In re Angel R.

• Decision Date: 16 June 2015
• Docket Number: No. 36692.,36692.
• Citation: 157 Conn.App. 826,118 A.3d 117
• Court: Connecticut Court of Appeals
• Parties: In re ANGEL R.

157 Conn.App. 826

118 A.3d 117

In re ANGEL R.^*

No. 36692.

Appellate Court of Connecticut.

Argued Nov. 20, 2014.

Decided June 16, 2015.

James Jude Connolly, director of juvenile post conviction, with whom were Lindsey Guerrero, assistant public defender, and, on the brief, Joshua Michtom, assistant public defender, and Aaron J. Romano, for the appellant (respondent).

Michael Besso, assistant attorney general, with whom, on the brief, were George Jepsen, attorney general, Gregory T. D'Auria, solicitor general, and Benjamin Zivyon, assistant attorney general, for the appellee (petitioner Commissioner of Children and Families).

Sandra J. Staub and David McGuire filed a brief for the American Civil Liberties Union of CT as amicus curiae.

LAVINE, ALVORD and BISHOP, Js.

Opinion

BISHOP, J.

The respondent, Angel R., appeals from the judgment of the trial court granting the motion filed by the petitioner, the commissioner of the Department of Children and Families (DCF), to transfer her from DCF's custody to the custody of the Department of Correction (DOC). On appeal, the respondent claims that General Statutes § 17a–12 (a) violates the federal and Connecticut constitutions on the ground that its application to the respondent deprives her of due process in the following ways: (1) the statute is impermissibly vague; and (2) the statute permits the court to order her transferred from the care of DCF to DOC without affording to her the procedural rights to which she is entitled, specifically, the right to a trial by jury, and the obligation that DCF prove its allegations by proof beyond a reasonable doubt. She claims, as well, that the court incorrectly denied her motion to dismiss DCF's transfer petition because her guilty plea in a prior delinquency proceeding to having violated General Statutes § 53a–167c was not knowing and voluntary.¹ We agree, in part, with the respondent's due process claim regarding the state's burden of proof at a transfer hearing, and, accordingly, reverse the judgment of the trial court.

The court's memorandum of decision reveals the following undisputed facts and procedural history that are relevant to our disposition of the respondent's appeal. The respondent is a seventeen year old transgender female.² She has been involved with DCF on and off since the age of five. Throughout her lengthy history with DCF, she has exhibited assaultive behavior toward staff members, other juveniles, and females. On November 21, 2013, the respondent was adjudicated as delinquent on the basis of her guilty plea to assault on an officer.³ She was thereafter committed to DCF pursuant to General Statutes § 46b–140 for a period not to exceed eighteen months. On the basis of this delinquency commitment, the respondent was placed at the Meadowridge Academy in Swansea, Massachusetts (Meadowridge).

During her two month placement at Meadowridge, the respondent evinced assaultive behaviors. On January 31, 2014, as a result of her assault on a staff person, the respondent was removed from Meadowridge and placed at the Connecticut Juvenile Training School.

On February 4, 2014, pursuant to § 17a–12 (a), DCF filed a motion to transfer the respondent to the John R. Manson Youth Institution (Manson), a high security institution run by DOC for young male offenders ranging in age from fourteen to twenty-one years old, usually with pending adult charges or serving adult sentences as a consequence of having been tried in the Superior Court as adults. On February 24, 2014, the respondent filed a motion to dismiss DCF's motion to transfer. After holding a series of evidentiary hearings and making findings of fact by a preponderance of the evidence, the court, on March 20, 2014, denied the respondent's motion to dismiss and followed with an articulation of its reasoning on April 8, 2014. Also, on April 8, 2014, the court granted DCF's motion to transfer the respondent and ordered that the respondent be transferred to the York Correctional Institution in Niantic (Niantic), a correctional institution for females of all levels of security operated by DOC.⁴ On May 6, 2014, the court filed a memorandum of decision in support of its April 8 order to transfer. This appeal followed.⁵ Additional facts will be set forth as necessary.

