In re Apple, Inc.

• Decision Date: 19 April 2010
• Docket Number: No. 09-3689.,09-3689.
• Citation: 602 F.3d 909
• Parties: In re APPLE, INC., formerly known as Apple Computer, Inc., Petitioner.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

602 F.3d 909

In re APPLE, INC., formerly known as Apple Computer, Inc., Petitioner.

No. 09-3689.

United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

Submitted: February 19, 2010.

Filed: April 19, 2010.

Kevin A. Crass, Little Rock, AR, Penelope A. Preovolos, Stuart C. Plunkett, San Francisco, CA, James M. Pratt, Jr., Camden, AR, for appellant.

Richard A. Adams, Phillip N. Cockrell, Reid D. Miller, Leisa B. Pearlman, Corey D. McGaha, Jeremy Y. Hutchinson, Texarkana, TX, Patrick Conroy, Theresa M. Dawson, Dallas, TX, for appellee.

Before BYE, MELLOY, and COLLOTON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM.

Apple, Inc., filed a petition for writ of mandamus seeking an order directing the United States District Court for the Western District of Arkansas to transfer this case to the United States District Court for the Northern District of California. We grant the petition.

I.

Luxpro Corporation, a manufacturer and distributor of digital music players, brought suit against Apple in the United States District Court for the Western District of Arkansas ("Western Arkansas"). Luxpro is a Taiwanese corporation with its principal place of business in Taiwan. Apple is a California corporation with its principal place of business in Cupertino, California, which is in the Northern District of California ("Northern California").

Apple manufactures and distributes digital music players under the well-known iPod brand name. According to Luxpro's complaint, Apple allegedly engaged Luxpro in abusive litigation in Germany and Taiwan. In addition, through threats of litigation and other pressure, Apple allegedly harmed Luxpro's dealings with companies located in the United States, Singapore, Japan, and elsewhere. Apple did so, Luxpro claims, to "prevent an increased market share among the smaller-ranged manufacturers" of digital music players. Luxpro asserts causes of action for interference with contractual/prospective advantage, tortious interference with contracts, attempted common-law monopolization, commercial disparagement, and a violation of California Business and Professions Code Section 17200.

Apple moved, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), to transfer venue to Northern California. Apple argued that its witnesses were located in California, that witnesses from nonparty companies and from Luxpro would be inconvenienced less by travel to California than to Arkansas, that litigious tactics of which Luxpro complained originated from Apple's California headquarters, that relevant documents were located in California, and that Arkansas had no connection to the dispute. For its part, Luxpro asserted that its choice of forum was entitled to deference, and that docket statistics showed that it would secure a trial more quickly in Western Arkansas. The district court denied Apple's transfer motion.

II.

A writ of mandamus serves as a "useful safety valve for promptly correcting serious errors," Mohawk Indus., Inc. v. Carpenter, ___ U.S. ___, 130 S.Ct. 599, 608, ___ L.Ed.2d ___ (2009) (internal quotation and alteration omitted), but it is an "extraordinary remedy" that is available only to correct a "clear abuse of discretion." Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court for D.C., 542 U.S. 367, 380, 124 S.Ct. 2576, 159 L.Ed.2d 459 (2004) (internal quotations omitted); see Wilkins v. Erickson, 484 F.2d 969, 971 (8th Cir.1973) (applying "clear abuse of discretion" standard to an order entered under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a)). Our precedent recognizes "manifest judicial arbitrariness" as a basis for granting a writ, McGraw-Edison Co. v. Van Pelt, 350 F.2d 361, 363 (8th Cir.1965) (en banc), but this language does not establish a standard that is narrower than the "clear abuse of discretion" standard recognized in Cheney and Wilkins. As McGraw-Edison itself indicates, a clear error of law or clear error of judgment leading to a patently erroneous result may constitute a clear abuse of discretion. In re Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 545 F.3d 304, 312 & n. 7 (5th Cir.2008) (en banc) (citing McGraw-Edison, 350 F.2d at 363), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 129 S.Ct. 1336, 173 L.Ed.2d 587 (2009); In re BellSouth Corp., 334 F.3d 941, 954 (11th Cir.2003); In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1295 (7th Cir.1995). Because mandamus is not to replace the usual appellate process, we will issue a writ only where the aggrieved party has no other adequate means to attain the desired relief. Cheney, 542 U.S. at 380-81, 124 S.Ct. 2576.

The usual post-judgment appeal process is not an adequate remedy for an improper failure to transfer. If Apple were to appeal from an adverse final judgment rendered in Western Arkansas, it could not show that it would have prevailed in a hypothetical trial in Northern California. See In re Nat'l Presto Indus., Inc., 347 F.3d 662, 663 (7th Cir.2003). Therefore, we have recognized that the writ of mandamus is proper, albeit extraordinary, relief for an erroneous ruling on a motion to transfer under § 1404(a). See McGraw-Edison, 350 F.2d at 363. We will not, however, disturb a district court's transfer order where "the facts and circumstances are rationally capable of providing reasons for what the district court has done." Id.; see In re Volkswagen, 545 F.3d at 312 n. 7.

Luxpro contends that mandamus relief is not warranted, because Apple did not seek reconsideration of the § 1404(a) order or ask the district court to certify the case for interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). We disagree. Our cases establish that a writ of mandamus is available with respect to a decision under § 1404(a), Wilkins, 484 F.2d at 971; McGraw-Edison, 350 F.2d at 363, and where mandamus is clearly an appropriate remedy, we are not bound to require that the petitioner first seek interlocutory review. Caleshu v. Wangelin, 549 F.2d 93, 96 n. 5 (8th Cir.1977). Thus, even if we assume that interlocutory review would be available, cf. In re Horseshoe Entm't, 337 F.3d 429, 432 (5th Cir.2003) ("§ 1292(b) review is inappropriate for challenges to a judge's discretion in granting or denying transfer under § 1404(a)"); Technitrol, Inc. v. McManus, 405 F.2d 84, 86 n. 2 (8th Cir.1968) (declining to resolve the issue), we may proceed to consider the petition for writ of mandamus.

Section 1404(a), the transfer-of-venue provision, provides: "For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other district or division where it might have been brought." The statute "was drafted in accordance with the doctrine of forum non conveniens, permitting transfer to a more convenient forum, even though the venue is proper." Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 634 n. 30, 84 S.Ct. 805, 11 L.Ed.2d 945 (1964) (quoting Revisor's Note, H.R.Rep. No. 80-308, at A132 (1947), and H.R.Rep. No. 79-2646, at A127 (1946)). "Congress, in passing § 1404(a), was primarily concerned with the problems arising where, despite the propriety of the plaintiff's venue selection, the chosen forum was an inconvenient one." Id. at 634, 84 S.Ct. 805.

This action "might have been brought" in Northern California, see 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a)(1), and Apple contends that the district court clearly abused its discretion in refusing to transfer the case. We have declined to offer an "exhaustive list of specific factors to consider" in making the transfer decision, see Terra Int'l, Inc. v. Miss. Chem. Corp., 119 F.3d 688, 691 (8th Cir.1997), but district courts should weigh any "case-specific factors" relevant to convenience and fairness to determine whether transfer is warranted. See Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 29, 108 S.Ct. 2239, 101 L.Ed.2d 22 (1988); Terra Int'l, 119 F.3d at 691.

An important issue in this case is the deference owed to Luxpro's choice of forum. In denying Apple's motion, the district court stated that "in general, federal courts give considerable deference to the plaintiff's choice of forum," and ruled that it would "not disregard the deference provided Luxpro because it brought its claim in a forum that was not its residence nor the place where the conduct occurred when a U.S. forum with those two connections does not exist."

This court has said that "in general, federal courts give considerable deference to a plaintiff's choice of forum and thus the party seeking a transfer under section 1404(a) typically bears the burden of proving that a transfer is warranted." Terra Int'l, 119 F.3d at 695. This "general" practice of according deference, however, is based on an assumption that the plaintiff's choice will be a convenient one. Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 255-56, 102 S.Ct. 252, 70 L.Ed.2d 419 (1981). When the plaintiff, like Luxpro, hails from a foreign nation, that assumption is "much less reasonable," id. at 256, 102 S.Ct. 252, and the risk that the plaintiff chose the forum to take advantage of favorable law or to harass the defendant increases. De Melo v. Lederle Labs., 801 F.2d 1058, 1062 n. 4 (8th Cir.1986). Accordingly, a foreign plaintiff's choice of forum "is entitled to substantially less deference." Id. We have never said that "a choice of forum supported only by the fact that it was chosen," Pac. Car & Foundry Co. v. Pence, 403 F.2d 949, 955 (9th Cir.1968), in and of itself, does anything more than shift the burden of proof to a movant seeking transfer under § 1404(a).

Because no relevant connection exists between Luxpro, Apple, potential witnesses, or the dispute and Western Arkansas, Luxpro's choice of forum was entitled to minimal weight in the § 1404(a) determination. See In re Horseshoe Entm't, 337 F.3d at 434-35. Neither party maintains its headquarters in Western Arkansas. Neither party identified any witness who resides in Arkansas. And although Apple sells the iPod and its other products there, none of Apple's alleged abusive litigation relates to Western Arkansas. The only connection between this dispute and Western Arkansas is that Luxpro chose to file there and...