In re Alexander A.

Decision Date10 February 2011
Docket NumberNo. D056674.,D056674.
Citation192 Cal.App.4th 847,2011 Daily Journal D.A.R. 23,11 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 1934,120 Cal.Rptr.3d 724
CourtCalifornia Court of Appeals
PartiesIn re ALEXANDER A., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. The People, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Alexander A., Defendant and Appellant.

**726 Brian A. Wright, Vista, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Edmund G. Brown, Jr., and Kamala Harris, Attorneys General, Gary W. Schons, Assistant Attorney General, Rhonda Cartwright-Ladendorf and Scott C. Taylor, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

BENKE, Acting P.J.

*850 Alexander A. appeals a restitution order under Welfare and Institutions Code 1 section 730.6. We affirm.

**727 *851 Alexander vandalized a school mural and a car. He was adjudicated a ward of the court for maliciously damaging and destroying real and personal property valued in excess of $400 in violation of Penal Code section 594, subdivisions (a), (b)(1). Alexander contends the trial court abused its discretion when it ordered him to pay $8,219.18 in restitution to the owner of the car which, at most, had a replacement value of approximately $5,300.

FACTS

Alexander pleaded guilty to defacing a school mural, which had been a gift to the school from the community, and vandalizing David Borja's 1992 Honda Accord LX (Accord).

At the restitution hearing, the deputy district attorney informed the court the school determined it did not have the funds to repair the three-wall mural at a cost of $18,750, and instead had the mural painted over at a cost of $234.92. Pursuant to a stipulated agreement, the court ordered Alexander to pay $234.92 in restitution to the school.2

Borja asked the court to order Alexander to pay the full cost of repairing the car. At the restitution hearing, Borja submitted an estimate of $8,219.19 to repair the Accord. He testified he considered replacing the Accord because he did not have the money to repair it and it was slowly deteriorating. According to the Kelley Blue Book, which Borja had viewed two months earlier, a dealer's price for a 1992 Accord in excellent condition was approximately $5,300, the estimate for a nondealer sale of a 1992 Accord in good condition was in the mid-$3,000 range and one in poor condition was worth between $1,800 and $1,900.

Alexander presented evidence showing that the nondealer purchase price of a 1992 Honda Accord LX in good condition was $2,605 and that the dealer purchase price of the same model in excellent condition was $4,205. At the time of the hearing, there was a 1992 Honda Accord LX on Craig's List, an Internet bulletin board, for $1,795.

At the end of the proceedings, the court asked whether Borja wanted to repair the Accord. The deputy district attorney stated without objection that Borja wanted to keep the car.

The juvenile court ordered Alexander to pay Borja restitution of $8,219.18 and found Alexander's parents jointly and severally liable in that amount. *852 Citing In re Dina V. (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 486, 59 Cal.Rptr.3d 862 ( Dina V.), the court stated the restitution amount was reasonable because the victim should not have to go to the trouble of looking for a similar vehicle in precrime condition. The court found that ordering Alexander to pay the cost of repairing the car was rehabilitative and taught him there were consequences to his behavior.

DISCUSSION
IThe Court Did Not Err When It Ordered Restitution in the Amount of Repair

Alexander contends the juvenile court erred when it ordered him to pay restitution for the higher repair costs instead of the lower replacement value of the Accord. He asserts the restitution award, which he **728 claims was $3,000 to $5,000 more than the car's replacement value, resulted in a windfall to the victim and does not comport with the purpose of the restitution statutes.

Alexander further contends the court erred when it relied on Dina V. to order restitution for the costs of repair. He asserts Dina V. stands for the erroneous proposition the juvenile court may consider the intangible value of the victim's time and effort to replace a damaged or stolen vehicle in fashioning a restitution order, and thus misinterprets section 730.6, which limits restitution to economic losses. Instead he urges this court to apply People v. Yanez (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 1622, 46 Cal.Rptr.2d 1 ( Yanez ), in which a division of this court capped restitution in criminal cases to the amount that may be awarded under a civil tort standard. According to Alexander, under Yanez restitution would be limited to the replacement cost of the vehicle, at most, approximately $5,300. (See id. at pp. 1626-1627, 46 Cal.Rptr.2d 1.)

"Ordinarily, the standard of review of a restitution order is abuse of discretion. [Citation.] However, when the propriety of a restitution order turns on the interpretation of a statute, a question of law is raised, which is subject to de novo review on appeal. [Citations.]" ( People v. Williams (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 142, 146, 108 Cal.Rptr.3d 772.)

