In re Application of Hinkle

• Decision Date: 02 April 1921
• Citation: 196 P. 1035,33 Idaho 605
• Parties: In the Matter of the Application of C. K. HINKLE for a Writ of Habeas Corpus
• Court: Idaho Supreme Court

196 P. 1035

33 Idaho 605

In the Matter of the Application of C. K. HINKLE for a Writ of Habeas Corpus

Supreme Court of Idaho

April 2, 1921

POLICE POWER-CONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATUTE-JURISDICTION OF DISTRICT COURTS TO COMMIT DIPSOMANIACS AND INEBRIATES-CHARACTER OF PROCEEDINGS-ORDER OF COMMITMENT, HOW VACATED.

1. C S., sec. 1191, which gives the district courts jurisdiction to hear and commit persons so far addicted to the use of narcotics as to have lost self-control, or who are dipsomaniacs or inebriates, to the insane asylums for treatment, is an exercise of the police power of the state.

2. These proceedings are paternal in character, and not criminal, and while analogous to the appointment of a temporary guardian, they are not guardianship proceedings within the meaning of art. 5, sec. 21, of the constitution or in derogation of this provision, which gives probate courts original jurisdiction in matters of guardianship.

3. Statutes of this character are in pari materia with laws for the commitment of the insane, and for the protection and safety of the general public against the acts of irresponsible persons, and also have for their purpose the exercise of the power of the state to correct the habits of its citizens, when such habits have become a menace to the peace, comfort, good order and health of the state.

4. A commitment made by the district court under this statute, in accordance with its requirements, is valid until vacated by direct proceedings on the ground that the person does not belong to the class defined, or until it is shown that he has sufficiently recovered to be restored to liberty.

Original application to this court for a writ of habeas corpus. Writ denied.

Writ quashed, petitioner remanded and proceedings against superintendent dismissed.

A. L Morgan, for Petitioner.

The original jurisdiction of the district court or a judge thereof is fixed by sec. 20, art. 5, of the constitution, and it is beyond the power of the legislature to extend such original jurisdiction so as to include any matter over which the probate court has been granted exclusive jurisdiction. ( Estate of McVay, 14 Idaho 64, 93 P. 31.)

A proceeding in the nature of that outlined in sec. 1191, C. S., is paternal rather than criminal. (State v. Ryan, 70 Wis. 676, 36 N.W. 823; In re Sharp, 15 Idaho 120, 96 P. 563, 18 L. R. A., N. S., 886.)

The order of the court directing that the petitioner having lost the power of self-control be confined in the insane asylum has the effect of appointing a temporary guardian for the person of petitioner. (In re Sharp, supra.)

The probate court has exclusive jurisdiction over the appointment of guardians. (Sec. 21, art. 5, of the constitution; In re Sharp, supra.)

The proceeding does not come within the class known as "cases, both in law and in equity." (Idaho Trust Co. v. Miller, 16 Idaho 308, 102 P. 360; Estate of McVay, supra.)

Roy L. Black, Attorney General, and Dean Driscoll, Assistant, for Defendant.

The jurisdiction vests in the district court under art. 5, sec. 20, of the constitution, and not in the probate court under art. 5, sec. 21. (Sec. 1191, C. S.; Ex parte O'Connor, 29 Cal.App. 225, 155 P. 115.) Our district court has general jurisdiction over all matters not elsewhere vested by the constitution. (Toncray v. Budge, 14 Idaho 621, 95 P. 26.)

Proceedings for the commitment of the insane to which this proceeding is analogous are matters of equitable cognizance. (14 R. C. L. 554; 22 Cyc. 1120.)

LEE, J. Rice, C. J., and Budge, McCarthy and Dunn, JJ., concur.

OPINION

LEE, J.

This is an application to this court for a writ of habeas corpus. The petitioner, C. K. Hinkle, sets forth in his petition that he was on the twenty-second day of January, 1921, by the Hon. Edgar C. Steele, Judge of the district court of the second judicial district of the state of Idaho, in and for Latah county, under and by virtue of the provisions of C. S., sec. 1191, committed to the Northern Idaho State Insane Asylum at Orofino for a period of two years from the date of said commitment. The petitioner contends that his confinement under said commitment is unlawful, for the reason that it is in contravention of article 5, sections 20 and 21 of the constitution, which define the jurisdiction of district and probate courts.

C. S., sec. 1191, reads as follows: "Whenever it appears by affidavit to a magistrate of the county that any person within the county is so far addicted to the intemperate use of narcotics or stimulants as to have lost the power of self-control, or is subject to dipsomania or inebriety, he must issue and deliver to some peace officer for service a warrant directing that such person be arrested and taken before the district court of the county, or the judge thereof, for a hearing and examination on such charge . . . . the said court or the judge thereof must then inform him of the charge against him, and inform him of his right to make a defense against said charge and produce any witnesses in defense thereto. The judge must by order fix such time and place for the hearing and examination as will give a reasonable opportunity for the production and examination of witnesses . . . . the hearing and examination must be had in compliance with the provisions of C. S., secs. 1178, 1179, 1180, 1181 and 1182. The judge, after such hearing and examination, if he believes the person is so far addicted to the intemperate use of narcotics or stimulants as to have lost the power of self-control, or is subject to dipsomania or inebriety, must make an order that he be confined in one of the state insane asylums, which shall be designated in said order, and the order must be accompanied by a written statement of the judge as to the financial condition of the patient, and of the person legally liable for his maintenance, as far as can be ascertained; such order and statement shall be in substantially the form provided by C. S., sec. 1184, for the commitment of insane persons. The said court or the judge thereof shall commit such person for a definite period, not to exceed two years, provided that he may be paroled or released under the same rules and conditions that the insane are paroled and released. Such person shall be delivered to said insane asylum to which he has been committed in compliance with the provisions of C. S., sec. 1185, providing for the commitment and deliverance of insane persons, . . . ."

From the petition, return thereto, and admissions of counsel, it appears that all of the requirements of this section of the statute were compiled with. He contends, however, that the proceedings under this statute are paternal rather than criminal; that the order of the court holding that the petitioner had lost the power of self-control, and directing that he be confined in the insane asylum, is in effect the appointment of a temporary guardian for his person; that the probate court has exclusive original jurisdiction over the appointment of guardians, under the provisions of article 5, section 21, of the constitution, and that said proceedings do not come within any class known as "proceedings both at law and in equity," as that term is used in article 5, section 20, of the constitution, which is as follows: "The district court shall have original jurisdiction in all cases, both at law and in equity, and such appellate jurisdiction as may be conferred by law."

Section 21 reads: "The probate courts shall be courts of record, and shall have original jurisdiction in all matters of probate, settlement of estates of deceased persons, and appointment of guardians. . . . "

A consideration of the law as it existed at the time of the adoption of the constitution, with reference to guardianship matters and the commitment of the insane, may aid in determining the constitutionality of the statute in question.

C. S., sec. 1191, was enacted as chapter 56 of the Laws of 1913, page 166, to amend what is now C. S., article 2, chapter 52, title IX, entitled "Charitable Institutions." This article prescribes the procedure for the commitment and confinement of the insane, as that term is commonly used and understood, with the exception of some minor changes, as the law was prior to the adoption of the constitution. This later amendment extends the general provisions of the commitment act to include persons "so far addicted to the intemperate use of narcotics or stimulants as to have lost the power of self-control, or to be subject to dipsomania or inebriety." Manifestly, the law by its terms, prior to this amendment, conferred upon district courts and the judges thereof authority to hear and determine all questions pertaining to the commitment of persons "so far disordered in mind as to endanger health, persons or property." Article 21, section 2, of the constitution continued in force "all laws which are now in force in the territory of Idaho which are not repugnant to this constitution, etc." The territorial law, R. S., secs. 769-782, which conferred upon "any judge of a court of record within the county" jurisdiction to commit the insane, was within the powers of the territorial legislature to enact, because its power to confer jurisdiction upon the several courts was only limited by the acts of the Congress and the federal constitution. It is therefore clear that this law was not open to the objection that the territorial legislature exceeded its authority in giving the district courts concurrent original jurisdiction with probate courts in the commitment of "persons so far disordered in mind as to endanger health, persons or property."

Proceedings for the commitment of the insane since statehood are usually conducted by probate courts, but district courts have continued to make...