In re American Buslines

• Decision Date: 04 June 1957
• Docket Number: No. B-15-54.,B-15-54.
• Citation: 151 F. Supp. 877
• Parties: Matter of AMERICAN BUSLINES, Inc., Debtor (On Motion of Trustee in Relation to Proceeding Before National Labor Relations Board).
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Nebraska

151 F. Supp. 877

Matter of AMERICAN BUSLINES, Inc., Debtor (On Motion of Trustee in Relation to Proceeding Before National Labor Relations Board).

No. B-15-54.

United States District Court D. Nebraska.

June 4, 1957.

Richard W. Smith (trustee) and J. Taylor Greer, Woods, Aitken & Aitken, Lincoln, Neb., for trustee.

Harry Irwig, Kansas City, Mo., and Stephen Leonard, Associate General Counsel, Washington, D. C., for National Labor Relations Board.

Robert B. Crosby, Crosby, Pansing & Guenzel, Lincoln, Neb., and George E. Bodle, Bodle & Fogel, Los Angeles, Cal., for Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen.

DELEHANT, District Judge (Retired, serving by assignment).

The ruling announced is made in the course of a proceeding for the corporate reorganization of the debtor under Chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C.A. § 501 et seq. It arises in this manner. On March 18, 1957, the trustee filed a "Motion for Instructions, and for Clarification of the Court's Stay Order of February 10, 1954, as it Relates to Proceedings Before the National Labor Relations Board; and for Order Directing That Cause be Shown Why the Proceeding of Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen Before the National Labor Relations Board Should Not be Stayed in Conformity to Said Order Herein of February 10, 1954", (filing 900), hereinafter referred to as "the motion". A copy of the body (with the intentional deletion of certain patently argumentative language), and the prayer of the motion is set out in a footnote.¹ That is done because the copied language discloses with adequate clarity the setting in which the issues are made and the prayer of the motion, as also because it fairly reflects the facts underlying the motion, which are not materially in dispute and may be considered to be accepted by the court. Pursuant to the motion and on the date of its filing, the court made and entered an order (filing 901) requiring Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, hereinafter referred to as "the Brotherhood", its officers, attorneys and agents to stay and discontinue the prosecution of the proceeding before National Labor Relations Board, hereinafter identified as "the Board" (being Case No. 17-RC-2432 before the Board), until the further order of the court, fixing a date for hearing upon the motion and requiring the Brotherhood to show cause at the hearing why the stay thus temporarily granted should not remain in effect during the remainder of the pendency of this reorganization proceeding, or until the further order of the court. Service of the order was timely made upon the Brotherhood and upon the Regional Director, seventeenth Region of the Board, as well as upon certain labor organizations identified in the motion as probably competitive with the Brotherhood, all as directed in the order. Hearing was had upon the motion and order to show cause, at which the Brotherhood and the Board were represented by counsel and resisted the further stay of the proceeding before the Board. The trustee and his counsel also appeared and generally supported the persistence of the stay. Briefs of counsel have been received and considered.

Upon due consideration the court has concluded, 1) that its stay order of February 10, 1954, whose language is fairly disclosed in footnote 1, was not made with express reference to, or in conscious anticipation of, Case No. 17-RC-2432 before the Board or any like proceeding; 2) that the court does not possess the power or authority to command or require the further stay of the prosecution of that proceeding; 3) that, if it did possess such power, a proper case has not been made out for its affirmative exercise; and 4) that an order should be made and given discharging and dissolving the order to show cause heretofore made and given, terminating the stay therein granted, and directing the trustee not to resist the position of the Brotherhood, or otherwise to participate as a party, in Case No. 17-RC-2432 before the Board, unless, upon due application and showing, the court shall hereinafter otherwise direct. The reasons prompting the court to the opinion just announced will now be mentioned without unnecessary or extended discussion.

