Ibid. The Attorney General, authorized by Congress to do so, 8 U.S.C. § 1103, has delegated his authority and discretion to suspend deportation to special inquiry officers of the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), whose decisions are subject to review by the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA). 8 CFR §§ 242.8, 242.21 (1985).

Respondents, a married couple, are natives and citizens of Mexico. Respondent husband illegally entered the United States in 1972. Apprehended, he returned to Mexico in early 1974 under threat of deportation. Two months later, he and respondent wife paid a professional smuggler $450 to transport them into this country, entering the United States without inspection through the smuggler's efforts. Respondent husband was again apprehended by INS agents in 1978. At his request, he was granted permission to return voluntarily to Mexico in lieu of deportation. He was also granted two subsequent extensions of time to depart, but he ultimately declined to leave as promised. INS then instituted deportation proceedings against both respondents. By that time, respondent wife had given birth to a child, who, born in the United States, was a citizen of this country. A deportation hearing was held in December 1978. Respondents conceded illegal entry, conceded deportability, but re- quested suspension of deportation. The Immigration Judge, ruling that respondents were ineligible for suspension because they had not satisfied the requirement of seven years' continuous physical presence, ordered their deportation. Respondents appealed the order to the BIA, asserting a variety of arguments to establish that the deportation violated their rights or the rights of their child. The BIA rejected these arguments and dismissed the appeal.

In July 1980, respondents filed a petition for review in the Court of Appeals, which automatically stayed their deportation pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a)(3). Asking that the court order their deportation suspended, respondents asserted substantially the same claims rejected by the BIA: that the Immigration Judge should have given them Miranda warnings, that their deportation was an unlawful de facto deportation of their citizen child, and that respondent husband should have been considered present in the United States for seven years. In March 1982, 15 months after the briefs were filed, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the BIA and remanded the case for further proceedings. Rios-Pineda v. United States Department of Justice, 673 F.2d 225 (CA8). The Court of Appeals was of the view that during the pendency of the appeals, respondents had accrued the requisite seven years' continuous physical presence in the United States. Id., at 227. Because of this development, the court directed the BIA to allow respondents 60 days to file a motion to reopen their deportation proceeding and cautioned the BIA "to give careful and thorough consideration to the . . . motion to reopen if, indeed, one is filed." Id., at 228, n. 5. During the pendency of the appeals, respondent wife gave birth to a second citizen child.

Respondents then moved the BIA to reopen and requested suspension of deportation. They alleged that deportation would result in extreme hardship in that their two citizen children would be deprived of their right to an education in United States schools and to social assistance. Respondents also alleged general harm to themselves from their "low skills and educations" and the lower standard of living in Mexico.

The BIA denied the motion to reopen. First, the motion was not timely filed, as respondents had not served it on the proper official within the specified 60 days. Second, discretionary relief was unwarranted, since the additional facts—seven years' continuous physical presence and an additional child—were available only because respondents had delayed departure by frivolous appeals. Third, respondent husband's conduct in returning to the country only two months after his 1974 departure, respondents' payment to a professional smuggler to enter this country illegally, and respondent husband's refusal to depart voluntarily after promising to do so, all evinced a blatant disregard for the immigration laws, disentitling respondents to the favorable exercise of discretion.

The Court of Appeals reversed and directed the BIA to reopen the proceeding. Rios-Pineda v. United States Department of Justice, 720 F.2d 529 (CA8 1983). The motion to reopen, the panel concluded, was timely filed,1 respondents had made out a prima facie case of hardship, and the factors relied on by the BIA did not justify its refusal to reopen. Although the court did not find merit in any of the legal...

