In re Application of Davis
| Decision Date | 26 May 1925 |
| Docket Number | Civil 2318 |
| Citation | 236 P. 715,28 Ariz. 312 |
| Parties | In the Matter of the Application of J. H. DAVIS for a Writ of Habeas Corpus. v. GEORGE BRISBOIS, as Chief of Police of the City of Phoenix, Appellee J. H. DAVIS, Appellant, |
| Court | Arizona Supreme Court |
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of the County of Maricopa. M. T. Phelps, Judge. Affirmed.
Mr. R E. L. Shepherd, for Appellant.
Mr James E. Nelson, for Appellee.
The appellant, J. H. Davis, was tried and convicted in the magistrate's court of the city of Phoenix of the offense of driving an automobile while intoxicated; the act charged being in violation of a city ordinance. Upon the calling of his case he demanded a jury trial, which was refused him. After conviction he applied to the superior court for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging his imprisonment to be illegal because of the refusal to him of a jury trial. The writ was issued but upon hearing was discharged. Upon this appeal he presents the one question only; that is, his right to a jury trial.
In the case of bowden v. Nugent, 26 Ariz. 485, 226 P. 549, we went into this question pretty fully and we do not think it necessary to go over the ground again. In that case we held that the right of trial by jury was preserved by our Constitution in common-law offenses, if at the time of the adoption of the Constitution a jury trial could be demanded by the accused. We said, among other things:
"While the right to a jury trial is a sacred right, and has been so recognized by all English-speaking peoples, it is too apparent that its guaranty is limited to those offenses which are by the state considered more important than those usually defined by the ordinances of cities and towns."
Offenses of the nature of the one charged against appellant are peculiarly within the range of police jurisdiction and regulation, and for obvious reasons do not fall within the rule announced in the Bowden case. The rule with respect to cases of this kind is stated in 35 C. J. 192, section 97, to be:
"Violations of municipal ordinances belong to the class of minor offenses which were in general triable in a summary manner prior to the adoption of the several Constitutions, and the denial of a jury trial in such cases is not a violation of the general constitutional provisions."
See, also, 16 R.C.L. 216, section 33.
In our opinion, offenses made such by city ordinance, such as...
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Benitez v. Dunevant
...right. See, e.g., United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. State, 65 Ariz. 212, 217, 177 P.2d 823, 826 (1947); In re Davis, 28 Ariz. 312, 313, 236 P. 715, 716 (1925). Thus, those offenses linked to jury trial at common law at the time the constitution was adopted are protected by the constitut......
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...as guaranteed in the Constitution does not apply to petty offenses. State v. Cousins, 97 Ariz. 105, 397 P.2d 217 (1964); In re Davis, 28 Ariz. 312, 236 P. 715 (1925); Bowden v. Nugent, 26 Ariz. 485, 226 P. 549 The case of State v. Cousins, supra, however, is clearly distinguishable from the......
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Rothweiler v. Superior Court of Pima County
...guaranteed in the Constitution does not apply to petty offenses. Bowden v. Nugent, 26 Ariz. 485, 491, 226 P. 549 [1924]; In re Davis, 28 Ariz. 312, 236 P. 715 [1925]; State v. Cousins, 97 Ariz. 105, 397 P.2d 217 Brown v. Greer, supra, stated that § 1389 of the 1901 Code, providing for jury ......
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State v. Superior Court of Maricopa County, 7803
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