In re Aldrich

• Decision Date: 12 May 1913
• Citation: 86 Vt. 531,86 A. 801
• Court: Vermont Supreme Court
• Parties: In re ALDRICH.

86 A. 801

86 Vt. 531

In re ALDRICH.

Supreme Court of Vermont.

May 12, 1913.

Original proceeding for the disbarment of William R. Aldrich. Respondent suspended for one year.

Argued before HOWELL, C. J., and MUNSON, WATSON, HASELTON, and POWERS, JJ.

W. M. Wright, State's Atty., of Barton, and John G. Sargent, Atty. Gen., for complainant.

F. D. Thompson, of Barton, and Young & Young, of Newport, for respondent.

HASELTON, J. This is a disbarment proceeding brought to this court by the Attorney General. Answer was made, and a committee was appointed to hear and report upon the charges made. The committee's report having been made and filed, the case came on to be heard at the November term, 1912, of this court.

Presentments 1 and 2 charge illegal and champertous undertakings and doings on the part of the respondent in respect to certain libel suits. It appears from the findings that a libelous petition affecting certain officers of the town of Lowell was put in circulation, and that these officers employed the respondent, who was counsel for the town in some matters, to commence libel suits against some of the signers of the petition. The respondent did not agree to pay costs and expenses, but agreed to restrict his charges for services to one-half of the amount that might be recovered. The respondent has, in fact, paid none of the expenses of the suits. The committee find and report that the first and second presentments are not sustained, unless the agreement of the respondent with regard to these libel cases was champertous. It was not such an agreement, since the respondent was not to carry on the suits at his own expense. Hamilton v. Gray, 67 Vt. 233, 31 Atl. 315, 48 Am. St. Rep. 811; 4 Bl. Comm. 135; Hadlock v. Brooks, 178 Mass. 425, 59 N. E. 1009; Phillips v. South Parks Commissioners, 119 Ill. 626, 10 N. E. 230; Peck v. Heurich, 167 U. S. 624, 630, 17 Sup. Ct. 927, 42 L. Ed. 302; McPherson v. Cox, 96 U. S. 404, 24 L. Ed. 746; Gelo v. Pfister & Co., 132 Wis. 575, 113 N. W. 69; Gould v. Brock, 221 Pa. 38, 69 Atl. 1122; Fenn v. McCarrell, 208 Pa. 615, 57 Atl. 1108; 33 St. Edw. 1, early note. The note above referred to accurately defines champerty as it was understood at common law, though some elements of the definition were sometimes omitted. The note reads as follows: "Champertors be they that move pleas and suits, or cause (them) to be moved, either by their own procurement, or by others, and sue them at their proper costs to have part of the land in variance, or part of the gains." 1 Statutes at Large, Runnington's Ruffhead's Edition, p. 150. Though not a part of the text of the statute, this early note or comment or gloss has often been treated as a statutory definition, notably by Blackstone in his Commentaries, by Lilly in his Abridgment, and by Baron Comyns in his Digest.

The report of the committee negatives the impropriety of the agreement for contingent fees in the particular circumstances: and, while such agreements are in general to be condemned, we do not feel called upon to discuss the matter, for the conclusions of a committee having, as this does, the confidence of the court and of the bar, will ordinarily be accepted. In re Jones, 70 Vt. 71, 83, 86, 39 Atl. 1087.

The third presentment is not sustained by the findings, and is not argued by the Attorney General, who conceded before the committee that he was misinformed about the matter thereof when the petition was brought.

Under presentment No. 4 the following facts appear: In July, 1910, one Wallace Dunn, a minor, lost a finger while employed about a machine where he was at work. Some time during the following month the respondent talked with young Dunn about the matter, and in substance gave an opinion that the boy had a good ease against his employers. The result was that a little later the respondent undertook the prosecution of the claim, and "as security for his services" took from Dunn an assignment of a one-half interest in the claim and in the proceeds thereof. At this time the respondent did not know that Dunn was a minor. Upon learning of this fact, he took steps which resulted in an appointment of a guardian for Dunn, and he then took steps which resulted in the settlement of the claim by a liability insurance company interested as such, which paid $400 to adjust the matter. Out of this the respondent was paid $100. The committee find that the respondent's charges were reasonable, and that the fourth presentment is not sustained unless the agreement, above referred to, taken by way of security, was a champertous agreement. The transaction was not champertous on the part of the respondent nor on the part of the insurance company. Tapley v. Coffin, 12 Gray (Mass.) 420; Blaisdell v. Ahern, 144 Mass. 393, 11 N. E. 681, 59 Am. Rep. 99; Gould v. Brock, 221 Pa. 38, 69 Atl. 1122. See, also, the cases referred to in the discussion of presentments one and two.

The counsel for the state say that the finding under the fourth presentment raises the question of whether there was not in this instance an unprofessional solicitation of business, but, in submitting to the court only the question of whether the agreement for security was or was not champertous, the committee must be treated as having considered the question of solicitation and found such relations to exist between the respondent and the boy, who was ignorant of his rights, as to remove the objection which in general lies against the giving of unsolicited advice and assistance.

The fifth presentment is not sustained by the findings, and is not argued on the part of the state.

Presentment No. 6 charges the respondent with collecting money for one Grant, and neglecting and refusing to pay it over to his client. Grant had a claim against a Mrs. Curtis for $29. This he had the respondent bring suit upon in the court of a justice of the peace. There a trial was had, and judgment was recovered for the $29 and costs. For his services on this trial the respondent was paid $5. However, the demand was large enough to make the case appealable, and Mrs. Curtis took an appeal to the county court, where the case was for two years. At the second term the case was set for trial, and during the term it was settled; the respondent having express authority to settle the case as he deemed best. A note was taken for the agreed amount. Later a renewal note was taken for a part of the amount. When the renewal note was paid, the respondent sent to his client a receipted bill for services and $3.50 in money, the charges and the remittance making up the amount which the respondent had received in settlement. In making up his bill in this case the respondent charged term fees according to the schedule of fees in Orleans county, the county where the suit had been pending, a schedule which in the respect complained of probably conforms substantially to that which has been adopted in other counties. The committee think that, since the matter in controversy was so small, the term fees should have been remitted or discounted. They express their belief that it is the universal practice of attorneys in good standing to remit or discount term fees in cases of the class to which this belonged, and they condemn the respondent's charges of term fees in this case. In the brief for the state...