As Alexander's argument indicates, there is a split in the California appellate courts concerning the appropriate restitution standard to apply when the cost of repairing damaged or stolen property exceeds its replacement value. This division of this court has not previously considered this issue. *853 Before we turn to the merits of Alexander's argument, we set forth the principles and statutes that govern restitution in juvenile cases brought under section 602.3

The California Constitution gives trial courts broad power to impose restitution on offenders for losses caused by their criminal conduct. (Cal. Const., art. I, § 28, subd. (b), par. (13)(A) [all persons who suffer losses as a result of criminal activity shall have the right to restitution from the persons convicted of the crimes for those losses]; see also People v. Giordano (2007) 42 Cal.4th 644, 651-654, 68 Cal.Rptr.3d 51, 170 P.3d 623 ( Giordano ) [providing a comprehensive analysis of the restitution scheme under the Penal Code].) A victim's right to restitution is broadly and liberally construed. ( People v. Saint-Amans (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 1076, 1084, 32 Cal.Rptr.3d 518; In re Johnny M. (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 1128, 1132, 123 Cal.Rptr.2d 316 ( Johnny M.).)

In proceedings involving minors, the juvenile court is vested with discretion to order restitution consistent with the goals of the juvenile justice system. ( In re Tommy A. (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 1580, 1587-1588, 33 Cal.Rptr.3d 103 ( Tommy A.).) The goal of the juvenile justice system is to provide minors under the jurisdiction of the court with care, treatment, and guidance that is consistent with their best interests and to hold them accountable**729 for their behavior as appropriate under the circumstances, consistent with the interests of public safety and protection. (§ 202, subd. (b).) In enforcing, interpreting and administering the juvenile court law, the trial court also is to consider the safety and protection of the public, the importance of redressing injuries to victims and the best interests of the minor. ( Id., subd. (d).)

Section 730.6, subdivision (h) directs the court to order restitution "of a dollar amount sufficient to fully reimburse the victim or victims for all determined economic losses incurred as the result of the minor's conduct" unless it finds compelling and extraordinary reasons for not doing so. "[T]he court may use any rational method of fixing the amount of restitution, provided it is reasonably calculated to make the victim whole, and provided it is consistent with the purpose of rehabilitation." ( In re Brittany L. (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 1381, 1392, 122 Cal.Rptr.2d 376 ( Brittany L.).) The court *854 may order full or partial payment for the value of stolen or damaged property and has the discretion to assess the value of stolen or damaged property at "the replacement cost of like property, or the actual cost of repairing the property when repair is possible." (§ 730.6, subd. (h)(1).)

Welfare and Institutions Code section 730.6, subdivision (a), like Penal Code section 1202.4, subdivision (a), limits restitution cases to "any economic loss." 4 ( Giordano, supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 656, 68 Cal.Rptr.3d 51, 170 P.3d 623; see also Welf. & Inst.Code, § 730.6, subd. (h) [restitution should be sufficient to reimburse victim for all determined economic losses incurred as a result of the minor's conduct]; see also Pen.Code, § 1202.4, subd. (f).) Welfare and Institutions Code section 730.6 does not authorize direct restitution for noneconomic losses. ( Welf. & Inst.Code, § 730.6, subd. (h); cf. Giordano, at p. 656, 68 Cal.Rptr.3d 51, 170 P.3d 623.)

As noted, California appellate courts examining the appropriate measure of restitution where the costs of repairing a stolen or damaged vehicle exceed its replacement value have reached different conclusions. In Yanez, the trial court ordered the defendant to pay $7,302.18 in restitution to repair a 17-year-old vehicle valued at $4,100. ( Yanez, supra, 38 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1624-1625, 46 Cal.Rptr.2d 1.) In reversing the restitution order, the Yanez court held that a restitution award in a criminal case may not exceed the award the victim is entitled to recover in a civil tort case,5 limiting the trial court's discretion**730 to choose between the statutory alternatives of replacement cost and reasonable repair cost. ( Id. at pp. 1626-1627, 46 Cal.Rptr.2d 1; see also Pen.Code, § 1202.4, subd. (f)(3).) Applying this standard, Yanez determined the maximum restitution amount in the controversy before it was $4,100, which was the value of the vehicle prior to its theft. ( Yanez, at p. 1627, 46 Cal.Rptr.2d 1.)

Without discussion, the Yanez court briefly acknowledged restitution serves a rehabilitative purpose. However, the focus of its discussion was on the *855 measure of restitution required to make the victim whole. ( Yanez, supra, ...

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