In re Agnew

• Decision Date: 27 August 1915
• Citation: 225 F. 650
• Parties: In re AGNEW et al.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of New York

225 F. 650

In re AGNEW et al.

United States District Court, N.D. New York.

August 27, 1915

[Copyrighted Material Omitted]

Weeds Conway & Cotter, of Plattsburgh, N.Y., for trustee and objecting creditor.

Agnew &amp Agnew, of Plattsburgh, N.Y., for administratrix.

RAY District Judge (after stating the facts as above).

The specifications of objection filed to the discharge of John Agnew challenge the validity of the order of the judge permitting the filing of an application for a discharge after one year and within the 18 months succeeding the adjudication, and also the right of the administratrix of a deceased bankrupt, duly adjudicated in his lifetime, to file or present a petition for his discharge, and also deny that Amy C. Agnew, who filed the application for discharge, is administratrix. These specifications of objection also present the following grounds for refusing a discharge, but whether sufficiently or not is the question, viz.:

That said John Agnew, while a bankrupt and unable to pay his debts, committed offenses punishable by imprisonment, as specified in section 29b of the Bankruptcy Act, in that he knowingly and fraudulently concealed and withheld from his trustee certain books, property, etc., and that said John Agnew made a false oath in relation to this bankruptcy proceeding, and on matters material therein, knowingly and intentionally, and then sets out details thereof; also that John Agnew, with intent to conceal his financial condition and the condition of the firm, destroyed, concealed, or permitted to be destroyed or concealed, records, vouchers, books, and papers of his said firm, and failed to keep or cause to be kept books of accounts and records from which the true financial condition of himself and his firm might be ascertained, etc.; also that said John Agnew obtained money, credit, and property upon materially false statements in writing made by him to various persons, firms, and corporations, for the purpose of obtaining money, credit, and property, etc.; also that at a time subsequent to the first day of the four months immediately preceding the filing of the petition in bankruptcy said John Agnew transferred, removed, destroyed, or concealed, or attempted to do so, his property, etc., with intent to hinder, delay, and defraud their creditors.

The grounds for refusing a discharge, so far as involved here, may be summarized thus:

Offenses Punishable by Imprisonment. (See section 29.) The bankrupt:

(A) Must have knowingly and fraudulently concealed, while a bankrupt, from his trustee, property belonging to his estate in bankruptcy.

(B) Must have made a false oath or account in, or in relation to, some (any) proceedings in bankruptcy. (This bankruptcy proceeding.)

Other Grounds. (See section 14.) The bankrupt:

(C) Must have, with intent to conceal his financial condition, destroyed, concealed, or failed to keep books of account or records from which such financial condition might be ascertained.

(D) Must have obtained money or property on credit upon a materially false statement in writing made by him to any person or representative for the purpose of obtaining credit from such person.

(E) Must have, at some time subsequent to the first day of the four months immediately preceding the filing of the petition, transferred, removed, destroyed, or concealed, or permitted this to be done, some of his property, with intent to hinder, delay, or defraud his creditors.

Bankruptcy proceedings, once commenced, do not abate on the death of the alleged bankrupt, whether the proceeding be voluntary or involuntary, and whether adjudication has been had, or not, at the time of such death. Bankr. Act, Sec. 8. 'The death or insanity of a bankrupt shall not abate the proceedings, but the same shall be conducted and concluded in the same manner, so far as possible, as though he had not died or become insane. ' In re Hicks (D.C.) 6 Am.Bankr.Rep. 182, 107 F. 910; Shute v. Patterson (C.C.A., 8th Circuit) 17 Am.Bankr.Rep. 99, 147 F. 509, 78 C.C.A. 75; In re Parker, 1 Am.Bankr.Rep. 615; In re Miller (D.C.) 13 Am.Bankr.Rep. 345, 133 F. 1017; Collier on Bankruptcy (10th Ed.) 249, 250. Therefore the administratrix, if there be one, properly filed the application for a discharge, and the judge had the right, on cause shown, to extend the time in which to file same, but not exceeding 18 months from the adjudication. If it be shown that no letters of administration issued to the person who, as administratrix, filed the application for a discharge, the proceedings for a discharge will fall, of course; but such appointment, as to its regularity, etc., cannot be attacked in this proceeding. The production of the letters will be sufficient, and establish the fact, unless it be shown they have been revoked. If it be shown that no reason whatever was presented to the judge for extending beyond one year the time for filing the application for a discharge, the order might be void, and vacated on motion. The objecting creditor and trustee have the right to present these questions, however; but the order granting the extension cannot be attacked in this proceeding before the special master or judge, nor can the regularity or validity of the letters of administration. If, as alleged, Amy C. Agnew, who applied for the extension, was not a person entitled to apply for such an order, it can be vacated on motion, but cannot be attacked collaterally; the order having been made and acted upon. It will be incumbent on her to produce and put in evidence the letters of administration. As to the other specifications of objection, they must point out and allege facts, not mere conclusions.

To constitute the punishable offense of having knowingly and fraudulently concealed while a bankrupt from his trustee property belonging to his estate in bankruptcy, such concealment must have been by the bankrupt after the filing of a petition against him, while a bankrupt, or after his discharge, and the property must have been concealed from the trustee, and such property must have belonged to the estate in bankruptcy. The concealment must be knowingly and fraudulently done. The evidence must be clear. It is evident that the specifications of objection should point out or specify what property was concealed, and when, with some reasonable degree of certainty. In re Meyers (D.C.) 5 Am.Bankr.Rep. 4, 105 F. 353; In re Hyman (D.C.) 3 Am.Bankr.Rep. 169, 97 F. 195; In re Webb (D.C.) 3 Am.Bankr.Rep. 38...