The point need not be labored that the stay order of February 10, 1954, was not made with a conscious view to Case No. 17-RC-2432 or any like proceeding. When it was made, immediately upon the institution of this proceeding, a collectively bargained labor contract with many of the debtor's employees was in effect. It was shortly cancelled by an order of the court. But a new agreement was promptly negotiated and executed, which the court approved. The employees of the debtor affected by those agreements then were, and, so far as the court is aware, still are represented for bargaining purposes by various labor organizations. Until comparatively recently, the court has not been advised of any controversy or question either upon the appropriate constitution of a bargaining unit, or of bargaining units, among the debtor's employees, or upon the right of any particular labor organization or organizations to represent such unit or units, once defined and determined. The matters pending before the Board have, therefore, arisen long after the entry of the order of February 10, 1954, and had no part in its prompting.

Whether the order, without formal design, is, by virtue of its purposefully general and broad language, adequate in terms to include an injunctive decree against the institution or prosecution of such a proceeding before the Board is quite another question. But, after careful examination of the order and of its several clauses, considered both separately and in their entirety, the court is of the opinion that that query has to be answered negatively. It would clearly appear that, if the order has any possible restraining impact upon the proceeding before the Board, such impact would have to arise out of the following language wherein restraint is imposed upon:

"* * * doing any act or things whatsoever to interfere with the possession or management by the debtor, said trustee, or said additional trustee of the property and assets of the within estate, or in any way interfere with said trustee or said additional trustee, in the discharge of his duties herein, or to interfere in any manner during the pendency of this proceeding with the exclusive jurisdiction of this court over said debtor, said trustee and said additional trustee and their respective properties."

The language of the order which precedes, and of that which follows, the material just quoted has reference to several specific activities, none of which, as the court believes, may be held to comprehend the proceeding pending before the Board. Nor, in the court's understanding of it, vide infra, is that proceeding one which does, or will, either "interfere with the possession or management by the debtor, said trustee, or said additional trustee of the property and assets of the * * * estate", or "interfere with said trustee or additional trustee in the discharge of his duties", or "interfere * * * with the exclusive jurisdiction of this court over said debtor, said trustee and said additional trustee and their respective properties." What is chiefly sought in the proceeding before the Board is a) the determination and prescription of an appropriate bargaining unit among employees of the debtor, and of the trustee and additional trustee as its managers in this action, and b) the choice by the persons within that unit of their bargaining representative. Those problems are the business of the affected employees, not of the debtor or its trustee or additional trustee. Only remotely and indirectly, if at all, will the debtor or the trustee or additional trustee be affected by the action taken before or by the Board. The court is not so naive as to assert that, as employers, the debtor and its trustee and additional trustee can have no possible emotional concern about the course of that action. They may easily, and with abundant reason, prefer to deal with one bargaining unit rather than another or to negotiate with one bargaining agency rather than another. But there is not much they may properly or prudently do about those choices, which are to be exercised by the employees, not by the employer. Once the unit is defined and the bargaining agency determined, management will necessarily deal with it, presumably in the mutual interest of both employer and employees, but in some measure perhaps in an adversary way. That being true, it does not lie with management either to control, to veto, or altogether to intercept the free selection by its employees of their representatives at the bargaining table. So far, no more is involved. And that selection seems clearly not to be within the reach of the language quoted from the order of February 10, 1954.

Most directly argued by counsel is the question whether the court is vested with the power or authority to stay throughout this proceeding further procedure in Case No. 17-RC-2432 before the Board. The court's conclusion, already announced, that such power or authority does not exist, appears to be inescapable. In support of that view a very brief reference to some of the pertinent statutes and judicial rulings is appropriate.

The engagement of the debtor in interstate commerce, before, and at the time of, the institution of this proceeding, and now is admitted. It could not be questioned. In its labor relations (with possible but presently insignificant exceptions) the debtor and its trustee and additional trustee are, therefore, within the reach of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended. Title 29 U.S. C.A. § 151 et seq. With due limitation to the present context, that Act erects the National Labor Relations Board, Title 29 U.S.C.A. § 153; provides for its organization and procedures and clothes it with authority to make rules and regulations for the administration of the Act, Title 29 U.S.C.A....