In re Anderson
| Decision Date | 15 February 1939 |
| Docket Number | No. 24866,24866 |
| Citation | 370 Ill. 515,19 N.E.2d 330 |
| Parties | In re ANDERSON. |
| Court | Illinois Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Proceeding in the matter of William G. Anderson, attorney.
Respondent suspended for three years.
Charles Leviton, of Chicago, amicus curiae.
W. G. Anderson, of Chicago, pro se (Hugh W. Housum, of Chicago, of counsel), for respondent.
A report filed by the board of managers and the committee on grievances of the Chicago Bar Association, as commissioners of this court under rule 59 (Ill.Rev.Stat.1937, c. 110, § 259.59), concerning a complaint by the association's committee on administration of criminal justice charging William G. Anderson with unprofessional conduct as an attorney and counsellor at law, recommends his disbarment. Respondent has filed exceptions to the report and the cause is submitted upon the record and proofs.
William G. Anderson, the respondent, was licensed to practice law in this State on March 28, 1896. On April 20, 1916, he was suspended for a period of two years and until restored by order of this court. People v. Anderson, 273 Ill. 37, 112 N.E. 273. Subsequently, on October 14, 1921, his name was reinstated on the roll. He has since been engaged in the practice of his profession in Chicago where he has had extensive experience in the filing of habeas corpus petitions. The present proceeding concerns the propriety of respondent's professional conduct in connection with the discharge of Vincenzo Ciollaro from the Illinois State Penitentiary, at Joliet, on a writ of habeas corpus issued by the Hon. Charles A. Williams, one of the judges of the superior court of Cook county, on January 6, 1927. Ciollaro, it appears, was sentenced to life imprisonment upon conviction of murder, on October 23, 1915, in the criminal court of Cook county. On September 16, 1915, the following recital was entered in Journal D45, page 12, of the criminal court: The docket entry of September 16, 1915, in the Ciollaro case, recites: In the margin of the docket at the right of the foregoing entry, appears this notation: ‘D34, 45’-a reference to the journal. On December 22, 1926, respondent subscribed and swore to a petition for habeas corpus in behalf of Ciollaro which alleged in part: ‘Your petitioner further shows unto your Honor that during the trial of said cause, after the jury was sworn to try said relator on said charge of murder, the jury so trying said cause was allowed to separate and go home until the following day without the consent of said relator personally and without an order being entered of record by the trial judge.’ The petition also charged that the mittimus did not run in the name of the People of the State of Illinois, as required by our constitution. Respondent's affidavit to the petition declared that he had read the petition, knew the contents thereof, and that the same were true of his own knowledge, except as to the matters stated to be upon information and belief, and as to those matters he believed them to be true. The petition contains no statement purporting to be on information and belief. At the hearing on the petition the warden of the penitentiary was represented by an assistant Attorney General of the State and an assistant State's attorney of Cook county. According to respondent they were William H. Harrison and Q. J. Chott, respectively. Harrison denied that he appeared in the proceeding and disclaimed any recollection of it. Chott died in 1932. Ciollaro was produced in open court, the warden's counsel made oral return to the writ of habeas corpus, admitted the allegations of the petition, and, according to Judge Williams, stated that they had examined the records of the cause in the criminal court. Judge Williams held that the truth of the allegations having been confessed, the detention of Ciollaro was unlawful by reason of the failure of the record to show that he expressly consented to the separation of the jury during the trial, and because the commitment did not run in the name of the People of the State. An order was accordingly entered discharging Ciollaro from the custody of the warden. On March 31, 1936, the State's attorney of Cook county made a motion to set aside the order of discharge of January 6, 1927. In passing upon the petition to expunge the earlier order Judge Williams stated that at the original trial for habeas corpus, the one question presented was whether the prisoner should be discharged if the jury had been allowed to separate without the consent of Ciollaro or his counsel, and that the order of discharge was based on this point. Proclaiming that a legal fraud had been perpetrated on the court Judge Williams vacated the order of January 6, 1927, and remanded the prisoner to the custody of the warden of the penitentiary at Joliet to complete the service of his sentence. Ciollaro was a fugitive from justice when the complaint was heard by the commissioners.
The gist of the complaint against respondent is that the statement of fact in the habeas corpus petition relative to the separation of the jury was not known to him to be true, was in fact untrue, and, further, that he could have ascertained the facts with respect to the orders entered by the court by examination of Journal D45, kept in the office of the clerk of the criminal court; that in making the quoted statement, under oath, without making full inquiry into the state of the record, he, respondent, was guilty of a serious dereliction of his duty to the court, and in consequence thereof, and of the admission of such allegation by the representatives of the warden, the trial judge was misled into entering the order for the discharge of the prisoner, Ciollaro.
From respondent's testimony it appears that although the docket recited the jury was allowed to separate ‘by agreement’ he placed reliance upon the absence of a notation to the effect that Ciollaro had personally assented in open court to the separation by agreement with counsel for the People. He testified that interested persons retained him to sue out a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of Ciollaro; that he visited the prisoner in the penitentiary where the latter informed him that during the trial, in 1915, he...
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Heirich, In re
...21 N.E.2d, this court stated: 'This contention cannot be sustained.' Also see In re Carr, 377 Ill. 140, 36 N.E.2d 243 and In re Anderson, 370 Ill. 515, 19 N.E.2d 330. Respondent filed an answer amounting to a general denial of the charges, and affirmatively alleging that seven major railroa......
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People ex rel. Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Barasch
...cases and seems most equitable in this proceeding. See: People ex rel. Healy v. Hooper, 218 Ill. 313, 75 N.E. 896; In re Anderson, 370 Ill. 515, 19 N.E.2d 330. In some cases the statutory period of limitation might be considered too long, while others, such as a series of contemptuous condu......
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Damisch, In re
... ... Nothing in Spevack has affected the continuing validity of the rule which has heretofore been adhered to in this State: a disciplinary proceeding is not a criminal prosecution and is not subject to all the rules that govern such a case. E.g., In re Anderson, 370 Ill. 515, 522, 19 N.E.2d 330; In re Needham, 364 Ill. 65, 68, 4 N.E.2d 19 ... The principal argument presented is that the evidence in support of the complaint is insufficient to establish solicitation, citing our decisions holding the complaint of misconduct similar to an ... ...
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Bossov, In re
... ... There is no statute of limitations applicable in a disciplinary proceeding such as this, and we will not refuse to entertain charges simply because of the passage of some period of time. In re Anderson", 370 Ill. 515, 19 N.E.2d 330; People ex rel. Healy v. Hooper, 218 Ill. 313, 75 N.E. 896 ... Considering all the circumstances, the argument of the respondent that the complaint should be dismissed and he should be discharged because of delays cannot be accepted.[60 Ill.2d 448] ... \xC2" ... ...