In re Anthony W.
| Decision Date | 15 October 2004 |
| Docket Number | No. 2341,2341 |
| Citation | 859 A.2d 679,159 Md. App. 514 |
| Parties | In re ANTHONY W. |
| Court | Court of Special Appeals of Maryland |
Michael R. Braudes (Stephen E. Harris, Public Defender, on the brief), Baltimore, for Appellant. Devy Patterson Russell (J. Joseph Curran, Jr., Atty. Gen., on the brief), Baltimore, for Appellee.
Panel: MURPHY, C.J., THEODORE G. BLOOM, (Retired, Specially Assigned), JAMES S. GETTY, (Retired, Specially Assigned), JJ.
JAMES S. GETTY, Judge (Retired, Specially Assigned).
Anthony W., appellant herein, appealed the finding of the Circuit Court for Frederick County, sitting as a juvenile court, which held that appellant committed the delinquent act of malicious destruction of property. Appellant argues that the evidence was not legally sufficient to sustain the court's decision because there was no corroboration of the testimony of two alleged accomplices who were also charged with committing delinquent acts.
Sometime after midnight on May 11, 2002, three young men were, according to one of the three, "just driving around, cuz [sic] there was really nothing to do." Being overcome by boredom resulted in the malicious destruction of a school bus parked on the grounds of Kempton Elementary School and the theft of a box of road flares from the bus by the three individuals.
The testimony presented by the State at trial was as follows: Keith Steers, the front seat passenger, testified that Anthony W., appellant, told Jose Gonzales, the driver, to stop the car. Appellant got out of the back seat and went toward a school bus. Steers and Gonzales then got out of the car and went to the rear of a bus about 15 feet from the car.
According to Steers, appellant entered the bus by breaking the glass in the front door. He smashed a number of windows with a fire extinguisher stored in the bus and then sprayed the interior of the bus. Allegedly, Steers and Gonzales, who entered the bus shortly after appellant, attempted to stop appellant from continuing to break the windows. Neither Steers nor Gonzales broke any windows, but they removed a box of road flares as all three left the school bus.
Significantly, the trial judge stated, "I have some reservations about Keith Steers' testimony from his backing and forthing."
The State's second witness, Gonzales, after being advised by the court of his rights, declined to testify until the State entered a "nol pros with prejudice" on the theft charge. Thereafter, Gonzales testified that appellant broke into a school bus and smashed the windows with a fire extinguisher, despite being told to stop. He admitted, "We circled the bus one time to see if any windows were open." Gonzales admitted that he stole the flares and Steers took one from the box.
At the conclusion of the State's case, appellant moved for judgment of acquittal, alleging that the State's case consisted of the testimony of two accomplices that was not corroborated in any manner. The court denied the motion.
The trial court's analysis was as follows:
It seems to me that this misdemeanor destruction of property began with the respondent alone on the school bus. The fact that Gonzales and Steers at some point in this continuum may have committed independent crimes, misdemeanors, does not make them accomplices to this in the sense of the word for purposes of the evidentiary rule. For that reason I'm ... going to find that Tony is involved as to [the] charge of malicious destruction of property.
Thus, the State argued, and the court concluded, that Steers and Gonzales were not accomplices, because they were charged with different crimes. Appellant, in their view, was charged with malicious destruction of property, and Steers and Gonzales were charged with theft. As we shall explain later herein, the novel approach adopted by the court may be a distinction without a difference in defining accomplice testimony.
The Accomplice Rule was created by the Court of Appeals 92 years ago in the case of Luery v. State, 116 Md. 284, 81 A. 681 (1911). The rationale for the rule was stated at that time by Chief Judge Boyd, who opined:
It is unsafe, at least in the great majority of cases, to rest a conviction upon the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice. Anyone who has had experience at nisi prius trials knows how captivating is the story of one relating the circumstances connected with some mysterious crime. When such a one has as a motive the prospect of freedom, a milder sentence or the favor of the officer who may have him in charge, an innocent one may be made to suffer, if great caution is not used. Hence it would seem to be safer to require some corroboration.
