In re Abrams
Decision Date | 10 April 1951 |
Docket Number | Patent Appeals No. 5723. |
Citation | 188 F.2d 165 |
Parties | In re ABRAMS. |
Court | U.S. Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (CCPA) |
Sidney A. Johnson, Dallas, Tex. (Richard K. Stevens, Washington, D. C., of counsel), for appellant.
E. L. Reynolds, Washington, D. C. (S. Wm. Cochran, Washington, D. C., of counsel), for Commissioner of Patents.
Before GARRETT, Chief Judge, and JACKSON, O'CONNELL, JOHNSON, and WORLEY, Judges.
By this appeal appellant seeks review and reversal of the decision of the Board of Appeals of the United States Patent Office affirming the rejection by the Primary Examiner, hereinafter referred to as the examiner, of four of the claims in appellant's application for patent entitled "for Petroleum Prospecting Method."
As passed on by the examiner the application contained eight claims numbered 1 to 8, inclusive, all of which he rejected. Appellant appealed to the Board of Appeals and before that tribunal withdrew four of the claims, the appeal as to which was dismissed. Those remaining and which are embraced in the appeal to us are Nos. 1, 2, 4, and 8.
In the brief of the Solicitor for the Patent Office it is said: "The rejection of the claims in this case is based on the ground that the claims fail to define a process involving subject matter which properly comes within the terms of Section 4886, R.S. 35 U.S.C.A. § 31 The specific objection is that the steps in the claims which constitute the heart of the invention are purely mental in character."
No prior art was cited in connection with the rejection of the claims.
The board quoted claim 4 as illustrative. There is no contention that any of the other appealed claims contain limitations which patentably differentiate them from that claim, and we here reproduce it:
We take from the brief for appellant the following description of the claimed method, the reference to pages of the record being deleted:
Counsel for appellant state in the brief on his behalf that a need exists "for a rule of guidance in so-called `mental step' cases," asserting that much confusion exists growing out of decisions which have been rendered. In connection with this, the brief states: "While appellant has found it possible, after no little effort, to draw some distinctions and conclusions from the various decisions involving this type of case, no decision has been found which specifically sets forth any logical rule to follow."
Going further, the brief sets forth as applicable to cases where the claims contain certain so-called mental steps, three suggested "rules of law" reading:
The brief states that the proposed rules were formulated on behalf of appellant from a review of many decisions, and it is said: "Appellant strongly feels that this court should adopt the three rules promulgated * * *, or some modification thereof, in order that some rule of reason which is readily understandable to all can be applied to these `mental' step cases."
It is argued that appellant's claims come within the third rule.
Apparently, the proposed rules were suggested to the tribunals of the Patent Office — at least to the examiner, who mentions them in his reply to the brief for appellant filed with the appeal to the board — but neither the examiner nor the board expressed either approval or disapproval of them.
From such examination of the decisions as we have been able to make, the suggested rules appear to accord with them, but it is unnecessary for us arbitrarily to go beyond the requirements of the instant case. For the purpose of its decision, it is sufficient to determine whether or not the claims fall within proposition 3 upon which appellant relies. According to that rule, it must appear that there has been (a) an advance over prior art and that (b) such advance or novelty resides in the physical steps set forth in the claims.
Inasmuch as no prior art was cited below, it would appear that an advance in the art is conceded so far as the tribunals of the Patent Office are concerned. At any rate, in the absence of an adverse finding as to that, no question about it is before us for consideration, and the sole question is whether the novelty thus assumed is the result of a physical act or is simply a mental concept.
In the statement of the examiner following the appeal to the board it was said:
"The total effect of these expressions and steps in the claims is convincing that the nature of the invention is like that found in such decisions as Ex part Toth, 63 U.S. P.Q. 131 (correcting and determining); In re Heritage, 150 F.2d 554, 32 C.C.P.A., Patents, 1170 and Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co. v. Walker, 9 Cir., 146 F.2d 817, involving therein such purely mental terms as `determining', `registering', `counting', `observing', `measuring', `comparing', `recording', and `computing', in which the processes claimed were found to be non-statutory."
The decision in the Toth case, supra, was by the Board of Appeals of the Patent Office and that in the Hallibur...
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