In re Air Crash Near Clarence Ctr. New York, on February 12, 2009

• Citation: 798 F.Supp.2d 481
• Decision Date: 18 July 2011
• Docket Number: No. 09–md–2085.,09–md–2085.
• Parties: In re AIR CRASH NEAR CLARENCE CENTER, NEW YORK, ON FEBRUARY 12, 2009,This document relates to: All Cases.
• Court: United States District Courts. 2nd Circuit. United States District Court of Western District of New York

798 F.Supp.2d 481

In re AIR CRASH NEAR CLARENCE CENTER, NEW YORK, ON FEBRUARY 12, 2009,This document relates to: All Cases.

No. 09–md–2085.

United States District Court, W.D. New York.

July 18, 2011.

Hugh M. Russ, III, Paul I. Perlman, Ryan J. Lucinski, Hodgson Russ, LLP, Anthony J. Colucci, III, Michael J. Keane, Paul G. Joyce, Colucci & Gallaher, P.C., James T. Scime, Lipsitz Green Scime Cambria LLP, Kevin A. Szanyi, Webster Szanyi, LLP, Richard A. Grimm, III, Magavern, Magavern & Grimm, Christopher M. Murphy, Doran & Murphy, LLP, Brian P. Crosby, Charles S. Desmond, II, Gibson, Mcaskill & Crosby, LLP, Richard A. Nicotra, Andrews, Bernstein & Maranto, LLP, Amy C. Martoche, Terrence M. Connors, Connors & Vilardo, LLP, Catherine E. Nagel, Nuchereno & Nagel, Buffalo, NY, Colin H. Dunn, Kevin P. Durkin, Michael S. Krzak, Robert A. Clifford, Clifford Law Offices, P.C., Chicago, IL, Daniel O. Rose, James P. Kreindler, Justin T. Green, Robert J. Spragg, Noah H. Kushlefsky, Justin T. Green, Kreindler & Kreindler LLP, Howard S. Hershenhorn, Gair, Gair, Conaason, Steigman & MacKauf, Christina M. Fry, Jeanne M. O'Grady, Kenneth P. Nolan, Frank H. Granito, III, Frank H. Granito, Jr., Speiser, Krause, Nolan & Granito, Jonathan C. Reiter, Meryl Iris Schwartz, Law Firm of Jonathan C. Reiter, Dorothea M. Capone, Douglas A. Latto, Michel F. Baumeister, Baumeister & Samuels, P.C., New York, NY, Angelo M. Patacca, Jr., Terrell Hogan Ellis Yegelwel, P.A., Jacksonville, FL, Fidelma L. Fitzpatrick, Motley Rice, Providence, RI, for Plaintiffs.

David J. Harrington, John Maggio, Condon & Forsyth LLP, New York, NY, Neil A. Goldberg, Goldberg Segalla LLP, Buffalo, NY, for Defendants.

DECISION AND ORDER

WILLIAM M. SKRETNY, Chief Judge.

I. INTRODUCTION

Presently before this Court are the parties' choice-of-law motions filed in this multidistrict litigation concerning the crash of Continental Connection Flight 3407. On February 12, 2009, while on final approach to the Buffalo Niagara International Airport, Flight 3407 crashed into a house in Clarence Center, N.Y., killing 50 people (all 49 on board and one in the house) and damaging neighboring property.

By order entered October 6, 2009, the United States Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation transferred all then-pending actions concerning the crash of Flight 3407 to this Court for coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1407. In Re Air Crash Near Clarence Ctr., N.Y., on Feb. 12, 2009, 655 F.Supp.2d 1355, 1356 (J.P.M.L.2009). Subsequently-filed actions have also been transferred here. To date, the litigation encompasses individual cases commenced in Connecticut, Florida, New Jersey, New York, and Pennsylvania.

In their Motions for the Application of a Federal Standard of Care (Docket No. 486 ¹) and for a Determination of Applicable Law on Punitive Damages (Docket No. 437), Defendants Pinnacle Airlines Corp. and its wholly-owned subsidiary, Colgan Air, Inc., argue that federal standards of care apply to Plaintiffs' state law negligence claims and that Virginia law governs punitive damages. In their Cross Motion for the Application of New York law (Docket No. 579), Plaintiffs argue that New York law governs both the standards of care and punitive damages. For the reasons discussed below, this Court finds that federal standards of care apply to Plaintiffs' state law negligence claims and that New York law applies to punitive damages.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Law Governing the Standard of Care

Defendants seek application of federal standards of care on the theory that Congress intended the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 (“the Aviation Act”), 49 U.S.C. §§ 40101, et seq., and its associated regulations ( e.g., 14 C.F.R. §§ 21.199, et seq.) to preempt all state law standards of care relating to air safety. Defendants maintain that federal control over the nation's airspace is extensive and exclusive, and therefore, federal standards of care preempt individual state law and provide the relevant standards relating to aviation safety and aircraft operations. Thus, rather than meet New York's reasonably-prudent-person standard, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs must instead prove that a violation of a federal standard of care ( e.g., a federal statute or regulation) caused their alleged injuries. Plaintiffs maintain that the Aviation Act does not preempt state law.

Congress's power to preempt state law derives from the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution, which provides that

[t]his Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby; any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.

U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2; see also Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 746, 101 S.Ct. 2114, 68 L.Ed.2d 576 (1981).

Federal preemption can be express or implied. See N.Y. SMSA Ltd. P'ship v. Town of Clarkstown, 612 F.3d 97, 104 (2d Cir.2010) (per curiam). Express preemption exists when “a federal statute expressly directs that state law be ousted.” Ass'n of Int'l Auto. Mfrs. v. Abrams, 84 F.3d 602, 607 (2d Cir.1996). Implied preemption exists when there is evidence that Congress intended federal authority to displace state authority. See Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 372, 120 S.Ct. 2288, 147 L.Ed.2d 352 (2000). Thus, implied preemption is “fundamentally a question of congressional intent.” Gerosa v. Savasta & Co., 329 F.3d 317, 323 (2d Cir.2003) (citing N.Y. State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645, 655, 115 S.Ct. 1671, 131 L.Ed.2d 695 (1995)); Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 45, 107 S.Ct. 1549, 1552, 95 L.Ed.2d 39 (1987) (Congressional intent is the “ultimate touchstone” of preemption analysis). The analysis “begin[s] with the assumption that ‘Congress does not intend to supplant state law.’ ” Gerosa, 329 F.3d at 323–24 (examining preemption in the ERISA context) (citing Travelers, 514 U.S. at 654–55, 115 S.Ct. 1671).

Defendants argue that the doctrine of field preemption requires the application of federal standards of care. Field preemption is a form of implied preemption. See English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 79–80, 110 S.Ct. 2270, 110 L.Ed.2d 65 (1990). It “is inferred in cases where federal law is so pervasive that it leaves ‘no room for supplementary state regulation’—where the federal law has fully occupied the field of regulation.” U.S. Smokeless Tobacco Mfg. Co. v. City of N.Y., 703 F.Supp.2d 329, 335 (S.D.N.Y.2010) (quoting Hillsborough Cnty., Fla. v. Automated Med. Labs., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 713, 105 S.Ct. 2371, 85 L.Ed.2d 714 (1985)). It is found where “the pervasiveness of the federal regulation precludes supplementation by the States, where the federal interest in the field is sufficiently dominant, or where ‘the object sought to be obtained by the federal law and the character of obligations imposed by it ... reveal the same purpose.’ ” Air Transp. Ass'n of Am., Inc. v. Cuomo, 520 F.3d 218, 220–21 (2d Cir.2008) (quoting Schneidewind v. ANR Pipeline Co., 485 U.S. 293, 300, 108 S.Ct. 1145, 99 L.Ed.2d 316 (1988)).

If congressional intent to preempt is found, the next task is to determine the scope of the preemption: “The key question is thus at what point the state regulation sufficiently interferes with federal regulation that it should be deemed preempted.” Gade v. Nat'l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass'n, 505 U.S. 88, 107, 112 S.Ct. 2374, 120 L.Ed.2d 73 (1992).

During the briefing of Defendants' present motion, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit resolved the first preemption inquiry, holding that “Congress has indicated its intent to occupy the entire field of aviation safety.” Goodspeed Airport LLC v. E. Haddam Inland Wetlands & Watercourses Comm'n, 634 F.3d 206, 212 (2d Cir.2011). In so doing, the Second Circuit joined its sister circuits in concluding that Congress intended the Aviation Act to entirely preempt state regulation of air safety. See, e.g., U.S. Airways, Inc. v. O'Donnell, 627 F.3d 1318, 1326 (10th Cir.2010); Montalvo v. Spirit Airlines, 508 F.3d 464, 468 (9th Cir.2007); Greene v. B.F. Goodrich Avionics Sys., Inc., 409 F.3d 784, 795 (6th Cir.2005); Abdullah v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 181 F.3d 363, 367–68 (3d Cir.1999); French v. Pan Am Express, Inc., 869 F.2d 1, 5 (1st Cir.1989); see also Curtin v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 183 F.Supp.2d 664, 671 (S.D.N.Y.2002). The remaining question is whether Congress's preemption of air safety encompasses the standards of care applicable to Plaintiffs' state law negligence claims.² Goodspeed, 634 F.3d at 210–11 (explaining the preemption analysis as twofold: “we must determine not only Congressional intent to preempt, but also the scope of that preemption”).

Plaintiffs' state law negligence claims would ordinarily require application of the reasonably-prudent-person standard of care to determine whether Defendants breached their duties. See Havas v. Victory Paper Stock Co., 49 N.Y.2d 381, 426 N.Y.S.2d 233, 402 N.E.2d 1136, 1138–39 (1980). Plaintiffs generally allege that Defendants' negligent acts included hiring, training, and supervising the flight crew, and creating and implementing various safety programs. Plaintiffs also allege that Defendants are responsible for the flight crew's negligent operation of Flight 3407. There is little question that these claims directly implicate air safety, and indeed, there is no argument from Plaintiffs that their claims fall outside the air safety field.

The Aviation Act “was passed by Congress for the purpose of centralizing in a single authority—indeed, in one administrator—the power to frame rules for the safe and efficient use of the nation's airspace.” Air Line Pilots Ass'n., Int'l v. Quesada, 276...