The reason for the rule was reiterated by Chief Judge Robert C. Murphy for the Court in Brown v. State, 281 Md. 241, 243-44, 378 A.2d 1104 (1977):
The corroborative evidence must relate to material facts tending either (1) to identify the accused with the perpetrators of the crime or (2) to show the participation of the accused in the crime itself.... If with some degree of cogency the corroborative evidence tends to establish either of these matters, the trier of fact may credit the accomplice's testimony even with respect to matters as to which no corroboration was adduced. McDowell v. State, 231 Md. 205, 189 A.2d 611 (1963). That corroboration need not extend to every detail ... is also settled by our cases.
Judge Delaplaine, in Watson v. State, 208 Md. 210, 117 A.2d 549 (1955), explained the necessity for the corroboration rule in the following terms:
The reason for the rule requiring the testimony of an accomplice to be corroborated is that it is the testimony of a person admittedly contaminated with guilt, who admits his participation in the crime for which he particularly blames the defendant and it should be regarded with great suspicion and caution, because otherwise the life or liberty of an innocent person might be taken away by a witness who makes the accusation either to gratify his malice or to shield himself from punishment, or in the hope of receiving clemency by turning State's evidence.[1]
All of these cases, however, were criminal cases, not proceedings in juvenile court.
The Accomplice Rule was designed precisely to avoid what occurred in the present case. Two respondents come into court and testify that the third person involved committed the malicious destruction of property (breaking school bus windows).
The two witnesses seek to bolster their credibility by admitting that they stole a box of flares from the bus. At the time of their testimony, the charges against Steers had been stetted by the State, and Gonzales had refused to testify until his charges were nol prossed. The trial court expressed reservations about Steers's credibility due to his lying to a different judge about the theft of the flares. Gonzales blamed appellant for the entire breaking into the bus despite the fact that he drove the car to the school property, he circled the bus "around one time to see if there were any windows open," and he entered the bus and stole the flares. None of the testimony from either witness was corroborated in any manner. The facts of this case establish clearly why the rule requiring corroboration is alive and well.
Appellant's counsel, presumably as a trial tactic, did not present any evidence and relied upon the rule as a basis for dismissal. The State argued that Steers and Gonzales were not accomplices in the breaking of the windows, because they were unaware that appellant intended to vandalize the bus, and they did not participate.
The trial court reasoned:
This misdemeanor destruction of property began with the respondent himself alone on the school bus. That the fact that Gonzales and Steers at some point in this continuum may have committed independent crimes, misdemeanors, does not make them accomplices to this in the sense of the word for purposes of the evidentiary rule.
"An accomplice is one who knowingly, voluntarily, and with common interest with the principal offender, participates in the commission of a crime either as principal or as accessory before the fact." Watson v. State, 208 Md. 210, 217, 117 A.2d 549 (1955). In our view, the three miscreants were all principals in the misdemeanor offenses of malicious destruction of the bus and the theft of property therein. They drove to the scene and drove around looking for open windows on a bus, from which one may reasonably infer they intended to enter. Finding no easy access, appellant broke the door of a bus and entered. The alleged accomplices voiced no objection until the window breaking ensued. The offense was committed when the door was broken open; the window breaking was not a separate offense, it was an acceleration of the illegal activity in which all three engaged. We know of no authority for defining an accomplice based on who did what after an illegal entry is gained. The objective was to enter the bus by whatever means was required.
The issue neither party addressed is whether the accomplice-corroboration rule applies to juvenile proceedings. That issue is a matter of first impression in Maryland. Our research has disclosed several reported cases addressing that question.
In Munhall v. State of Arkansas, 337 Ark. 41, 986 S.W.2d 863 (1999), the Supreme Court of Arkansas held that the Arkansas statute2 requiring corroboration of the testimony of an accomplice did not apply to juvenile proceedings. The court's opinion states:
Appellant appealed from the chancery court, juvenile division's adjudication of delinquency and order to pay $1,000 as restitution for a burglary and a theft of $1,000 from a residence in Russelville. Aaron Royce who was found by the chancery court to be an accomplice to the crimes, testified that he entered the residence with fourteen year old appellant who took between $100 and $1,000 therefrom.
After the testimony was completed, d...
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In re Anthony W.
...amount of $250.00. In a reported opinion, the Court of Special Appeals reversed the judgment of the Circuit Court. In re Anthony W., 159 Md.App. 514, 859 A.2d 679 (2004). The majority reasoned they [the three youths] drove to the scene and drove around looking for open windows on a bus, fro......