In re Antonio Guerra

• Decision Date: 08 May 1920
• Citation: 110 A. 224,94 Vt. 1
• Parties: IN RE ANTONIO GUERRA
• Court: Vermont Supreme Court

110 A. 224

94 Vt. 1

IN RE ANTONIO GUERRA

Supreme Court of Vermont

May 8, 1920

Special Term at St. Johnsbury, April, 1920.

PETITION for writ of habeas corpus brought to the Supreme Court for Washington County, and heard on the facts set forth in the petition. The opinion states the case.

It is adjudged that the relator is not unlawfully imprisoned and he is remanded to the House of Correction, whence he was taken, and his complaint is dismissed.

Richard A. Hoar and Alland G. Fay for the relator.

Present WATSON, C. J., POWERS, TAYLOR, MILES, and SLACK, JJ.

OPINION

TAYLOR

The relator was convicted in the city court of Montpelier December 31, 1919, on a complaint charging that at a time and place named he did keep and expose for sale intoxicating liquor with intent to sell and furnish the same without authority, contrary to the form of the statute, etc. He was sentenced to the House of Correction, where he is now imprisoned, and brings this proceeding to test the legality of his conviction and imprisonment. On the trial the relator objected that the court was without jurisdiction in the premises, for that the statute upon which the complaint was founded was suspended or abrogated by the passage of an act of Congress regulating the traffic in intoxicating liquors, which act was and is the supreme law of the land, and that the courts of the United States had the sole jurisdiction of offences thereunder. The act of Congress referred to is the so-called War Prohibition Act, approved November 21, 1918, and was in force when the offence was committed for which the relator was tried, as well as at the time of his trial and conviction. The claim that he is illegally imprisoned is based solely upon the contention that the trial court was without jurisdiction of the offence charged in the complaint. It is argued that the act of Congress relating to the manufacture and sale of intoxicating liquor superseded, or for the time being suspended, the State law regulating the traffic in intoxicating liquors, leaving the state courts without power or authority in the premises.

It is not claimed, nor could it well be, that the court was acting under authority of the Federal statute. Exclusive jurisdiction of all crimes and offences cognizable under authority of the United States, unless otherwise provided, is vested in the courts thereof. U.S. Comp. Stat. § 1233; Houston v. Moore, 18 U.S. 1, 5 Wheat. 1. 5 L.Ed. 19. This general provision is left undisturbed by the War Prohibition Act. The controlling question then is whether the statute of the State (G. L. 6558), prohibiting the unlicensed traffic in intoxicating liquors, ceased to be of force because of the subsequent act of Congress prohibiting throughout the United States the manufacture and sale of intoxicating liquors for a certain period, covering the time in question here. It should be observed at the outset that the question is not affected by the 18th Amendment of the Constitution, nor by the provisions of the National Prohibition Act so far as it regulates the traffic in intoxicating liquors under the amendment, both having become effective at a later date. The questions discussed will be treated without any reference to the act or amendment, or the possibility of their being affected thereby.

The Act of November 21, 1918, was a general war measure. Among its provisions was the so-called war-time prohibition. It provides in substance that after June 30, 1919, until the conclusion of the then present war and thereafter until the termination of demobilization, the date of which is to be determined and proclaimed by the President of the United States, it shall be unlawful to sell for beverage purposes any distilled spirits, beer, wine, or other intoxicating malt or vinous liquor, except for export, and that after May 1, 1919, during the same time, no grains, cereals, fruits, or other food product shall be used in the manufacture or production of beer, wine, or other intoxicating malt or vinous liquor for beverage purposes. The act provides a penalty for the violation of its provisions. The purpose of this legislation, expressly declared in the act, is to conserve the man power of the nation and to increase efficiency in the production of arms, munitions, ships, food, and clothing for the army and navy. This act is one of a series of war-time measures enacted for the same definite purpose, was not aimed at the traffic as a social evil, and is temporary in duration, expiring with the emergency which called it into being. Its validity has been called in question on several grounds, but upheld as a proper exercise of the war powers granted to the United States by the Constitution. See Hamilton v. Kentucky Distilleries Co., 251 U.S. 146, 64 L.Ed. 194, 40 S.Ct. 106; Ruppert v. Caffey, 251 U.S. 264, 64 L.Ed. 260, 40 S.Ct. 141; United States v. Standard Brewery, 251 U.S. 210, 64 L.Ed. 229, 40 S.Ct. 139. We are asked to hold that such an act passed for such a purpose, of necessity suspends the operation of all state legislation on the subject, whatever its character and purpose. Numerous decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States are relied upon as supporting the relator's position; but on careful examination they are not found to be in point on the question raised by this proceeding.

It is insisted that, where Congress has legislated on a subject, state statutes on the same subject cannot be enforced, but are abrogated by such action. Cases are cited in support of the claim which hold that, where power is delegated to Congress over a certain subject, although until Congress exercises that power the states have the right to legislate thereon, yet when Congress acts, and thus assumes jurisdiction, its control becomes paramount and exclusive. But, as we shall see presently, this principle has no application here. It is indisputably settled that under the Federal Constitution the authority of Congress is paramount when exerted as to subjects concerning which it has the power to control. The general principle on which this line of cases is based is tersely stated in the North Dakota Rate Case, 250 U.S. 135, 250 U.S. 135, 63 L.Ed. 897, 39 S.Ct. 502, in an opinion by Chief Justice White. It is said that, although authority to regulate within a given sphere may exist in both the United States and in the states, where the former calls into play constitutional authority within such general sphere, the necessary effect is that to the extent that any conflict arises the state power is limited, since in such case that which is paramount necessarily controls that which is subordinate. However, we shall see as we proceed that a wholly different question is presented in the case at bar. Here the State is acting within the sphere of a power expressly reserved to it, and not under an implied authority to exercise a power delegated to Congress until it shall see fit to exert its paramount authority.

Nor are the cases in point that are cited by the relator bearing upon the question of state jurisdiction over crimes and offences, as to which Congress has power to act, but has not acted, or as to which Congress, having acted, has not granted the state courts concurrent jurisdiction. It is doubtless true, as claimed, that in certain cases, as for example offences affecting national banks, national currency, interstate commerce, or other subjects committed to Federal control, when Congress exercises its delegated authority and penalizes the act, the continuance of state authority or the jurisdiction of the state courts in the premises depends upon whether, in the particular case, provision is made for concurrent jurisdiction. A somewhat exhaustive discussion of this and kindred questions will be found in State v. Randall, 2 Aik. 89. But it is at once apparent that the cases relied upon have no relation to a situation where the act of Congress, though valid, encroaches upon a jurisdiction expressly reserved by the Constitution to the states. We do not take the time to notice such cases further.

The real question at issue is this: Is the general statute of the State prohibiting the traffic in intoxicating liquors in no license territory within this State superseded by the temporary act of Congress forbidding the manufacture and sale of such liquors for beverage purposes throughout the United States? Though questions involving conflict between Federal and state authority respecting the subject-matter have recently engaged the attention of the courts, we are not aware that this precise question has been decided in a court of last resort. It is urged that the exigency of the times demanded the enactment of a national prohibitory law, uniform throughout the country and under national control, and that, Congress having passed an act of general application without reserving to the states concurrent jurisdiction, the power of the state and the jurisdiction of the state courts ceased and all state laws upon the subject were suspended. A brief "recurrence to fundamental principles" will be helpful to a correct solution of the question.

Prior to the formation of the Federal Constitution the states were sovereign in the full, absolute sense of the term. Thurlow v. Massachusetts, 46 U.S. 504, 5 HOW 504, 12 L.Ed. 256. By the compact which formed the Union certain enumerated powers were surrendered to the Federal Government, among which were the war powers expressly granted by Article 1, § 8, of the Constitution. The states remain sovereign within their separate spheres as to all powers not delegated to the General Government or prohibited to the states. New Hampshire v. Louisiana, 108 U.S. 76, 27 L.Ed. 656, 2 S.Ct. 176. Subject to these restrictions each state is supreme, and possesses the exclusive right of...