In re Air Bag Products Liability Litigation

• Decision Date: 21 May 1998
• Docket Number: No. Civ.A. MDL 1181.,Civ.A. MDL 1181.
• Citation: 7 F.Supp.2d 792
• Parties: In re AIR BAG PRODUCTS LIABILITY LITIGATION. This Document Relates to All Cases.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Louisiana

7 F.Supp.2d 792

In re AIR BAG PRODUCTS LIABILITY LITIGATION This Document Relates to All Cases.

No. Civ.A. MDL 1181.

United States District Court, E.D. Louisiana.

May 21, 1998.

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James Minge (Plaintiff's Lead and Liaison Counsel), James Minge & Associates, New Orleans, LA, Vance R. Andrus, Andrus, Boudreaux, Lemoine & Tonore, P.L.C., Lafayette, LA, Richard J. Arsenault, Neblett, Beard & Arsenault, Alexandria, LA, Darleen Jacobs, New Orleans, LA, John M. O'Quinn, Richard Laminack, Houston, TX, Dianne M. Nast, Roda & Nast, P.C., Lancaster, PA, Joseph J. McKernan, McKernan, Clegg & Walker, Baton Rouge, LA, Patrick W. Pendley, Plaquemine, LA, Rene R. Barrientos, San Antonio, TX, Joaquin L. Rodriguez, Eagle Pass, TX, Vincent L. Marble, III, Wharton, TX, for Plaintiffs.

David G. Radlauer (Defendants' Liaison Counsel), Thomas A. Casey, Jr., Nan Roberts Eitel, Katy W. Kimball, Jones, Walker, Waechter, Poitevent, Carrere & Denegre, L.L.P., New Oleans, LA, for Defendants, General Motors Corp., Mossy Motors, Inc., Wickstrom Chevrolet, Inc. and Armadillo Motors, Inc.

Terence M. Murphy, James S. Teater, Chrysta L. Castaneda, Tamara Marinkovic, Jones, Day, Reavis & Pogue, Dallas, TX, for Defendant, General Motors Corp.

John H. Beisner, Brian Anderson, Barton S. Aronson, O'Melveny & Myers, Washington, DC, for Ford Motor Co.

Colvin G. Norwood, Jr., Mark N. Bodin, McGlinchey, Stafford L.L.C., New Orleans, LA, for Ford Motor Co., Chrysler Corp., Spinato Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc. and Bohn Ford, Inc.

Peter W. Herzog, Amy Thompson, Bryan Cave L.L.P., St. Louis, MO, for Chrysler Corp. and Spinato Chrysler-Plymouth.

Robert L. Green, Jr., Charles Loughlin, Howrey & Simon, Washington, DC, for Volvo Cars of North America, Inc.

Henry A. King, Norman S. Anseman, Nesser, King & LeBlanc, New Orleans, LA, for Volvo Cars of North America, Inc. and Bergeron Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc. d/b/a Bergeron Volvo.

Chilton Davis Varner, Dwight J. Davis, Carmen R. Toledo, King & Spalding, Atlanta, GA, for Nissan Motor Corp. in U.S.A.

Terry Christovich Gay, Charles W. Schimidt, III, Christovitch & Kearney, New Orleans, LA, for Nissan Motor Corp. in U.S.A., Bill Watson Nissan, Inc. and Bensco, Inc. Jerry L. Saporito, Brandt K. Enos, O'Neil, Eichin, Miller, Saporito & Harris, New Orleans, LA, for Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc. and Pinnacle Automotive, Inc.

Joel A. Mathias, H. Bruce Dorsey, Piper & Marbury, Baltimore, MD, for Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc.

Lawrence J. Duplass, Gregory O. Currier, Duplass, Zwain & Bourgeois, Metairie, LA, for American Honda Motor Co., Inc. and Superior Imports, Inc. d/b/a Superior Honda.

Peter Choharis, Lawrence S. Robbins, Andrew J. Morris, Mayer, Brown & Platt, Washington, DC, for American Honda Motor Co., Inc.

ORDER AND REASONS

FELDMAN, District Judge.

Before the Court are several motions in these consolidated MDL cases: a Motion to Dismiss by all defendants, a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment by the dealer defendants, and a Motion for Summary Judgment by all defendants in Frederick Lewis, et al. v. Volvo of North America, et al., Civ. No. 97-1309; a Motion to Dismiss and a Motion for Summary Judgment by all defendants in Theresa Marble v. Chrysler Corp., Civ. No. 97-2055; and a Motion to Dismiss by all defendants, a Motion for Summary Judgment by all defendants, and a Motion for Summary Judgment by the dealer defendants in Eloisa Rodriguez v. General Motors Corp., et al., Civ. No. 97-2667. For the reasons that follow, these motions are granted, with the exception of the dealer defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment in Lewis, which is denied as moot. Many of the issues these motions raise necessarily duplicate one another, and, for clarity, the Court will repeat them as needed.

