In re Aggrenox Antitrust Litig., 3:14–md–2516 SRU.

• Decision Date: 23 March 2015
• Docket Number: No. 3:14–md–2516 SRU.,3:14–md–2516 SRU.
• Citation: 94 F.Supp.3d 224
• Parties: In re AGGRENOX ANTITRUST LITIGATION. This Document Relates to: All Actions.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Connecticut

94 F.Supp.3d 224

In re AGGRENOX ANTITRUST LITIGATION.

This Document Relates to: All Actions.

No. 3:14–md–2516 SRU.

United States District Court, D. Connecticut.

Signed March 23, 2015.

Mathew P. Jasinski, William H. Narwold, Motley Rice LLC, Hartford, CT, Michael M. Buchman, Motley Rice LLC, Mitchell M. Breit, Simmons Hanly Conroy, LLP, Ephraim R. Gerstein, Bruce E. Gerstein, Jonathan Michael Gerstein, Joseph Opper, Garwin Gerstein & Fisher, LLP, Lee Albert, Glancy Binkow & Goldberg LLP, Archana Tamoshunas, Taus Cebulash & Landau LLP, Sarah A. Westby, Faruqi & Faruqi, LLP, Adam Giffords Kurtz, Pomerantz LLP, Adam Steinfeld, Bradley J. Demuth, Linda P. Nussbaum, Peter Anthony Barile, III, Grant & Eisenhofer, P.A., J. Douglas Richards, Sharon K. Robertson, Cohen Milstein Sellers & Toll PLLC, Eric J. Belfi, Gregory Asciolla, Jay L. Himes, Matthew J. Perez, Labaton Sucharow LLP, New York, NY, Derek Y. Brandt, Sarah S. Burns, Simmons Browder Gianaris Angelides & Barnerd LLC, Alton, IL, Lori Ann Fanning, Marvin A. Miller, Miller Law LLC, Chicago, IL, David C. Raphael, Jr., Erin R. Leger, Smith Segura & Raphael, LLP, Alexandria, LA, Keith J. Verrier, Levin, Fishbein, Sedran & Berman, Andrew Coyne Curley, David F. Sorensen, Nicholas Urban, Berger & Montague, P.C., Jacob Alexander Goldberg, Michael Coren, Stewart Lee Cohen, Cohen Placitella & Roth, P.C., Krishna B. Narine, Meredith & Narine, Noah Axler, Donovan Searles, Jeffrey L. Kodroff, John A. Macoretta, William G. Caldes, Spector, Roseman & Kodroff & Willis, P.C., Brent W. Landau, Hausfeld LLP, Philadelphia, PA, Gerald C. Pia, Jr., Roche Pia LLC, Shelton, CT, Christina H.C. Sharp, Daniel C. Girard, Scott M. Grzenczyk, Girard Gibbs, LLP, San Francisco, CA, Natalie Finkelman Bennett, Shepherd, Finkelman, Miller & Shah, LLP, Media, PA, Karen Leser Grenon, Sheperd Finkelman Miller & Shah, LLP, Chester, CT, Joseph T. Lukens, Peter R. Kohn, Faruqi & Faruqi, Jenkintown, PA, Brian C. Roche, Gerald C. Pia, Jr., Roche Pia LLC, Shelton, CT, Jayne A. Goldstein, Pomeranz LLP, Weston, FL, David R. Woodward, Renae D. Steiner, Vincent J. Esades, Heins Mills & Olson, PLC, Anne T. Regan, Zimmerman Reed, PLLP, Heidi M. Drewes–Silton, Karen Hanson Riebel, Lockridge Grindall Nauen PLLP, Minneapolis, MN, Keith S. Dubanevich, Stoll Stoll Berne Lokting & Shlachter, PC, Portland, OR, Garrett D. Blanchfield, Jr., Roberta A. Yard, Reinhardt, Wendorf & Blanchfield, St. Paul, MN, Stephen E. Connolly, Connolly Wells & Gray, LLP, King of Prussia, PA, Brian O. O'Mara, Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd LLP, San Diego, CA, Marc S. Henzel, Law Offices of Marc S. Henzel, Merion Station, PA, David R. Schaefer, Brenner, Saltzman & Wallman, New Haven, CT, Barbara J. Hart, Noelle–Kristen F. Ruggiero, Peter D. St. Phillip, Jr., Richard W. Cohen, Uriel Rabinovitz, Lowey Dannenberg Cohen & Hart, P.C., White Plains, NY, Gerald Lawrence, Lowey Dannenberg Cohen & Hart, P.C., West Conshohocken, PA, David S. Nalven, Thomas M. Sobol, Hagens Berman Sobel Shapiro, LLP, Cambridge, MA, for Plaintiffs.

Brigid M. Carpenter, Baker, Donelson, Berman, Caldwell & Berkowitz, P.C., Robert Dale Grimes, Bass, Berry & Sims, Nashville, TN, Robert D. Carroll, Sarah K. Frederick, Christopher T. Holding, Goodwin Procter, LLP, Boston, MA, Assaf Ze'Ev Ben–Atar, James T. Shearin, Pullman & Comley, Bridgeport, CT, Alison Hanstead, Jack E. Pace, III, Robert A. Milne, White & Case, David Kessler, Norton Rose Fulbright, New York, NY, J. Mark Gidley, Matthew S. Leddicotte, Peter J. Carney, Matthew S. Leddicotte, White & Case, Washington, DC, John E. Iole, Jones Day, Pittsburgh, PA, Kelly G. Laudon, Mark A. Jacobson, Lindquist & Vennum LLP, Minneapolis, MN, Richard P. Colbert, Day Pitney LLP, Stamford, CT, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION AND ORDER

STEFAN R. UNDERHILL, District Judge.

This case aggregates numerous antitrust actions brought by numerous plaintiffs in various districts against several interrelated pharmaceutical companies, all transferred to this Court by the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation. Under a Practice and Procedure Order (doc. # 37), the actions are consolidated into two groups: all direct-purchaser actions, and all indirect-purchaser actions (the indirect purchasers also style themselves “end payors”). Two consolidated, putative class-action complaints have accordingly been filed. One of the indirect purchasers (or end payors), Humana, Inc. (“Humana”), which alleges that it has the greatest economic interest of any such plaintiff (and that it alone has standing in every state), is pursuing its claims individually. There are thus three current complaints: (1) the direct-purchaser plaintiffs' putative class complaint (doc. # 109); (2) the indirect-purchaser plaintiffs' (or end-payor plaintiffs') putative class complaint (doc. # 120); and (3) the Humana complaint (doc. # 93).

The defendants are also divisible into several groups: (1) Boehringer Ingelheim Pharma GmbH & Co. KG and Boehringer Ingelheim International GmbH, which are organized under German law, and Boehringer Ingelheim Pharmaceuticals, Inc., which is a Delaware corporation (collectively “Boehringer”); (2) Teva Pharmaceutical Industries, Ltd. (“Teva Israel”), which is organized under Israeli law, and Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc. (“Teva USA”), which is a Delaware corporation; (3) Barr Pharmaceuticals, Inc. and Barr Laboratories, Inc., which are both Delaware corporations (collectively “Barr”); and (4) Duramed Pharmaceuticals Inc. and Duramed Pharmaceuticals Sales Corp., which are both Delaware corporations (collectively “Duramed”). In 2008, Teva USA acquired Barr Pharmaceuticals. Duramed was, in turn, a subsidiary of Barr, and thus also became a subsidiary of Teva USA. Teva USA is a subsidiary of Teva Israel, making all non-Boehringer defendants at least indirect subsidiaries of Teva Israel.

There are four pending motions to dismiss, three of them filed collectively by all defendants except Teva Israel, and one filed by Teva Israel alone. Those motions are: (1) Teva Israel's motion to dismiss all complaints against it under Rule 12(b)(2) and Rule 12(b)(6) (doc. # 150); (2) the defendants' motion to dismiss the direct-purchaser complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) (doc. # 149; sealed mem., doc. 168); (3) the defendants' motion to dismiss the indirect-purchaser complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) (doc. # 151); and (4) the defendants' motion to dismiss the Humana complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) (doc. # 152).

I. Standards of Review

A. Rule 12(b)(2)

A plaintiff bears the burden of showing that the court has personal jurisdiction over each defendant. Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Robertson–Ceco Corp., 84 F.3d 560, 566 (2d Cir.1996). Where, as here, there has been no discovery on jurisdictional issues and the court is relying solely on the parties' pleadings and affidavits, the plaintiff need only make a prima facie showing that the court possesses personal jurisdiction over the defendant. Bank Brussels Lambert v. Fiddler Gonzalez & Rodriguez, 171 F.3d 779, 784 (2d Cir.1999).

B. Rule 12(b)(6)

A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) is designed “merely to assess the legal feasibility of a complaint, not to assay the weight of evidence which might be offered in support thereof.” Ryder Energy Distribution Corp. v. Merrill Lynch Commodities, Inc., 748 F.2d 774, 779 (2d Cir.1984) (quoting Geisler v. Petrocelli, 616 F.2d 636, 639 (2d Cir.1980) ).

When deciding a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), the court must accept the material facts alleged in the complaint as true, draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiffs, and decide whether it is plausible that plaintiffs have a valid claim for relief. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678–79, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) ; Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555–56, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) ; Leeds v. Meltz, 85 F.3d 51, 53 (2d Cir.1996).

Under Twombly, “[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level,” and assert a cause of action with enough heft to show entitlement to relief and “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” 550 U.S. at 555, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ; see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (“While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations.”). The plausibility standard set forth in Twombly and Iqbal obligates the plaintiff to “provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief” through more than “labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955 (quotation marks omitted). Plausibility at the pleading stage is nonetheless distinct from probability, and “a well-pleaded complaint may proceed even if it strikes a savvy judge that actual proof of [the claims] is improbable, and ... recovery is very remote and unlikely.” Id. at 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955 (quotation marks omitted).

II. Discussion

A. Factual and Legal Background

This case arises at the intersection of two areas of law that would seem to be naturally at odds with one another: antitrust law—procompetitive by design—which prohibits certain forms of anticompetitive conduct, and patent law—anticompetitive by design—which seeks to encourage innovation by rewarding innovators with limited legal monopolies. The question at the heart of this case is whether a patent-litigation settlement—that is, an agreement to settle litigation that had put the legitimacy of a patent's grant of monopoly at issue—constituted a violation of antitrust law. Two features dominate the background: (1) the incentives to undertake patent litigation under the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act, commonly known as the Hatch–Waxman Act, and (2) the uncertain but disruptive effect on such litigation of the Supreme Court's recent decision in FTC v. Actavis, Inc., ––– U.S. ––––, 133 S.Ct. 2223, 186...