In re Adams
| Decision Date | 09 January 1989 |
| Docket Number | Bankruptcy No. 113515,88-128075,Adv. No. 88-09475 |
| Citation | 94 BR 838 |
| Parties | In re Vera ADAMS, Debtor. Vera ADAMS, Plaintiff, v. PHILADELPHIA HOUSING AUTHORITY, Edward Sparkman, Trustee, and James J. O'Connell, U.S. Trustee, Defendants. In re Kim BOWENS, Debtor. Kim BOWENS, Plaintiff, v. The PHILADELPHIA HOUSING AUTHORITY, Marilyn Lowney, Robert Byrd, PHA Police Officer # 2, PHA Police Officer # 3, PHA Police Officer # 4, Edward Sparkman, Trustee and James J. O'Connell, U.S. Trustee, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. Bankruptcy Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania |
Peter D. Schneider, Community Legal Services, Inc., Philadelphia, Pa., for Adams.
Michael Donahue, Community Legal Services, Inc., Philadelphia, Pa., for Bowens.
Edward Sparkman, Philadelphia, Pa., Standing Chapter 13 Trustee.
Terry W. Claybrook, Philadelphia, Pa., for PHA in Adams.
Jose E. Morales, Susan F. May, Philadelphia, Pa., for PHA in Bowens.
James J. O'Connell, Asst. U.S. Trustee, Philadelphia, Pa., U.S. Trustee.
As we advised the parties, our intention, in deciding these adversary proceedings together, was to attempt to eliminate or at least reduce the stream of matters coming before us which raise the issue of whether a particular debtor is a "remaining member of a tenant family," see 24 C.F.R. § 912.2 (Definition of "Family") i.e., a person entitled to remain in possession of a public housing unit owned by the Philadelphia Housing Authority (hereinafter "PHA"), after the head of the family dies or moves out (hereinafter referred to as "a remainder"). Our original belief was that this question could be resolved by our formulation of a more specific definition of exactly what a remainder is or should be. However, further reflection of the records made in these proceedings and the post-trial submissions of counsel for the parties in these proceedings and further research of the pertinent authorities convinces us that our original belief as to how to approach and reduce the flow of these matters into our court was incorrect.
We now believe that the issue of who is or should be considered to be a remainder is too fact-determinative for us to lay down any meaningful definition of such a party that will resolve these cases summarily on this point. Further, we believe that public-housing grievance panels and the state courts, rather than this bankruptcy court, are the appropriate bodies to make these determinations. However, we also believe that the PHA's policy of summary, forcible eviction of parties who are colorably remainders is violative of these parties' rights to due process of law and consistent pertinent federal Regulations. This policy has engendered the substantial number of instances in which remainders have resorted to bankruptcy, because the only sure means of halting their summary PHA eviction is by invoking the automatic stay of a bankruptcy case.
Therefore, we conclude that the PHA must provide an opportunity for a grievance hearing and must obtain a court order before it may evict any party who allegedly is a remainder. Relief from the automatic stay will be accorded to the PHA in the only one of these cases in which such relief was requested, i.e., the Adams case, but only on the condition that the PHA must grant that Debtor an opportunity for a grievance hearing and obtain a court order before removing her. Damages of $1,000.00 are also awarded to this Debtor. In addition, we award damages to the Debtor summarily evicted in the other case, i.e., the Bowens case, in the amount of $7,500.00. However, we also offer a remittance of these sums and the potential counsel fees of the Debtors' counsel are reduced to $5,000.00 on the condition that the PHA offers leases of premises to both Debtors involved, and that, as recoupment for damages, it allows the Bowens Debtor to occupy a unit rent-free, as long as she otherwise remains in good standing, for five years.
The instant proceeding was preceded by at least four other matters filed in this court in the past year raising very similar issues of whether particular debtors were remainders who were entitled to remain in premises from which the FHA sought to evict them.1
The Adams matter involves VERA ADAMS (hereinafter referred to as "Adams"), a 20-year-old mother of two infants who filed a voluntarily Chapter 13 proceeding on April 20, 1988. On July 15, 1988, although still in possession of a PHA premises, she filed an adversary proceeding seeking to establish both her right to remain in the premises as a remainder and her right to due process of law prior to her eviction. Almost simultaneously, on July 18, 1988, the PHA filed a motion for relief from the automatic stay in Adams' main bankruptcy case in order to obtain permission to proceed to summarily evict her. A consolidated hearing on both matters was conducted on October 13, 1988, and, at its close, we issued an Order of October 14, 1988, maintaining the automatic stay in place pending our final decision and allowing the parties until October 28, 1988, to supplement pre-trial Memoranda which they had submitted in connection with the stay-relief motion.
The Bowens matter features KIM BOWENS (hereinafter "Bowens"), a petite (4'11", 88 pounds), 31-year-old mother of a 14-year-old son who also filed a Chapter 13 bankruptcy case on August 10, 1988. Bowens has experienced a far rockier course of dealings with the PHA than has Adams. The adversary proceeding initiated in her case, on August 24, 1988, sought to recover possession of a PHA premises from which, despite her claims as a remainder, she had already been summarily evicted. As of the date on which a hearing on a preliminary injunction seeking to restore her to possession was scheduled, i.e., August 31, 1988, the PHA agreed to allow her to return to the premises pending the outcome of this proceeding. The original trial date of September 29, 1988, was continued to October 27, 1988. In this interval, we tried the Adams matters, and, when a further continuance of the Bowens hearing was requested, we cautioned the PHA that we intended to decide both this proceeding and the Adams matters together, and that therefore a continuance of the Bowens proceeding would further delay a disposition of the Adams matters. Nevertheless, the PHA reiterated its desire for one further continuance of the Bowens proceeding, until November 10, 1988, on which date it was finally tried.
After the trial, we accorded the parties until November 29, 1988, and December 9, 1988, to offer post-trial submissions. The PHA requested a further extension of their briefing until December 23, 1988, which we allowed after again cautioning the PHA that this request would delay disposition of the Adams matters.
In this interval, we noted that Adams' Chapter 13 Plan was listed for a confirmation hearing and had been confirmed without objection on December 8, 1988. The Plan made no mention of Adams' intention to assume or reject her purported lease with the PHA, nor had the Debtor filed any separate, pre-confirmation motion seeking assumption or rejection of any lease. The Plan contemplated payment of $2.39 monthly for 36 months, a most modest undertaking.2 We therefore entered an Order on December 9, 1988, inviting the parties to comment on the impact of confirmation upon the disposition of the matters before us in this case on or before December 22, 1988. Only Adams' counsel accepted our offer.
There are certain factual disputes between the parties in both matters, although most of the disputes relate to varying interpretations of the Debtors on one hand and PHA personnel on the other of communications between the parties. Most of the hard facts are undisputed. The facts which are directly relevant to our ultimate disposition, on basically due process grounds, are the undisputedly accurate recitation of the PHA's procedures regarding remainders recited by its Director of Housing Management. We are required by the terms of Bankruptcy Rule (hereinafter "B.Rule") 7052 and Federal Rule of Civil Procedures (hereinafter "F.R.Civ.P.") 52(a) to present our decision in the adversary proceedings in issue in the form of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Our conclusions of law will be expressed as headnotes in our following discussion.
1. Adams became a resident of a PHA scattered-site, four-bedroom house, located at 2209 North 5th Street, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, in 1970, at age two, when her mother, Wilhelmina Adams, first leased the home as a head of the family's household.
2. In October, 1983, Adams' mother died and her father, Lonnie Artis (hereinafter "Artis"), leased the home as head of the household. Adams continued to live in the home until October, 1985, when she went to live with an older sister named Denise. Thereafter, she moved to a place of her own with a girlfriend, and later moved in with her boyfriend.
3. In February, 1988, pregnant with her second child and experiencing problems with her boyfriend, Adams moved back into the home, with Artis and her brother Lonnie Adams, the latter of whom vacated the premises on March 1, 1988.
4. Neither Adams nor Artis advised the PHA of Adams' departure from nor her return to the home at the time of her moves.
5. In early April, the PHA approved the longstanding request of Artis, who suffers from numerous physical problems, for a transfer to a one-bedroom PHA apartment designated for the elderly.
6. Upon receipt of this notice, Artis and Adams advised the PHA of Adams' presence in the unit for the first time, and Adams indicated a desire of Adams to rent the home for her family.
7. Adams' request was initially refused solely because she was not at that time listed as a resident of the home on Artis' lease or his 1987 annual "continued occupancy form" (hereinafter "CO") which each tenant is supposed to...
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