Background

This consolidated multi-district litigation¹ comprises several putative class actions² brought on behalf of owners of vehicles equipped with driver or passenger-side air bags. Although the individual allegations of each suit differ, the common charge is essentially the same: the air bags are dangerously defective because they are designed to deploy with sufficient speed and force to seriously injure or kill front seat occupants (although no plaintiff maintains they have done so), especially women, children, the elderly, and short adults. Plaintiffs predicate recovery for this alleged defect on several theories. The Lewis plaintiffs³ assert redhibition claims against defendants⁴ under Louisiana law and negligence per se claims under federal transportation laws, 49 U.S.C. § 30118 et seq.⁵ The Marble plaintiffs,⁶ in turn, bring redhibition claims against Chrysler Corporation under Louisiana law, and negligence per se, strict liability, breach of implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose, and breach of implied warranty of merchantability claims under Texas law. Finally, the Rodriguez plaintiffs⁷ advance negligence, negligence per se, and breach of implied warranty of merchantability claims against defendants⁸ under Texas law.

Notwithstanding their varying theories for recovery, the many plaintiffs seek similar relief: (1) for the Louisiana plaintiffs in Lewis and Marble, rescission of the sale and restitution of the purchase price, or the appropriate reduction and return of the purchase price; (2) for all plaintiffs, the cost of retrofitting their vehicles with air bags, sensors and electronic components which will eliminate or significantly reduce unnecessary danger to front-seat occupants while protecting those occupants during collisions; (3) compensation for the diminution of the resale value of their vehicles; (4) compensation for the diminution of their vehicles' usefulness and convenience during the term of ownership, resulting from the inadvisability of allowing the at-risk groups mentioned to occupy either of the front seats; (5) compensation for the difference between what plaintiffs actually paid for their vehicles and the fair market value of those vehicles, taking into account the alleged defect; (6) for those plaintiffs permitted to do so under National Highway Traffic Safety Administration regulations, the cost of hiring a manufacturer, distributor, dealer or motor vehicle repair business to furnish and install an air bag "shut-off" or "on-off" switch; (7) in the event that any plaintiff elects to disconnect the air bags without hiring a professional third party, a refund of that portion of the purchase price attributable to air bags and their related sensors and electronics; (8) for those plaintiffs who elect to install the "shut-off" or "on-off" switches without professional third-party assistance, the cost of parts and reasonable compensation for time and inconvenience; and (9) attorney's fees, costs, legal interest, and all other available general and equitable relief.⁹ Defendants deny that the air bags are defective in law, and have filed motions to dismiss or for summary judgment in each case.

Law and Application

I. Standards of Review

A. Standard for Motions for Summary Judgment

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 instructs that summary judgment is proper if the record discloses no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. No genuine issue of fact exists if the record, taken as a whole, could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). A genuine issue of fact exists only "if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). The mere argued existence of a factual dispute does not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion. See id. Therefore, "[i]f the evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative," summary judgment is appropriate. Id. at 249-50, 106 S.Ct. 2505 (citations omitted).

In addition, if the party opposing the motion fails to establish an essential element of his case, summary judgment is proper. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). In evaluating the summary judgment motion, a court must read the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505.

B. Standard for Motions to Dismiss

To prevail on a motion to dismiss under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), a defendant must show that the plaintiff "can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957); see also Mitchell v. McBryde, 944 F.2d 229, 230 (5th Cir.1991). The Court "must take the factual allegations of the complaint as true and resolve any ambiguities or doubts regarding the sufficiency of the claim in favor of the plaintiff." Fernandez- Montes v. Allied Pilots Ass'n, 987 F.2d 278, 284 (5th Cir.1993). However, "conclusory allegations or legal conclusions masquerading as factual conclusions will not suffice to prevent a motion to dismiss." Id. The Court now turns to each of the cases.

II. Frederick Lewis, et al. v. Volvo of North America, et al., Civ. No. 97-1309 F(3)

A. Motion for Summary Judgment By All Defendants

All Lewis defendants move for summary judgment on plaintiffs' redhibition claims. First, they contend that each of the cars purchased by the plaintiffs contained a written label, placed prominently on the sun visors by the manufacturers, disclosing potential dangers associated with air bag deployment and directing purchasers to read the owner's manual for further information. The manuals, in turn, afforded more information and warnings about air bag safety. Further, by the time each of the plaintiffs made their purchase, national and local print and broadcast media had publicized extensively what plaintiffs characterize here as...