IN RE AIR CRASH NEAR VAN CLEVE, MISS., ETC., 407.

• Decision Date: 12 March 1980
• Docket Number: No. 407.,407.
• Citation: IN RE AIR CRASH NEAR VAN CLEVE, MISS., ETC., 486 F.Supp. 926 (J.P.M.L. 1980)
• Parties: In re AIR CRASH NEAR VAN CLEVE, MISSISSIPPI, ON AUGUST 13, 1977.
• Writing for the Court: PER CURIAM
• Court: Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation

486 F. Supp. 926

In re AIR CRASH NEAR VAN CLEVE, MISSISSIPPI, ON AUGUST 13, 1977.

No. 407.

Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation.

March 12, 1980.

Before ANDREW A. CAFFREY, Acting Chairman, ROY W. HARPER, CHARLES R. WEINER, EDWARD S. NORTHROP, and ROBERT H. SCHNACKE, Judges of the Panel.

OPINION AND ORDER

PER CURIAM.

This litigation consists of nine actions, pending in a total of four federal districts: three in the Southern District of Mississippi, and two each in the Northern District of Oklahoma, the Southern District of Alabama and the Northern District of Texas.

On August 13, 1977, a Beech Queenair aircraft was on a flight from Biloxi, Mississippi, to a destination in Alabama. On board the aircraft were a pilot, a co-pilot and a single passenger. During the course of the flight, the left engine of the aircraft allegedly failed, causing an in-flight fire to occur in and around the engine. This fire allegedly caused the left wing of the aircraft to fall off, and the aircraft crashed near Van Cleve, Mississippi. Each of the occupants of the aircraft died as a result of this disaster.

Plaintiffs in each of the actions before the Panel are the personal representatives or relatives of the three decedents. Relatives of the passenger and the personal representative and/or relatives of the co-pilot have each commenced an action in each of the districts in which the actions before the Panel are pending; the ninth action was commenced by a personal representative of the pilot. Beech Aircraft Corporation (Beech), the manufacturer of the aircraft, is a defendant in most of the actions before the Panel. Other parties named as defendants in one or more of these actions include numerous companies that participated in a major overhaul of the left engine of the aircraft, which was performed in April, 1976 in Tulsa, Oklahoma; the corporation that manufactured the aircraft's left engine; and the individual who owned the aircraft at the time of the crash. Plaintiffs seek to recover against these defendants on theories of, inter alia, strict liability and negligence.

Each of the actions before the Panel was filed in 1979 and minimal or no discovery has yet been accomplished in the actions.

Because these actions appeared to share questions of fact, the Panel, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1407, originally issued orders to show cause why the actions should not be transferred to a single district for coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings. See Rule 8(a), R.P.J.P.M.L. 78 F.R.D. 561, 566-67 (1978). Subsequently, an individual who is either a plaintiff or a co-plaintiff in an action pending in each of the four districts involved in this litigation moved the Panel to centralize all actions in the Southern District of Mississippi. Two defendants oppose transfer; alternatively, these defendants urge centralization in, respectively, the Northern District of Oklahoma or the Northern District of Texas.¹ All other responding parties favor centralization, and support either the Northern District of Oklahoma or the Southern District of Mississippi as the transferee district.

We find that these actions involve common questions of fact and that transfer of the actions pending in districts other than the Northern District of Oklahoma to that district for coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings under Section 1407 with the actions pending there will serve the convenience of the parties and witnesses and promote the just and efficient conduct of the litigation.

The opponents of transfer concede that these actions share questions of fact concerning the cause or causes of the crash. The thrust of opponents' argument is that although nine actions are before the Panel, these actions were commenced by only three sets of plaintiffs, and that voluntary cooperation among the parties and courts involved in this litigation is a viable and preferable alternative to Section 1407 transfer.

We do not find this argument persuasive. While voluntary coordination of pretrial efforts is always commendable, transfer of these actions to a single district under Section 1407 will ensure the streamlining of discovery and all other pretrial proceedings. See In re Gas Meter Antitrust Litigation, 464 F.Supp. 391, 393 (Jud.Pan.Mult.Lit. 1979). The transferee judge, of course, will have the...