IN RE BALLOT TITLE 1999-2000 NO. 219

Decision Date24 April 2000
Citation999 P.2d 819
PartiesIN THE MATTER OF THE TITLE, BALLOT TITLE AND SUBMISSION CLAUSE, AND SUMMARY FOR 1999-2000 NO. 219, Bennett S. Aisenberg, Petitioner, v. Douglas Campbell and Mark Dorn, Respondents, and William Hobbs, Alan J. Gilbert, and Charles W. Pike, Title Board.
CourtColorado Supreme Court

Susan E. Burch, Denver, Colorado, Attorney for Petitioner.

Douglas Campbell, Pro Se, Arvada, Colorado; Ken Salazar, Attorney General, Barbara McDonnell, Chief Deputy Attorney General, Alan J. Gilbert, Solicitor General, Maurice G. Knaizer, Deputy Attorney General, State Services Section Denver, Colorado, Attorneys for Title Board.

Justice RICE delivered the Opinion of the Court.

In this original proceeding brought pursuant to section 1-40-107(2), 1 C.R.S. (1999), Petitioner, Bennett S. Aisenberg, seeks review of the Initiative Title Setting Board's (Title Board or Board) action denying Petitioner's December 22, 1999 motion for rehearing on the ground that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the motion. We affirm the action of the Title Board denying Petitioner's motion for rehearing based on lack of jurisdiction.

I. Facts and Procedural History

On November 17, 1999, Douglas Campbell and Mark Dorn, Proponents of Initiative #219,1 (Proponents) submitted a proposed initiative to the Title Board for the purpose of setting a title, ballot title and submission clause, and summary (titles). On December 1, 1999, the Board fixed the titles. On December 8, 1999, Petitioner filed a motion for rehearing, alleging ten deficiencies that all related to the constitutional requirement that the titles set by the Board clearly and correctly express the subject of the Initiative. Stated broadly, Petitioner alleged that "the [titles] do not correctly and fairly express the true intent and meaning of the proposed constitutional amendment nor do they clearly express the subject of the proposal" and that "the [titles] as fixed and determined are likely to cause confusion and are misleading as to the content."

On December 15, 1999, the Board granted Petitioner's motion for rehearing and reset the titles, addressing Petitioner's concerns.2

On December 22, 1999, Petitioner filed a second motion for rehearing, alleging that the titles contained more than the subject.than one subject. Petitioner stated that the proposal repeals article VI, section 11 of the Colorado Constitution, which governs the qualifications for district court judges. Section 13 of article VI requires that district attorneys, who are members of the executive branch, possess the same qualifications as district judges. Thus, because the Initiative changes the qualifications for both district judges and district attorneys, Petitioner contends that the titles contain a second subject beyond the qualifications of judicial officers. Petitioner did not raise this complaint in his first motion for rehearing.3

On January 5, 2000, the Board denied Petitioner's motion for rehearing, stating that it lacked jurisdiction to address the motion. On January 10, 2000, Petitioner filed a petition for review with the court, asking us to reverse the action of the Board in denying his motion for rehearing.

II. Jurisdiction of Title Board

Section 1-40-107(1), 1 C.R.S. (1999), which governs motions for rehearings, states:

Any person presenting an initiative petition or any registered elector who is not satisfied with the titles, submission clause, and summary provided by the title board and who claims that they are unfair or that they do not fairly express the true meaning and intent of the proposed ... constitutional amendment may file a motion for a rehearing with the secretary of state within seven days after the titles and summary are set. The motion for rehearing shall be heard at the next regularly scheduled meeting.

A court's primary task in interpreting a statute is to give effect to the legislative purpose underlying its enactment. See Griffin v. S.W. Devanney & Co., 775 P.2d 555, 559 (Colo.1989)

. Where the statutory language is clear and unambiguous on its face, there is no need to apply rules of statutory construction because it may be presumed that the legislature meant what it clearly said. See id. at 559; Askew v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office, 927 P.2d 1333, 1337 (Colo.1996). However, where a statute is ambiguous or capable of more than one meaning, we construe the statute in light of the General Assembly's objective, employing the presumption that the legislature intended a consistent and sensible effect. See Matter of Title, Ballot Title and Submission Clause, and Summary for 1997-98 # 62, 961 P.2d 1077, 1079 (Colo.1998).

The statutory language at issue here is ambiguous regarding whether it permits a registered elector to file more than one motion for a rehearing in a circumstance where the Board has set titles at an initial hearing, granted a rehearing, and reset titles. The language "may file a motion for a rehearing" appears to indicate that only one motion may be filed. On the other hand, however, language that such motion must be filed "within seven days after the titles and summary are set" creates an ambiguity as to whether, in a situation where the titles are reset, a registered elector may file a second motion for rehearing within seven days of the date that the titles were reset. In other words, the statute is ambiguous whether a registered elector may file one motion for rehearing in total, or may file one motion for rehearing for each title-setting action by the Board. Accordingly, we turn to the legislative intent to determine the meaning of the statute.

The Colorado Constitution reserves to the people the power to propose and enact amendments to the constitution. See Colo. Const. art. V, §§ 1(1) and (2). Article 40 of the Colorado Revised Statutes, spanning sections 1-40-101 to -134, 1 C.R.S. (1999), governs the initiative process in Colorado. The legislative intent of article 40 is "to properly safeguard, protect, and preserve inviolate ... these modern instrumentalities of democratic government." § 1-40-101. In short, the initiative statutes strive "primarily to make the initiative process fair and impartial." Montero v. Meyer, 13 F.3d 1444, 1449 (10th Cir. 1994). To that end, the statute endeavors to balance the rights of citizens to present petitions to the voters of Colorado, see id. at 1448, with the rights of the voters to be presented with clear, single-subject initiatives that are not misleading. See In re Proposed Initiative on Fair Treatment of Injured Workers, 873 P.2d 718, 719 (Colo. 1994)

; see also In re Title, Ballot Title and Submission Clause, and Summary for 1999-2000 # 25, 974 P.2d 458, 462-65 (Colo.1999); In re # 62, 961 P.2d at 1082.

Toward these competing goals, the initiative scheme provides a method by which registered electors may challenge within a limited timeframe the Title Board's setting of titles for a proposed initiative. In order to provide proponents of initiatives with sufficient time for the collection of signatures and for public debate, stringent time restraints are placed on the proponents and opponents of initiatives, as well as on the Title Board. For example, motions for rehearing must be filed within seven days after the titles and summary are set. See § 1-40-107(1). The Board must consider any motions for rehearing at its next scheduled meeting. See id. If a motion is filed to oppose titles set at the Board's last meeting in May, the motion must be heard within 48 hours of filing. See id. If a motion is overruled, an objector has five days in which to file for review with the supreme court. See § 1-30-107(2). The supreme court is directed to "dispose[ ] of [the matter] promptly." See id.

The above examples illustrate that the general assembly has placed great emphasis on expediting the review process governing initiatives. To permit an objector to file unlimited motions for rehearing regarding titles fixed by the Board would frustrate this purpose and permit objectors to indefinitely stall initiatives in the early stages of the process. This, in turn, would frustrate the general purpose of the initiative process to protect the "right in the people of Colorado to bring initiatives before the Colorado electorate." Montero, 13 F.3d at 1449.

Accordingly, we construe section 1-40-107 to permit an objector to bring only one motion for rehearing to challenge titles set by the Board. This construction strikes a balance between the competing rights of both the proponents and opponents of an initiative, and furthers the fundamental purpose of the initiative process to permit state citizens to present "fair and impartial" initiatives to the voters of Colorado.

We note that we do not address the situation in which an objector files a second motion for rehearing that raises objections relating to the reset titles. In this case, Petitioner's second motion did not raise any complaints relating to the changes made in the titles; rather, his objections related to issues that were present in the first titles set by the Board on December 1, 1999. Petitioner could have raised those objections in his first motion for rehearing. Under these facts, we find that the proper balance is met by prohibiting multiple motions that challenge issues which could have been raised in the first motion for rehearing.

III. Conclusion

Accordingly, we affirm the action by the Title Board denying Petitioner's second motion for rehearing based on a lack of jurisdiction.

APPENDIX

Proposed Initiative on "1999-2000—# 219"4

The title as designated and fixed by the Board is as follows:

AN AMENDMENT TO THE COLORADO CONSTITUTION CONCERNING JUDICIAL PERSONNEL, AND, IN CONNECTION THEREWITH, DEFINING "JUDGES" TO INCLUDE JUSTICES AND MAGISTRATES AND TO EXCLUDE JUDGES AND MAGISTRATES OF THE COUNTY COURT OF THE CITY AND COUNTY OF DENVER; LIMITING FUTURE TERMS OF OFFICE FOR STATE COURT JUDGES; PROVIDING THAT THE GOVERNOR APPOINT SUCH ...

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