To continue reading

Request your trial
286 cases
  • Interstate Commerce Commission v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers Railroad Company v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers
    • United States
    • U.S. Supreme Court
    • June 8, 1987
    ...v. Northern Pacific R. Co., 288 U.S. 490, 492-494, 53 S.Ct. 406, 406-407, 77 L.Ed. 914 (1933); see also INS v. Rios-Pineda, 471 U.S. 444, 105 S.Ct. 2098, 85 L.Ed.2d 452 (1985); INS v. Jong Ha Wang, 450 U.S. 139, 101 S.Ct. 1027, 67 L.Ed.2d 123 (1981). In many of these cases we have stressed ......
  • Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Doherty
    • United States
    • U.S. Supreme Court
    • January 15, 1992
    ...and the authority for such motions derives solely from regulations promulgated by the Attorney General. INS v. Rios-Pineda, 471 U.S. 444, 446, 105 S.Ct. 2098, 2100, 85 L.Ed.2d 452. The applicable regulation, 8 CFR § 3.2, is couched solely in negative terms: It specifies that motions to reop......
  • Hernandez-Rodriguez v. Pasquarell
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit
    • July 24, 1997
    ... ... PASQUARELL, District Director of the Immigration ... and Naturalization Service, Respondent-Appellee ... 719, 724, 116 L.Ed.2d 823 (1992); INS v. Rios-Pineda, 471 U.S. 444, 445, 105 S.Ct ... Page 1039 ... 2098, ... ...
  • Ananeh-Firempong v. I.N.S., ANANEH-FIREMPON
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — First Circuit
    • June 24, 1985
    ...or whether it was "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion." 5 U.S.C. Sec. 706(2)(A); INS v. Rios-Pineda, --- U.S. ----, ----, 105 S.Ct. 2098, 2101-02, 85 L.Ed.2d 452 (1985); Holley v. INS, 727 F.2d 189, 191 (1st Cir.1984). In doing so, we must keep in mind the fact that here no broad......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
4 books & journal articles
  • Table of Cases
    • United States
    • James Publishing Practical Law Books Bohr's Social Security Issues Annotated - Volume II
    • May 4, 2015
    ...§ 1105.1 Rios-Pineda v. United States Dep’t of Justice, I.N.S. , 720 F.2d 529, 532 (8th Cir. 1983, rev’d on other grounds , 471 U.S.444, 105 S.Ct. 2098, 85 L.Ed.2d 452 (1985), § 603.4 Rios v. Secretary of Health, Educ. & Welfare, 614 F.2d 25, 26-27 (1st Cir. 1980), §§ 506.1, 603.1 Ripley v.......
  • Federal court issues
    • United States
    • James Publishing Practical Law Books Archive Social Security Issues Annotated. Vol. II - 2014 Contents
    • August 3, 2014
    ...(8 th Cir. 1995); Rios-Pineda v. United States Department of Justice, I.N.S. , 720 F.2d 529, 532 (8 th Cir. 1983, rev’d on other grounds , 471 U.S. 444, 105 S.Ct. 2098, 85 L.Ed.2d 452 (1985); Chicago v. N.W. Transp. Co. v. United States , 574 §603.4 SOCIAL SECURITY ISSUES ANNOTATED II-602 F......
  • Table of cases
    • United States
    • James Publishing Practical Law Books Archive Social Security Issues Annotated. Vol. II - 2014 Contents
    • August 3, 2014
    ...1997)(unpub.), § 1105.1 Rios-Pineda v. United States Dep’t of Justice, I.N.S. , 720 F.2d 529, 532 (8th Cir. 1983, rev’d on other grounds , 471 U.S. 444, 105 S.Ct. 2098, 85 L.Ed.2d 452 (1985), § 603.4 Rios v. Secretary of Health, Educ. & Welfare, 614 F.2d 25, 26-27 (1st Cir. 1980), §§ 506.1,......
  • Is birthright citizenship good for America?
    • United States
    • The Cato Journal Vol. 32 No. 1, January 2012
    • January 1, 2012
    ...The Green Bag 9 (4). Available at: www.ilw.com/articles/2007,0212-ho.pdf. Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Rios-Pineda, 471 U.S. 444 Lincoln, A. ([1857] 1953) "'Speeches on Dred Scott.'" In R. P. Basler (ed.) The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln, Vol. 2: 403-7. New Brunswick, N.J......

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT