In Re Alison M. Et Al.*

• Decision Date: 08 March 2011
• Docket Number: AC 32359
• Court: Connecticut Court of Appeals
• Parties: IN RE ALISON M. ET AL.*

IN RE ALISON M. ET AL.^*

AC 32359

COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT

Argued December 15, 2010

Officially released March 8, 2011

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(Appeal from Superior Court, judicial district of

Middlesex, Child Protection Session at Middletown,

Olear, J.)

Rosemarie T. Weber, for the appellant (respondent mother).

Benjamin Zivyon, assistant attorney general, with whom, on the brief, were Richard Blumenthal, former attorney general, and Susan T. Pearlman, assistant attorney general, for the appellee (petitioner).

Steven R. Dembo, with whom were Campbell D. Barrett, and, on the brief, Jon T. Kukucka, for the appellee (intervenor maternal grandmother).

Opinion

DiPENTIMA, C. J. The respondent mother, Katherine M., appeals from the judgments of the trial court terminating her parental rights with respect to her twin minor children, Alison M. and Andrew M.¹ On appeal, the respondent claims that the trial court improperly (1) concluded that she was unable to benefit from reunification services, (2) found that she failed to achieve a sufficient degree of personal rehabilitation, (3) found that it was in the best interests of the children to terminate the respondent's parental rights, (4) denied the respondent's motion for a continuance, (5) precluded the respondent's therapist from offering expert opinion testimony and (6) allowed the intervening grandmother to participate in the trial beyond the scope of the dispositional phase.² We disagree with the respondent's claims and, accordingly, affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The following facts and procedural history are relevant to this appeal. The respondent first exhibited symptoms of mental health issues when she was a child and at times throughout her life has been hospitalized as a result of these issues. She has received treatment for depression and anxiety and has been diagnosed with alcoholism, panic disorder and bipolar disorder and has admitted to substance abuse. In 2005, the respondent voluntarily sought treatment at the Institute of Living at Hartford Hospital. While there, she met the children's father and became pregnant with the children.

In July, 2006, the respondent was living with her mother (grandmother) and stepfather (grandfather). The respondent twice had contacted the local police department and expressed concerns regarding her safety and that of the children. Upon investigation, the police learned that the respondent's behavior had become increasingly erratic and that she had been engaging in threatening behaviors. For example, she was screaming and banging on a piano in the middle of the night. Later that month, the police went to the grandmother's home where the respondent had injured herself but blamed the grandfather for her injuries. She was taken to a hospital for treatment.

On July 27, 2006, the petitioner, the commissioner of children and families (commissioner), filed petitions, claiming that the children had been neglected and sought orders of temporary custody. Specifically, the petitions alleged that the children were being denied proper care and attention, physically, educationally, emotionally or morally and that the children were being permitted to live under conditions, circumstances or associations injurious to their well-being. In addenda attached to the petitions, the commissioner further alleged that both the respondent and the children's father suffered significant mental health issues that neg-atively impacted their ability to provide appropriate care and that they were unable or unwilling to provide a safe, stable and nurturing environment for the children. The court granted the commissioner's requests for orders of temporary custody. On August 1, 2006, the children were placed with the grandmother and grandfather, where they have remained ever since.³ On October 4, 2006, the respondent entered a plea of nolo contendere to the neglect allegation. The court accepted the plea, adjudicated the children neglected and committed the children to the custody of the com-missioner.⁴

In May, 2009, the commissioner filed petitions to terminate the parental rights of the respondent and the children's father.⁵ The petitions alleged that the department of children and families (department) had made reasonable efforts to reunify the children and that the respondent was unable or unwilling to benefit from the reunification efforts. A trial was held in May, 2010. On May 26, 2010, the court issued its memorandum of decision terminating the respondent's parental rights.

The court found that the respondent had been compliant with and engaged in her treatment, had maintained her stability and had made ''good, personal progress.'' The court further found that the respondent had ''made measured, but insufficient progress'' with respect to her parenting ability. The court noted that despite the respondent's ''significant substance abuse history, '' she failed to disclose this information to her treatment providers and currently consumed alcoholic beverages. The respondent also omitted her ''history of psychotic symptoms, [suicidal ideation] and significant interpersonal relationship issues, '' including those with her former husband and current roommate, Brian B. Notwithstanding Brian B.'s failure to cooperate with the department's efforts to assess his suitability as a resource for the respondent and the children, she continued to live with him, despite her claims of her intention to move out. Furthermore, the respondent provided inconsistent and contradictory reports regarding her ongoing relationship with Brian B. The court concluded that the respondent had not ''demonstrated an ability to live independently and maintain a household for herself—let alone for herself and the children.''

With respect to the adjudicatory phase, ⁶ the court found, by clear and convincing evidence, that the department had made reasonable efforts to reunify the respondent with the children. The court noted that the department had provided transportation, case management services and supportive housing referrals, therapeutic supervised visits, parent education and mentoring, substance abuse evaluations, couples counseling and mediation services, as well as individual counseling and therapy for the respondent. The court indicated that although the respondent participated inand benefited personally from these services, ''she was unable to make progress in such a manner as to allow for her reunification with the children. [The respondent], despite the participation in services, has not been able to gain the ability to consistently and safely meet the needs of these young children. The court further finds, by clear and convincing evidence, [that the respondent] has been unable to benefit from reunification efforts to a degree sufficient to permit reunification with the children to occur now or in the reasonably foreseeable future.'' Later in its decision, the court iterated that the prospect of reunification in the foreseeable future was dim. Ultimately, the court concluded: ''During the time this case has been pending and despite the availability of services, [the respondent] has, lamentably, been unable to demonstrate such a degree of personal rehabilitation as would encourage the belief that within a reasonable amount of time, considering the children's ages and needs, she could safely and consistently assume a responsible position in the life of these children.'' The court then found, by clear and convincing evidence, that the termination of the respondent's parental rights was warranted as a result of her failure to ahieve sufficient personal rehabilitation.

In the dispositional phase of the proceeding, after weighing the seven factors of General Statutes § 17a-112 (k), the court found, by clear and convincing evidence, that termination of the parental rights of the respondent was in the best interests of the children. Accordingly, the court approved the department's permanency plans. This appeal followed. Additional facts will be set forth as necessary.

Prior to addressing the specific claims raised in this appeal, we note that a ''hearing on a petition to terminate parental rights consists of two phases, adjudication and disposition.... In the adjudicatory phase, the trial court determines whether one of the statutory grounds for termination of parental rights... exists by clear and convincing evidence. If the trial court determines that a statutory ground for termination exists, it proceeds to the dispositional phase.... In the dispo-sitional phase of a termination of...