The statute at issue, § 17a–12 (a), provides: “When the commissioner, or the commissioner's designee, determines that a change of program is in the best interest of any child or youth committed or transferred to the department, the commissioner or the commissioner's designee, may transfer such person to any appropriate resource or program administered by or available to the department, to any other state department or agency, or to any private agency or organization within or without the state under contract with the department; provided no child or youth voluntarily admitted to the department under section 17a–11 shall be placed or subsequently transferred to the Connecticut Juvenile Training School; and further provided no transfer shall be made to any institution, hospital or facility under the jurisdiction of the Department of Correction, except as authorized by section 18–87, unless it is so ordered by the Superior Court after a hearing. When, in the opinion of the commissioner, or the commissioner's designee, a person fourteen years of age or older is dangerous to himself or herself or others or cannot be safely held at the Connecticut Juvenile Training School, if a male, or at any other facility within the state available to the Commissioner of Children and Families, the commissioner, or the commissioner's designee, may request an immediate hearing before the Superior Court on the docket for juvenile matters where such person was originally committed to determine whether such person shall be transferred to the John R. Manson Youth Institution, Cheshire, if a male, or the Connecticut Correctional Institution, Niantic, if a female. The court shall, within three days of the hearing, make such determination. If the court orders such transfer, the transfer shall be reviewed by the court every six months thereafter to determine whether it should be continued or terminated, unless the commissioner has already exercised the powers granted to the commissioner under section 17a–13 by removing such person from the John R. Manson Youth Institution, Cheshire or the Connecticut Correctional Institution, Niantic. Such transfer shall terminate upon the expiration of the commitment in such juvenile matter.”⁶

The respondent raises three claims on appeal with respect to the granting of DCF's motion to transfer. The first two issues implicate the respondent's due process rights under the United States and Connecticut constitutions. The due process claims relate to whether the statute in question is impermissibly vague and to whether the transfer hearing afforded to the respondent pursuant to the statute adequately protected her liberty interests. The third issue relates to whether the respondent's plea that resulted in a delinquency finding was knowing and voluntary. We take up each in turn.

I

As a preliminary matter, however, we must consider whether the issues raised on appeal are moot because, since the filing of this appeal, the respondent has been returned to the custody of DCF and also because she will attain the age of eighteen during this calendar year.

It is well established that “[m]ootness implicates [this] court's subject matter jurisdiction and is thus a threshold matter for us to resolve.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)

In re Emma F., 315 Conn. 414, 423, 107 A.3d 947 (2015). “Because mootness implicates this court's subject matter jurisdiction, it may be raised at any time, including by this court sua sponte.” State v. Charlotte Hungerford Hospital, 308 Conn. 140, 143, 60 A.3d 946 (2013). Accordingly, before reaching the merits of this appeal, we must address the threshold issue of whether the respondent's claims are moot and, if so, whether we have jurisdiction over the matter on the basis of an exception to the mootness doctrine.

“Mootness is a threshold issue that implicates subject matter jurisdiction, which imposes a duty on the court to dismiss a case if the court can no longer grant practical relief to the parties.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) New Image Contractors, LLC v. Village at Mariner's Point Ltd. Partnership, 86 Conn.App. 692, 698, 862 A.2d 832 (2004). “When, during the pendency of an appeal, events have occurred that preclude an appellate court from granting any practical relief through its disposition of the merits, a case has become moot.... It is a well-settled general rule that the existence of an actual controversy is an essential requisite to appellate jurisdiction; it is not the province of appellate courts to decide moot questions, disconnected from the granting of actual relief or from the determination of which no practical relief can follow.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Steven M., 264 Conn. 747, 754, 826 A.2d 156 (2003).

As noted, the respondent was returned to the custody of DCF on June 24, 2014; see footnote 5 of this opinion; additionally, the file reflects that she will reach the age of majority prior to the end of 2015. In its brief, while asserting that the matter is moot because the respondent has been returned to its custody, DCF also concedes that the matter may be reviewable under the “capable of repetition, yet evading review” exception to the mootness doctrine.⁷ “To qualify under this exception, an otherwise moot question must satisfy the following three requirements: First, the challenged action, or the effect of the challenged action, by its very nature, must be of a limited duration so that there is a strong likelihood that the substantial majority of cases raising a question about its validity will become moot before appellate litigation can be concluded. Second, there must be a reasonable likelihood that the question presented in the pending case will...