In re Asbestos Litigation
| Decision Date | 07 December 2001 |
| Docket Number | Civ. A. No. 2:01-1204.,Civ. A. No. 2:01-1107.,Civ. A. No. 2:01-1100.,Civ. A. No. 2:01-1184.,Civ. A. No. 2:01-1138.,Civ. A. No. 2:01-1202.,Civ. A. No. 2:01-1145.,Civ. A. No. 2:01-1218.,Civ. A. No. 2:01-1169.,Civ. A. No. 2:01-1089.,Civ. A. No. 2:01-1224.,Civ. A. No. 2:01-1069.,Civ. A. No. 2:01-1207.,Civ. A. No. 2:01-1208.,Civ. A. No. 2:01-1058.,Civ. A. No. 2:01-1085.,Civ. A. No. 2:01-1131.,Civ. A. No. 2:01-1066.,Civ. A. No. 2:01-1162.,Civ. A. No. 2:01-1059.,Civ. A. No. 2:01-1144.,Civ. A. No. 2:01-1166.,Civ. A. No. 2:01-1136.,Civ. A. No. 2:01-1070.,Civ. A. No. 2:01-1178.,Civ. A. No. 2:01-1106.,Civ. A. No. 2:01-1142.,Civ. A. No. 2:01-1111.,Civ. A. No. 2:01-1180.,Civ. A. No. 2:01-1125.,Civ. A. No. 2:01-1212.,Civ. A. No. 2:01-1133.,Civ. A. No. 2:01-1087.,Civ. A. No. 2:01-1186.,Civ. A. No. 2:01-1105.,Civ. A. No. 2:01-1088.,Civ. A. No. 2:01-1096.,Civ. A. No. 2:01-1210.,Civ. A. No. 2:01-1112.,Civ. A. No. 2:01-1143.,Civ. A. No. 2:01-1150.,Civ. A. No. 2:01-1056.,Civ. A. No. 2:01-1147.,Civ. A. No. 2:01-1064.,Civ. A. No. 2:01-1175.,Civ. A. No. 2:01-1222.,Civ. A. No. 2:01-1139.,Civ. A. No. 2:01-1102.,Civ. A. No. 2:01-1127.,Civ. A. No. 2:01-1122.,Civ. A. No. 2:01-1126.,Civ. A. No. 2:01-1188.,Civ. A. No. 2:01-1097.,Civ. A. No. 2:01-1190.,Civ. A. No. 2:01-1177.,Civ. A. No. 2:01-1195.,Civ. A. No. 2:01-1130.,Civ. A. No. 2:01-1165.,Civ. A. No. 2:01-1057.,Civ. A. No. 2:01-1176.,Civ. A. No. 2:01-1187.,Civ. A. No. 2:01-1200.,Civ. A. No. 2:01-1149.,Civ. A. No. 2:01-1174.,Civ. A. No. 2:01-1117.,Civ. A. No. 2:01-1215.,Civ. A. No. 2:01-1071.,Civ. A. No. 2:01-1219.,Civ. A. No. 2:01-1073.,Civ. A. No. 2:01-1151.,Civ. A. No. 2:01-1104.,Civ. A. No. 2:01-1157.,Civ. A. No. 2:01-1154.,Civ. A. No. 2:01-1123.,Civ. A. No. 2:01-1172.,Civ. A. No. 2:01-1213.,Civ. A. No. 2:01-1220.,Civ. A. No. 2:01-1067.,Civ. A. No. 2:01-1217.,Civ. A. No. 2:01-1116.,Civ. A. No. 2:01-1163.,Civ. A. No. 2:01-1155.,Civ. A. No. 2:01-1221.,Civ. A. No. 2:01-1164.,Civ. A. No. 2:01-1205.,Civ. A. No. 2:01-1109.,Civ. A. No. 2:01-1209.,Civ. A. No. 2:01-1216.,Civ. A. No. 2:01-1193.,Civ. A. No. 2:01-1132.,Civ. A. No. 2:01-1135.,Civ. A. No. 2:01-1158.,Civ. A. No. 2:01-1128.,Civ. A. No. 2:01-1124.,Civ. A. No. 2:01-1153.,Civ. A. No. 2:01-1189.,Civ. A. No. 2:01-1091.,Civ. A. No. 2:01-1168.,Civ. A. No. 2:01-1119.,Civ. A. No. 2:01-1201.,Civ. A. No. 