In re Arch Ins. Co. Ski Pass Ins. Litig.

Decision Date08 September 2021
Docket NumberMDL No. 2955,Master Case No. 4:20-MD-02955-BCW
Citation559 F.Supp.3d 882
Parties IN RE: ARCH INSURANCE COMPANY SKI PASS INSURANCE LITIGATION, All Actions
CourtU.S. District Court — Western District of Missouri
OPINION AND ORDER

BRIAN C. WIMES, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Before the Court is DefendantsMotion to Dismiss the Master Consolidated Class Action Complaint. (Doc. #48). The Court, being duly advised of the premises and having heard argument on the motion on July 7, 2021, grants said motion pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).

This putative class action is a consolidated proceeding transferred to this Court on October 2, 2020, by the United States Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation (JPML). The members of the putative class bought Ikon brand ski passes from Alterra Mountain Company for the 2019-2020 ski season. By purchasing an Ikon pass for between $600 and $1000, depending on the type of pass selected, passholders purchased skiing access to participating resorts for the entire ski season.

In connection with the purchase of Ikon passes, Defendants Arch Insurance Company ("Arch") and Out of Towne, LLC, doing business as Red Sky Travel Insurance, sold optional insurance to cover the unforeseen loss of season ski pass benefits.

The members of the putative plaintiff class ("Plaintiffs") purchased this optional insurance coverage. This Ski Pass Preserver Individual Travel Protection Policy, underwritten by Arch and administered by Red Sky Travel Insurance, is the basis for Plaintiffs’ claims.

In March and April 2020, state and local governments issued orders restricting travel and other activities to protect against the spread of COVID-19. Ski resorts throughout North America thus closed in mid-March 2020, about two-thirds of the way through the ski season. Plaintiffs therefore lost all Ikon pass benefits for at least one-third of the 2019-2020 ski season. Plaintiffs seek recovery for this loss under their respective Ski Pass Preserver insurance policies.

The material terms of the Ski Pass Preserver Individual Travel Protection Policy ("the policy") purchased by Plaintiffs are summarized as follows.

The policy provides coverage pursuant to its terms in the event an insured is required to cancel his or her season pass, or in the event the insured's use of the season pass is interrupted in the manner the policy describes. In the event of "Season Pass Interruption," an insured can recover the "pro-rated season pass cost." Both pass cancelation and pass interruption require the insured to "advise the Travel Supplier and Red Sky Travel Insurance as soon as possible in the event of a claim," and the policy does not cover additional charges incurred because the insured failed to provide notice of a claim under the policy "as soon as reasonably possible."

A Season Pass Interruption under the policy occurs when an insured "cancel[s]" the ski pass during the coverage period because the insured or a family member of the insured dies during the coverage period, or the insured or a family member incurs a sickness or injury with certain requirements as defined in the policy, or "for other Covered Events" that occur during the ski season.

‘Other Covered Events’ means:

a. You being hijacked, quarantined, required to serve on a jury (notice of jury duty must be received after Your Effective Date), served with a court order to appear as a witness in a legal action in which You are not a party (except law enforcement officers)
[....]

(Doc. #30-1 at 4).

Plaintiffs’ claims stem from this policy provision for coverage under circumstances where the insured is "quarantined." Named Plaintiffs Mark Rossi, John Jackson, Earl Parker, Ronald Osborn, and Nolte Mehnert allege claims on behalf of themselves and on behalf of others similarly situated for (I) breach of contract; (II) declaratory judgment; (III) bad faith refusal to pay under California, Colorado, and New Jersey common law; and (IV) bad faith refusal to pay under Colorado statute.

In the instant motion, Defendants seek dismissal of each of Plaintiffs’ claims under both Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim.

A. Defendantsmotion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) is denied.

Because Defendantsmotion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) implicates whether federal jurisdiction exists over Plaintiffs’ claims, the Court considers this aspect of the motion first, though the Court's conclusion under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) is dispositive. Kuhns v. Scottrade, Inc., 868 F.3d 711, 716 (8th Cir. 2017) (constitutional standing as a threshold question). Defendants argue Plaintiffs’ complaint should be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) to the extent Plaintiffs allege their claims by and through individual plaintiffs Mark Rossi and/or Nolte Mehnert.

First, Defendants argue Rossi lacks standing to make a claim under the policy. Second, Defendants argue the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the allegations of the complaint to the extent they are asserted by or through Mehnert because Mehnert did not file an underlying case against Defendants, presented to the JPML in the first instance, for a determination that Mehnert's claims are properly included in this consolidated MDL proceeding.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) provides for dismissal based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), a party may challenge the complaint "on its face or on the factual truthfulness of its averments." Titus v. Sullivan, 4 F.3d 590, 593 (8th Cir. 1993) (citing Osborn v. United States, 918 F.2d 724, 729 n.6 (8th Cir. 1990) ). "In a facial challenge to jurisdiction, all of the factual allegations concerning jurisdiction are presumed to be true and the motion is successful if the plaintiff fails to allege an element necessary for subject matter jurisdiction." Id. In a factual challenge, "no presumptive truthfulness attaches to the plaintiff's allegations, and the existence of disputed material facts will not preclude the trial court from evaluating for itself the merits of jurisdictional clams." Id. at 593 n.1.

1. The motion to dismiss for Rossi's lack of standing is denied.

Defendants argue the complaint should be dismissed to the extent alleged by Rossi because Rossi did not give notice or make a claim for any loss, such that he lacks standing under the policy. In opposition, Plaintiffs argue Defendants’ assertion that Rossi lacks standing conflates whether the Court has jurisdiction over Rossi's claims with the merits of those claims.

A plaintiff who files suit in federal court has the burden to demonstrate the "irreducible constitutional minimum of standing," which has three requirements. Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 102-104, 118 S.Ct. 1003, 140 L.Ed.2d 210 (1998).

First and foremost, there must be alleged (and ultimately proved) ‘an injury in fact’ — a harm suffered by the plaintiff that is concrete and actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical. Second, there must be causation — a fairly traceable connection between the plaintiff's injury and the complained-of conduct of the defendant. And third, there must be redressability — a likelihood that the requested relief will redress the alleged injury.

Id.

The injury in fact requirement is the "first and foremost" part of the standing test, and the standing requirements do not change in the context of class action allegations. Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330, 136 S.Ct. 1540, 1547-48, 194 L.Ed.2d 635 (2016) ; Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 357, 116 S.Ct. 2174, 135 L.Ed.2d 606 (1996) (citing Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rts. Org., 426 U.S. 26, 40 n.20, 96 S.Ct. 1917, 48 L.Ed.2d 450 (1976) ) (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 502, 95 S.Ct. 2197, 45 L.Ed.2d 343 (1975) ("[E]ven named plaintiffs who represent a class must allege and show that they personally have been injured, not that injury has been suffered by other, unidentified members of the class to which they belong and which they purport to represent.")).

Here, Defendants argue there is no subject matter jurisdiction over Rossi's claims as an individual or as a class representative because Rossi cannot demonstrate that he provided notice to Defendants of a claim for loss in the manner required by the policy. Because Defendants challenge the facts underlying the complaint, Plaintiffs are not entitled to a presumption of truthfulness for purposes of this argument under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). Titus, 4 F.3d at 593 n.1.

As referenced above, the policy requires an insured to provide notice and proof of loss "as soon as reasonably possible." (Doc. #30-1). Plaintiffs do not dispute these policy terms or requirements. Rather, Plaintiffs argue the complaint includes sufficient facts through which Rossi pleads the elements of a breach of contract claim, which is adequate to meet the injury in fact requirement for standing purposes.

In Missouri, a claim for breach of contract requires the plaintiff to show: (1) "the existence and terms of a contract; (2) that plaintiff performed or tendered performance pursuant to the contract; (3) breach of the contract by the defendant; and (4) damages suffered by the plaintiff." Keveney v. Mo. Mil. Acad., 304 S.W.3d 98, 104 (Mo. 2010) ; Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78, 58 S.Ct. 817, 82 L.Ed. 1188 (1938) (federal district court sitting in diversity applies the substantive law of the state in which it sits).

Under the general allegations of the complaint, Rossi purchased a Ski Pass Preserver policy. When Rossi was unable to use the ski pass for about one-third of the 2019-2020 ski season, he called Defendants to inquire whether this loss was within the policy coverage. Defendants indicated no coverage was available for losses attributable to the ski resort closures.

Though Defendants argue Rossi cannot demonstrate satisfaction of all conditions precedent to...

To continue reading

Request your trial

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT