IN RE DE-ANNEXATION OF CERTAIN REAL PROPERTY

• Decision Date: 06 July 2004
• Docket Number: No. 98,038.,98,038.
• Citation: 102 P.3d 120,2004 OK 60
• Parties: In re DE-ANNEXATION OF CERTAIN REAL PROPERTY FROM THE CITY OF SEMINOLE, A Municipal Corporation, Kinslow Round-Up Inc., an Oklahoma Corporation; Jack C. and Bonnie M. Humphreys Trust No. 1; 8:32, Inc., a Non-profit Corporation; D. Kircher Investments, L.L.C.; The CFS Insurance and Securities Money Purchase Plan and Trust; Gary and Linda Bloomer, HWJT's; Modern Oil Co., Inc.; Bobby J. Williams and Mary E. Williams Living Trust; Joe K. and Alyce Ellis, HWJT's; Billy G. Clark; Hazel Reynolds; Jim and Robin Norris (Landlord) Julia Bellini and Leslie Hinds (Tenants); Eugene and Francis Warrensberg; and Sue Jarvis, Petitioners/Plaintiffs/Appellants, v. The City of Seminole, a Municipal Corporation, Respondent/Defendant/Appellee, and State of Oklahoma, ex rel., Oklahoma Tax Commission, Additional Defendant.
• Court: Oklahoma Supreme Court

102 P.3d 120

2004 OK 60

In re DE-ANNEXATION OF CERTAIN REAL PROPERTY FROM THE CITY OF SEMINOLE, A Municipal Corporation,

Kinslow Round-Up Inc., an Oklahoma Corporation; Jack C. and Bonnie M. Humphreys Trust No. 1; 8:32, Inc., a Non-profit Corporation; D. Kircher Investments, L.L.C.; The CFS Insurance and Securities Money Purchase Plan and Trust; Gary and Linda Bloomer, HWJT's; Modern Oil Co., Inc.; Bobby J. Williams and Mary E. Williams Living Trust; Joe K. and Alyce Ellis, HWJT's; Billy G. Clark; Hazel Reynolds; Jim and Robin Norris (Landlord) Julia Bellini and Leslie Hinds (Tenants); Eugene and Francis Warrensberg; and Sue Jarvis, Petitioners/Plaintiffs/Appellants, v. The City of Seminole, a Municipal Corporation, Respondent/Defendant/Appellee, and State of Oklahoma, ex rel., Oklahoma Tax Commission, Additional Defendant.

No. 98,038.

Supreme Court of Oklahoma.

July 6, 2004.

Rehearing Denied November 15, 2004.

Michael J. Novotny, Hartzog, Conger, Cason & Neville, Oklahoma City, OK, for Appellants.

Ed Cadenhead, Elsener & Cadenhead, Seminole, OK, and Reggie N. Whitten, Jason E. Roselius, Philip W. Anderson, Whitten, McGuire, Wood, Terry, Roselius & Dittrich, Oklahoma City, OK, for Appellee.

Harlan Hentges, Mulinix, Ogden, Hall, Andrews & Ludlam, Oklahoma City, OK, for Amicus Curiae — Oklahoma Agricultural Legal Foundation.¹

OPALA, V.C.J.

¶ 1 The dispositive issue tendered on certiorari is whether summary relief for the City was erroneously entered. We answer in the affirmative.

I

THE ANATOMY OF LITIGATION

Ordinance 917

¶ 2 On 6 December 1999 the City of Seminole (City) enacted Ordinance No. 917, whose terms annexed certain territory to its corporate limits. The territory consisted of several tracts of land along Highway 99 which were connected by a 3-foot-wide strip of land that touched the northern boundary of the city, extending perpendicularly several (7 to 10) miles (along the west side of the highway) to the I-40 intersection. The protestants (non-consenting landowners and commercial tenants) challenged the ordinance by petitioning the City for de-annexation of the land. Upon denial of their quest they appealed to the district court, brought an action for a judicial declaration of the ordinance's invalidity, and sought an order to restrain the City from proceeding with the annexation. Both parties moved for summary judgment. Protestants argued inter alia that the December 6 meeting was held in violation of the Open Meeting Act.² Agreeing with the protestants on that issue, the trial court set a hearing date to determine whether the Act's violation was willful. Before disposition of the willfulness issue, the City enacted on 7 August 2001 Ordinance 941, whose terms vacated Ordinance 917, de-annexed the property included in that ordinance and re-annexed the protestants' property as well as the property of consenting landowners.

Ordinance 941

¶ 3 After adoption of Ordinance 941, the parties amended their district court pleadings and motions for summary judgment. The protestants incorporated their earlier arguments directed at Ordinance 917, challenged the validity of Ordinance 941 as well as brought a third-party claim against the Oklahoma Tax Commission [OTC] for a judicial declaration of their entitlement to all municipal sales taxes paid under protest as well as to taxes illegally collected by the City or by the OTC on the City's behalf.

¶ 4 The trial court gave summary relief to the City on the claim addressing solely Ordinance 941,³ leaving unresolved the controversy over Ordinance 917, and certified the order (as if it were a judgment)⁴ for immediate appeal in advance of judgment upon all the claims pressed in the action in accordance with the provisions of 12 O.S.2001 § 994(A).⁵ Protestants brought an appeal upon the certified order, which they prosecuted by the accelerated-track method (designed for review of summary judgments).⁶ The Court of Civil Appeals [COCA] affirmed.

II CERTIORARI ARGUMENTS

¶ 5 Protestants advance three principal theories for declaring Ordinance 941 invalid. Firstly, they claim the statutory municipal annexation scheme entitles owners of property to be annexed to notice and an opportunity either to consent to the proposal or to negotiate a plan for municipal services. Secondly, they argue that the statutory contiguity requirement is not met by the annexation of several discontiguous commercial tracts located at three intersections on a ten-mile stretch of highway, which are tied together by a 3- foot-wide "shoestring strip" of land whose inclusion was doubtless for the sole purpose of meeting the technical contiguity requirement. Thirdly, they argue that neither the trial court nor COCA applied any standard of reasonableness either to the annexation process or to its result.⁷

¶ 6 City argues that judicial review of a municipal annexation is limited to determining whether the governing body acted within the scope of its legislative authority and its action is reasonable. Because the ordinance was passed in accordance with the statutory requirements — inasmuch as the necessary consents had been obtained and the annexed territory is contiguous to the city limits — City urges the only remaining question for the courts is whether its actions were reasonable. According to City, the reasonableness standard requires a two-step analysis — ascertaining whether the goal and intent of annexation is reasonable under the circumstances and if so, whether the ordinance is a reasonable means to accomplish the goal. City claims that Ordinance 941 meets the reasonableness test because (a) its goals were (a) to establish control over the Highway 99 corridor extending to the I-40 intersection, (b) to increase its tax base through generation of sales tax revenue from the business district located along Highway 99 and (c) to encourage the City's growth towards the I-40 intersection. City contends that a corridor-style annexation constitutes a reasonable method for expanding municipal boundaries.

III THE STANDARD OF REVIEW FOR APPEALABLE PRODUCTS OF SUMMARY PROCESS

¶ 7 Summary process — a special pretrial procedural track pursued with the aid of acceptable probative substitutes⁸ — is a search for undisputed material facts which, sans forensic combat, may be utilized in the judicial decision-making process.⁹ Summary relief is permissible where neither the material facts nor any inferences that may be drawn from uncontested facts are in dispute, and the law favors the movant's claim or liability-defeating defense.¹⁰ Only those evidentiary materials which eliminate from trial some or all fact issues on the merits of the claim or defense afford legitimate support for nisi prius resort to summary process for a claim's adjudication.¹¹

¶ 8 Summary relief issues stand before us for de novo review.¹² All facts and inferences must be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-movant.¹³ Just as nisi prius courts are called upon to do, so also appellate tribunals bear an affirmative duty to test for its legal sufficiency all evidentiary material received in summary process to support the relief sought by the movant.¹⁴ Only if the court should conclude there is no material fact (or inference) in dispute and the law favors the movant's claim or liability-defeating defense is the moving party entitled to summary relief in its favor.

¶ 9 The material facts in this case are not disputed. The dispositive issue on certiorari presents a pure question of applying the statute-prescribed standards to the undisputed facts.

IV

THE LAW GOVERNING MUNICIPAL ANNEXATIONS

A. An Alteration of Municipal Boundaries Is Accomplished By The Exercise Of A State Sovereign Power That Has Been Delegated to Municipalities

¶ 10 There is only one sovereign power in state government.¹⁵ The exercise of that power in Oklahoma is through the State Legislature.¹⁶ Municipalities¹⁷ are political subdivisions of the State.¹⁸ Their governmental activities — executive, legislative and judicial — must conform to both the mandates of the State's constitution and to the general laws upon matters of statewide interest.¹⁹

¶ 11 The power to alter local governmental boundaries falls solely within the State's plenary authority. The State Legislature has conferred the annexation power upon municipalities to be exercised in conformity to the Oklahoma Municipal Code.²⁰

B. The Governing Statutory Annexation Scheme

¶ 12 A municipality is authorized to annex territory that is adjacent or contiguous to its corporate limits as the governing body deems desirable for the benefit of the municipality. 11 O.S.2001 § 21-101.²¹ Property may be considered to be adjacent or contiguous if it is separated from the corporate limits by a railway, highway right-of-way or an intervening strip less than four rods wide. 11 O.S.2001 § 21-102.²² The city is required to obtain the written consent of the owners of at least a majority of the acres to be annexed, except in two instances. 11 O.S.2001 § 21-103(A).²³ Neither of the two exceptions is applicable here.

C. Judicial Review of A Municipality's Annexation Decision

¶ 13 The extension of municipal boundaries by ordinance is a legislative act of the city's governing body.²⁴ The primary judicial function in reviewing municipal annexations is to determine whether the city has exercised its annexation power in a reasonable manner and in compliance with the standards of state law.²⁵

¶ 14 Extant caselaw has frequently described the municipal annexation process as a "political" decision.²⁶ We reclarify today this oft-repeated adjective in an effort to illuminate its correct meaning in the context of municipal annexations. The term "political,"²⁷ when used in its classical sense, refers to governing.²⁸ Political activity relating to governing is reviewable solely by political means. This is so because the U.S. Constitution assigns responsibility for political activity to the political branches of...