2:01-1129.,Civ. A. No. 2:01-1137.,Civ. A. No. 2:01-1170.,Civ. A. No. 2:01-1110.,Civ. A. No. 2:01-1055.,Civ. A. No. 2:01-1072.,Civ. A. No. 2:01-1118.,Civ. A. No. 2:01-1198.,Civ. A. No. 2:01-1196.,Civ. A. No. 2:01-1098.,Civ. A. No. 2:01-1094.,Civ. A. No. 2:01-1099.,Civ. A. No. 2:01-1134.,Civ. A. No. 2:01-1171.,Civ. A. No. 2:01-1223.,Civ. A. No. 2:01-1203.,Civ. A. No. 2:01-1113.,Civ. A. No. 2:01-1197.,Civ. A. No. 2:01-1146.,Civ. A. No. 2:01-1095.,Civ. A. No. 2:01-1086.,Civ. A. No. 2:01-1061.,Civ. A. No. 2:01-1092.,Civ. A. No. 2:01-1159.,Civ. A. No. 2:01-1161.,Civ. A. No. 2:01-1191.,Civ. A. No. 2:01-1114.,Civ. A. No. 2:01-1206.,Civ. A. No. 2:01-1173.,Civ. A. No. 2:01-1185.,Civ. A. No. 2:01-1074.,Civ. A. No. 2:01-1194.,Civ. A. No. 2:01-1211.,Civ. A. No. 2:01-1063.,Civ. A. No. 2:01-1121.,Civ. A. No. 2:01-1183.,Civ. A. No. 2:01-1060.,Civ. A. No. 2:01-1101.,Civ. A. No. 2:01-1108.,Civ. A. No. 2:01-1148.,Civ. A. No. 2:01-1103.,Civ. A. No. 2:01-1167.,Civ. A. No. 2:01-1152.,Civ. A. No. 2:01-1068.,Civ. A. No. 2:01-1141.,Civ. A. No. 2:01-1156.,Civ. A. No. 2:01-1065.,Civ. A. No. 2:01-1115.,Civ. A. No. 2:01-1120.,Civ. A. No. 2:01-1062.,Civ. A. No. 2:01-1140.,Civ. A. No. 2:01-1093.,Civ. A. No. 2:01-1182.,Civ. A. No. 2:01-1192.,Civ. A. No. 2:01-1199.,Civ. A. No. 2:01-1090.,Civ. A. No. 2:01-1160.,Civ. A. No. 2:01-1214.,Civ. A. No. 2:01-1181.,Civ. A. No. 2:01-1179. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of West Virginia |
| Parties | In re ASBESTOS LITIGATION. |
Ronald L. Motley, Esquire, Ness, Motley, Loadholt, Richardson & Poole, P.A., Mt. Pleasant, SC, Scott S. Segal, Esquire, Segal Law Firm, J. David Cecil, Esquire, James Humphreys & Associates, L.C., Charleston, WV, for Plaintiffs.
J. Tyler Dinsmore, Esquire, Flaherty, Sensabaugh & Bonasso, Charleston, WV, Steven R. Williams, Esquire, McGuire Woods, LLP, Richmond, VA, David Bernick, Esquire, Kirkland & Ellis, Chicago, IL, John R. McGhee, Jr., Esquire, Kay, Casto & Chaney, Charleston, WV, for Removing Defendants.
Pending are the motions of Plaintiffs in these civil actions 1) to remand them to the Circuit Court of Kanawha County, West Virginia, 2) to abstain from hearing these claims, or 3) to enjoin their transfer to the District Court for the District of Delaware (Delaware court). For reasons discussed below, the Court GRANTS the motion for remand. The remaining motions are DENIED as moot.
On November 20, 2001 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1452(a) and Bankruptcy Rule 9027(a), DaimlerChrysler Corporation, Ford Motor Company, and General Motors Corporation (the Removing Defendants or Automakers) removed civil actions numbered -1055 to -1074. The same day they moved the Delaware court to transfer to that court "all claims and causes of action against the Automobile Manufacturers [Automakers] in state or federal court alleging injuries due to friction products, including brakes and other automotive parts [,]" pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(5). On November 26, 2001 the remaining civil actions numbered -1085 to 1224 were removed. The Automakers contend the 160 actions removed here are related to the bankruptcy of Federal-Mogul Global, Inc. (Federal-Mogul).1
Plaintiffs immediately moved for an emergency hearing on motions to remand, abstain, or enjoin transfer of the cases. Following an expedited briefing schedule, the Court heard extensive argument on December 4, 2001. The parties have supplemented their initial briefing. These matters are now ripe for disposition.
General principles of removal and remand apply to bankruptcy, as well as non-bankruptcy, actions. See Things Remembered, Inc. v. Petrarca, 516 U.S. 124, 128, 116 S.Ct. 494, 133 L.Ed.2d 461 (1995). Under the general removal statute, defendants may remove any case of which the district courts have original jurisdiction.2 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). Removal statutes must be construed strictly against removal. See Mulcahey v. Columbia Organic Chem. Co., Inc., 29 F.3d 148, 151 (4th Cir.1994). The party seeking to remove a case to federal court has the burden of establishing federal jurisdiction. See id. If federal jurisdiction is doubtful, a remand is necessary. See id.
The Automakers removed the state actions pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1452(a), which provides, "A party may remove any claim or cause of action in any civil action ... to the district court for the district where such civil action is pending, if such district court has jurisdiction of such claim or cause of action under section 1334 of this title." 28 U.S.C. § 1452(a). Under Section 1334, district courts have "original but not exclusive jurisdiction of all civil proceedings arising under title 11, or arising in or related to a case under title 11." 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b)(emphasis added). All parties agree, if this Court has jurisdiction over these proceedings, it must be based on their relatedness to the Federal-Mogul bankruptcy.
Our Court of Appeals has adopted the Pacor test for determining the existence of such related-to jurisdiction:
The usual articulation of the test for determining whether a civil proceeding is related to bankruptcy is whether the outcome of that proceeding could conceivably have any effect on the estate being administered in bankruptcy. Thus, the proceeding need not necessarily be against the debtor or against the debtor's property. An action is related to bankruptcy if the outcome could alter the debtor's rights, liabilities, options or freedom of action (either positively or negatively) and which in any way impacts upon the handling and administration of the bankruptcy estate.
A.H. Robins Co. v. Piccinin, 788 F.2d 994, 1002 n. 11 (4th Cir.1986)(quoting Pacor v. Higgins, 743 F.2d 984, 994 (3d Cir.1984)); see also Celotex Corp. v. Edwards, 514 U.S. 300, 308 n. 6, 115 S.Ct. 1493, 131 L.Ed.2d 403 ().
Discussing the Pacor test, the Supreme Court said:
We agree with the views expressed by the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in [Pacor] that "Congress intended to grant comprehensive jurisdiction to the bankruptcy courts so that they might deal efficiently and expeditiously with all matters connected with the bankruptcy estate and that the `related to' language of § 1334(b) must be read to give district courts (and bankruptcy courts under § 157(a)) jurisdiction over more than simple proceedings involving the property of the debtor or the estate." We also agree with that court's observation that a bankruptcy court's "related to" jurisdiction cannot be limitless.
Celotex, 514 U.S. at 308, 115 S.Ct. 1493 (citations omitted)(emphasis added).
Pacor's limiting language, approved by the Supreme Court, clarified that the related-to jurisdictional test is broad, but
[o]n the other hand, the mere fact that there may be common issues of fact between a civil proceeding and a controversy involving the bankruptcy estate does not bring the matter within the scope of Section 1471(b).3 Judicial economy itself does not justify federal jurisdiction. See generally Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1, 15, 96 S.Ct. 2413, 49 L.Ed.2d 276 (1976). "Jurisdiction over nonbankruptcy controversies with third parties who are otherwise strangers to the civil proceeding and to the parent bankruptcy does not exist." In re Haug, 19 B.R. 223, 224-25 (Bankr.D.Ore.1...
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