Imperial Production Corp. v. City of Sweetwater

• Decision Date: 23 February 1954
• Docket Number: No. 14513.,14513.
• Citation: 210 F.2d 917
• Parties: IMPERIAL PRODUCTION CORP. et al. v. CITY OF SWEETWATER.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

210 F.2d 917 (1954)

IMPERIAL PRODUCTION CORP. et al. v. CITY OF SWEETWATER.

No. 14513.

United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit.

February 23, 1954.

W. B. Patterson, Robertson, Jackson, Payne, Lancaster & Walker, Dallas, Tex., for appellants.

Charles R. Griggs, Nunn, Griggs & Sheridan, Sweetwater, Tex., for appellee.

Before HUTCHESON, Chief Judge, and BORAH and RIVES, Circuit Judges.

RIVES, Circuit Judge.

Imperial Production Corporation and Nottingham sued the City of Sweetwater, Texas for damages for the destruction of their airplanes by fire allegedly as the proximate result of negligence on the part of the agents, servants or employees of the City. The City owned and operated an airport in connection with which it rented to the Corporation and to Nottingham space in a hangar for storage of their airplanes and other equipment. On March 20, 1951, the hangar and the airplanes and belongings stored therein were consumed by fire. The district court sustained the City's motion to dismiss on the ground that the City is exempt from liability for its negligence by virtue of having adopted the Municipal Airport Act of the State of Texas, Article 46d, Sections 1 through 22, Revised Civil Statutes of Texas, Vernon's Ann.Civ.St.¹ This appeal followed.

In determining the liability of a municipal corporation for tort, the Texas courts recognize the distinction generally prevailing based on the nature of the act or function as governmental or proprietary, City of Houston v. Quinones, 142 Tex. 282, 177 S.W.2d 259, 261; 38 Am.Jur., Municipal Corporations, Sec. 572. The Texas Supreme Court said in the case just cited:

"The underlying test is whether the act performed by a city is public in its nature and performed as the agent of the State in furtherance of general law for the interest of the public at large, or whether it is performed primarily for the benefit of those within the corporate limits of the municipality." City of Houston v. Quinones, supra, 177 S.W.2d at page 261.

The position of appellants is based upon four arguments: First, that, in the absence of any state statute, a city acts in a proprietary capacity in operating an airport;² second, that Article

46d-15 (footnote 1, supra) was not intended by the legislature to exempt a municipality from liability for negligence in operating an airport; third, alternatively, that the statute does not include a business venture such as renting storage space; and, fourth, further alternatively, if the statute so exempts the municipality, it is unconstitutional. The appellee concedes appellants' first point, that, in the absence of any state statute, the operation of an airport is a proprietary act of a municipality.

The appellants elaborate their second point by urging that the effect of the statute is to declare the City's operation of an airport to be governmental only insofar as material for taxation, condemnation, appropriation, bonded indebtedness, the authority of public officers, etc., but not in such sense as to free the City from tort liability.³ The North Carolina case of Rhodes v. City of Ashville cited by appellants (footnote 3, supra) furnishes strong support for their position and, we think, should be followed if the legislative and judicial history of Texas were similar to that of North Carolina at the time the respective acts were passed. Appellee points out, however, that the appellants' position becomes untenable in the light of the existing law in Texas when Article 46d-15 was enacted.

The original airport legislation in Texas was enacted in 1929 and amended in 1941 and 1947.⁴ In 1936 a Texas Court of Civil Appeals in Christopher v. City of El Paso, 98 S.W.2d 394, held Section 3 of the Act to be violative of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Due Process Clause of the Texas State Constitution, Vernon's Ann.St. art. 1, § 19. That holding, however, was predicated upon the operation of the airport being a proprietary function, and the Court said: "* * * we cannot agree that the Legislature in granting the power to incorporated cities in Texas to own and operate airports made the exercise of such power a governmental function." Christopher v. City of El Paso, supra, 98 S.W.2d at page 398. The Texas Court expressly determined that the remainder of the Act was unaffected by its decision. After that decision, therefore, Article 1269h of the Revised Civil Statutes, Vernon's Ann.Civ.St. (footnote 4, supra) still furnished authority to municipalities to acquire land for airports, to condemn land for that purpose, to maintain and operate airports, to issue bonds and levy taxes to that end, and to do all things necessary to the accomplishment of the statutory purpose.

The Act with which we are now concerned, Article 46d-15 (footnote 1, supra) was adopted in 1947, the same year in which Article 1269h was last amended. There was no need for Article 46d-15 to accomplish the purposes for which appellants contend that it was intended. Those purposes were already accomplished by Article 1269h. It is, of course, elementary that a statute should be so construed as to give it a field of operation and to make it an effective law. The legislature is never presumed to have done a vain thing in the enactment of a statute. See 50 Am.Jur., Statutes, Sections 357, 362. In the light of the then existing law, we can see no effective meaning to be given to Article 46d-15, other than that the designation of the functions therein as being public and governmental carried with it all of the consequences which such a designation entails, including exemption of the municipality from tort liability.

Appellants' third argument assumes the governmental nature of the operation of an airport under Article 46d-15, but urges that renting of space for the storage of airplanes is a business venture not included within the statute. The ordinance of the City of Sweetwater setting up the operation of the airport expressly stated that it was not the purpose of the City to enter into a business for profit.⁵ When not primarily undertaken for profit, the charging of a fee by a municipal corporation does not affect the governmental nature of the activity. City of Midland v. Hamlin, Tex. Civ.App., 239 S.W.2d 159, 25 A.L.R.2d 1048; City of Dallas v. Smith, 130 Tex. 225, 107 S.W.2d 872; 38 Am.Jur., Municipal Corporations, Sec. 575, p. 271. It seems to us that the quartering of airplanes is a part of the airport operations and a governmental function within Article 46d-15.

To support their fourth and final argument, the appellants rely principally upon Christopher v. City of El Paso, supra, citing also the Annotation in 124 A.L.R. 350 on "Constitutionality of Statute Which Relieves Municipalities from Liability for Tort." In Stocker v. City of Nashville, 174 Tenn. 483, 126 S. W.2d 339, 341, 124 A.L.R. 345, the Christopher Case was distinguished as follows:

"We are cited to one case, decided by the Court of Civil Appeals of Texas, Christopher v. City of El Paso, 98 S.W.2d 394, 397, holding unconstitutional an exemption from liability to suit provision in a statute authorizing municipalities to acquire and maintain airports. Vernon\'s Tex.Ann.Civ.St.Art. 1269 h. But that statute differs from the one before us in the important particular that it contained no declaration as a predicate for the exemption from suit, as does the Tennessee statute, that the maintenance and operation of municipal airports is a public governmental function. What is said in that opinion and its citations indicates the importance of this difference."

It is clearly within the province of the legislature, when acting reasonably and not arbitrarily, to determine whether an act that may be performed by a city is public in its nature and performed as the agent of the state in furtherance of general law for the interest of the public at large and, hence, governmental. See Stocker v. City of Nashville, supra; 38 Am.Jur., Municipal...